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Abstract 
This research project focused on the treatment of safety risks in railways. Existing 
methodologies for assessment and management of the safety risk on railways are mostly 
empirical and have been developed out of a need to satisfy the regulatory requirements 
and in response to a number of major accidents. Almost all of these processes and 
methodologies have been developed in support of approvals of specific products or very 
simple systems and do not add up to a holistic coherent methodology suited for analysis 
of modern, complex systems, involving many vastly different constituents (software, 
hardware, people, products developed in different parts of the world, etc.).  The 
complexities of modern railway projects necessitate a new approach to risk analysis and 
management. 
At the outset, the focus of the research was on the organisation of the family of existing 
system analysis methodologies into a coherent, heterogeneous methodology. An 
extensive review of existing methodologies and processes was undertaken and is 
summarised in this thesis. Relationships between different methodologies and their 
properties were investigated seeking to define the rules for embedding these into a 
hierarchical nest and relating their emergent properties.   
Four projects were utilised as case studies for the evaluation of existing methodologies 
and processes and initial development.  
This thesis describes the methodology adopted in support of development of the System 
Safety Case and the structure of the document. 
Based on that experience and knowledge a set of high level requirements was identified 
for an integrated, holistic system safety analysis and management process. A framework 
consisting of existing and novel methodologies and processes was developed and 
trialled on a real life project. During the trial several gaps in the process were identified 
and adequate new methodologies or processes defined and implemented to complete the 
framework.  
The trial was very successful and the new framework, referred to as the Engineering 
Safety Case Management Process is implemented across the London Underground 
Upgrades Directory.  
 
 
Key words: Risk modelling, Systems Approach, Holistic, Safety Case, Systems 
Assurance, Change Safety Analysis, System Safety,  System Integration. 
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The whole is more than the sum of its parts. The part is more than a 
fraction of the whole – Aristotle 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem area 
In engineering problems, detailed analyses of risk and its attributes can lead to 
significant benefits in safety performance and savings in time and money (e.g. analyses 
of essentially chaotic behaviour of winds lead to notable improvements in designs for 
buildings and bridges, not to mention benefits in weather forecasting, a classic example 
of a chaotic system).  
Most of the existing processes and guidelines state what needs to be a result of the 
safety risk analysis, broadly outlining the expectations from each of the identified risks  
and depicted activities (listed later).  Alternative methodologies exist, for some of the 
activities but not for all, each one invented and used in the context of different aspects 
of systems structure, behaviour and/or its emerging properties. 
However, none of these amount to an integrated framework for the systems safety risk 
analysis and management.   
For example, any sound analysis, including risk analysis, should be based on series of 
observations and measurements. The first stage of this activity, before the hazard 
identification can be carried out, should be to define a system to be analysed, including 
definition of the scope and context of the analysis and development of some form of 
system description. This preparation should also support identification of the experience 
and expertise of the participants of the hazard identification. Yet none of the guidelines 
provide any support in this area.  
Furthermore, none of the processes depicted in the available literature, provide any 
guidance in relation to the monitoring of change of the system during its lifecycle and 
control of the impact of that change on the safety performance of the system.  
These are just some of the shortcomings of existing processes and guidelines.  
The scope of the research and this thesis includes engineering safety analysis and 
management applicable to any industry, but with the trial implementation being specific 
to the railway industry. The methodology aims to support systems safety analysis and 
identification of major contributors to safety risks and benefits, whilst safety and 
business decision making is supported through evaluation of different application 
solutions and mitigation measures. The methodology is supporting the holistic 
evaluation of safety risk and alternative solutions to a problem.  Later in the thesis, this 
methodology is referred to as Engineering Safety and Assurance Process (ESAP). 
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1.2 Objectives and Aim of the Research 
Society generally expects a level of safety from products and services and the current 
legislation (EU as well as UK) supports this view. 
History demonstrates that safety failures can have significant societal costs, life or limb, 
monetary, environmental etc. Again, history shows that most accidents are avoidable. 
Due to the above and other primary legislation we all have a ‘Duty of Care’ to the 
following groups: 
1 Staff and Colleagues, 
2 Passengers, 
3 Members of the Public, and 
4 The environment. 
The complexity of modern projects and products demands the Systems approach to the 
analysis of Safety as an emerging property of the system, for a simple reason that with 
increased complexity of the systems produced by human kind our ability to comprehend 
the totality of the system without a structured methodical process is decreasing.   
The objective of the research was to develop an innovative integrated methodology in 
support of safety risk assessment and management for engineering problems, in 
particular in support of introduction of large scale, novel and complex railway systems. 
However the developed process is generic and can be used in any industry or 
undertaking. The aim of the research was to contribute to decision-making and 
management practices involving safety risk. The research was carried out in three   
stages: 
1. Research of existing industry practices and literature; 
2. Application, testing and improvement of a selection of the existing processes on 4 
real life projects. Development of new methodologies for risk assessment as part 
of this work; 
3. Further development of an integrated innovative methodology, testing and 
implementation on a real life project.   
Four projects were utilised as case studies for evaluation of existing methodologies and 
processes and initial development.  
Once an outline framework had been created, utilising the existing methodologies on 
real life projects, the research focused on development of methodologies in support of 
the activities not catered for, or not sufficiently supported, by existing methodologies 
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and integrating these new methodologies with existing ones into a new process. 
Three high level principles of analysis and management of safety risks must be 
respected and supported by adequate processes, because only by adhering to these 
principles one will be able to: 
1 Ensure completeness of analysis; 
2 Build a defendable argument in support of the final results (not forgetting that the 
choice based on the analysis may directly influence decisions potentially affecting 
human lives and costing millions). 
These principles are: 
1 Systematic Approach to the problem solving; 
2 Holistic approach to the analysis; 
3 Necessity of extensive use of Domain Specific Expertise. 
After an initial literature research and following from experience of working on a 
number of railways related safety case development projects, a number of major steps 
have been identified as generic safety risk analysis and management process activities, 
as listed later. Processes and tools in support of missing, or insufficiently developed, 
stages were invented or further developed, and following that, an integrated process 
inclusive of all these steps was developed.  
In summary, the result of the research project is a decision support methodology, which 
is already in use in support of making and managing decisions involving system safety 
risk and development of the safety cases on one of the most complex railway projects in 
this country, the upgrade of London Underground’s Victoria Line (Lucic and Short, 
2007) and Subsurface Lines (Metropolitan, District, Circle and Hammersmith & City 
and East London).   
1.3 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is structured in 8 chapters as outlined by use of Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) in Figure 1-1 below.  This research made significant use of the existing 
methodologies and processes, combining them with novel methodologies and processes 
(developed as part of this research) into a new general framework for safety risk 
analysis and management. GSN elements corresponding to novel processes and/or 
methodologies are indicated by red line outline. Later on, in the introduction to each 
chapter, discussion of the novel use of existing processes and methods has been 
indicated by blue and application of existing methods or processes within the new 
framework has been indicated by green.  
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Figure 1-1: Overall Structure of the thesis 
A more detailed outline of the logical argument of this thesis is provided within 
introduction for each of chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7 using Goal Structuring Notation.  
The First chapter outlines the aim, objectives and scope of the research and thesis and 
presents the structure of the thesis. It also presents the more important definitions used 
later in the thesis. 
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The Second chapter portrays the history of the problem area and the background to the 
research and defines the problem area and research aims and objective.  
The Third chapter presents the findings of the literature research and provides an 
overview of basic processes and tools for analysis, treatment and modelling of safety 
risk in engineering processes. 
The Fourth chapter outlines the initial applied research areas and presents the findings 
of the early development. Four real life projects have been used as a vehicle for initial 
development and testing.   
The Fifth chapter presents a critique of existing tools for analysis and management of 
safety risks and, using experience gained on the real life projects as outlined in the 
fourth chapter, sets out the agenda for the research. 
The Sixth chapter develops the theoretical background of the basic concepts further and 
lays out a new system based framework for safety risk analysis and management. 
The Seventh chapter presents the challenges, results and observations of application of 
the new framework on two real life projects.  
The Eighth chapter concludes the findings of the research and outlines the 
requirements and direction of further research. 
1.4 Definitions 
The following are definitions of terms used throughout the thesis.  
1. A system is an interconnection, organisation of objects that is embedded in a 
given environment (Karcanias, 2003). The System is the sum total of all 
constituent parts working together within a given environment to achieve a given 
purpose within a given time period. The totality of the system is a matter of 
perspective. It is not a fixed term, but can be defined arbitrarily; 
2. System conceptualisation is a process of the development of the internal 
(constituent parts and their connections) and external (environment) system 
specification. A conceptual model should reflect knowledge about the application 
domain rather than about the implementation of the system (Milloti, 2004); 
3. A Hazard is defined as an object, act or condition likely to lead to an accident;  
4. An Accident is an unplanned, unintended event entailing loss; 
5. A Consequence is the outcome of a hazard;  
6. A Loss is defined as an undesirable, detrimental effect of an accident;  
7. An opposite of the hazard is an Opportunity. This is an object, act or condition 
likely to lead to a gain; 
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8. A Gain is a desirable effect of the opportunity; 
9. A Risk is a forecast for a future accident of a certain severity. An opposite of risk 
is reward; 
10. A Risk Profile is a multi dimensional presentation of forecasts for future 
accidents, of certain severities, for a system. Additional dimensions introduced, 
may be time, space or some other relevant variable parameters. 
1.5 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
Acronym Definition 
AC Alternating Current 
ACC Check in the MSCC docs 
AGC Standard for international Railway corridors 
AGTC Standard for international Railway corridors 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ALF Algorithm File 
ATO Automatic Train Operation 
ATP Automatic Train Protection 
AWS Automatic Warning System  
BBN Bayesian Belief Network 
BS British Standards 
BT Bombardier Transportation 
BTLUP Bombardier Transportation London Underground Projects 
CCS Control Command and Signalling  
CCTV Closed Circuit Television 
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
CIS Customer Information Systems 
CM Coded Manual (mode of operation of the new train) 
CRMS Cable Route Management System 
CSA Change Safety Analysis 
CSDE Correct Side Door Enable 
CSP Current Safety Performance 
CSPSSL Current Safety Performance SubSurface Lines 
CSPVL Current Safety Performance of Victoria Line 
CSPVL Current Safety Performance Victoria Line 
DC Direct Current 
DRACAS Defect Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System 
DTG-R Distance To Go – Radio (signalling system) 
ECB Engineering Change Board 
ECR Engineering Change Request 
EDF Energy Provider company 
EEPL EDF Energy Powerlink Limited 
ELLCCR Extra Low Loss Conductor Rail 
EMC ElectroMagnetic Compatibility 
EMI ElectroMagnetic Interference 
EN European Norm 
ERTMS European Railway Train Management System  
ESAC Engineering Safety and Assurance Case 
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Acronym Definition 
ESAP Engineering Safety and Assurance Process 
ESM Engineering safety Management 
ETCS European Train Control System 
EU European Union 
FET Fault-Event Tree  
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FRACAS Failure Recording, Analysis and Corrective Action System 
FSP Final Safety Performance 
FSPVL Final Safety Performance Victoria Line 
FT Fault Tree 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
FV Fussel-Vesely (importance value) 
GLEE General Loss Estimation Engine 
GPAD General Parametric Data Set 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HAZID HaZard IDentificaiton 
HAZOP HAZard and OPerability (study) 
HF Human Factors 
HMI Human Machine Interfaces 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
ICSA Initial Change Safety Analysis 
ICSS Initial Change Safety Analysis 
IEEE Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
IET Institution of Engineering and Technology 
IHRG Interdisciplinary Hazard review Group 
INCA Incident Capture and Analysis database 
INCOSE 'International Council on Systems Engineering 
ISA Independent Safety Assessor 
ISAE Integrated Safety Assurance Environment 
ISP Interim Safety Performance 
ISPVL Interim Safety Performance Victoria Line 
IT Information Technology  
LU London Underground 
LUL London Underground Limited 
LVAC Low Voltage AC 
MA Manned Automatic (mode of operation of the new train) 
MOP Member of Public 
MR Metronet 
MRBCV Metronet Rail Bakerloo, Central and Victoria Line 
MSCIP Manchester South Capacity Improvement Project 
NDUP Neasden Depot Upgrade Project 
OIDB Objects and Interfaces DataBase 
OPO TT  CCTV One Person Operation Track to Train 
PAD Parametric Data Set 
PD Position Detector 
PDD Project Definition Document 
PFI Private Finance Initiative 
PHA Preliminary Hazard Identification 
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Acronym Definition 
PKP Polish railway authorities 
PM Protected Manual (mode of operation of the new train) 
PMF Project Management Framework 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PSR Permanent Speed Restriction 
PTI Passenger Train Interface 
QRA Quantified Risk Assessment 
RAM Reliability, Availability and Maintainability 
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
RBD Reliability Block Diagrams 
RM Route Manual (mode of operation of the new train) 
RSF Right Side Failure 
RSSB Railway Safety and Standards Board 
SAA Station Area Accident 
SCC Service Control Centre 
SCID System Context and Interface Diagrams 
SDO Selective Door Opening Closed Circuit Television 
SER Signalling Equipment Room 
SHL System Hazard Log 
SHWW Sandbach/Wilmslow (geographical area of railway) 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SIM Check in the MSCC docs 
SM Slow Manual (mode of operation of the new train) 
SSC System Safety Case 
SSL Sub-Surface Lines 
SSR Sub Surface Railway 
SUP Subsurface Lines Upgrade Programme 
TEN Train European Network 
THR Tolerable Hazard Rate 
TPWS Train Protection and Warning System 
TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability 
TSR Temporary Speed Restriction 
UNISIG (European) Union Industry OF Signaling 
VAF Value of Avoiding a Ffatality 
VL Victoria Line 
VLU Victoria Line Upgrade 
VLUP Victoria Line Upgrade Programme  
VPF Value Preventing Fatality 
WCMU West Coast Management Unit 
WRI Wheel Rail Interface 
WRSL Westinghouse Rail Systems Limited  
WSF Wrong Side Failure 
Table 1-1: Acronyms and Abbreviations 
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During one of many German air raids on Moscow in WW II, a 
distinguished Soviet professor of statistics showed up in his local air-raid 
shelter. He had never appeared there before. “There are seven million 
people in Moscow,” he used to say. “Why should I expect them to hit me?”  
His friends were astonished to see him and asked what had happened to 
change his mind. “Look,” he explained, “there are seven million people in 
Moscow and one elephant. Last night they got the elephant.” 
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CHAPTER 2:  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1 Chapter Introduction  
Findings of the research of the history of the perception and understanding of 
uncertainty and risk and investigation of the existing theoretical and analytical 
framework in relation to treatment of safety in engineering are presented in this chapter.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Structure of Chapter 2 
2.2 History and Background (Waldrop, 1992), (Bernstein, 1996) 
Everyday experience is rich with uncertainties and (most of the time unconscious) risk 
analysis. The treatment of risks that we are performing everyday familiarises us with the 
subject. Impulses of nature, inaccuracy of our senses and tools, new technologies and 
foolishness of human beings all complement to the level of uncertainty.  Early in life we 
learn to rely on a series of intuitive models of common situations, outcomes of which 
depend on unknown factors.   
This ability of our mind for complex statistical analysis is often sufficient, but still 
situations where one could benefit from more sophisticated treatment of issues are 
many. 
Unfortunately, ignorance about the scientific advances in this field, as well as far too 
much confidence into intuition prevents one from gaining advantage by using powerful 
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and, more often than not, simple sets of tools provided by probability, statistics and the 
sciences of dynamical systems and stochastic processes.  
The word “RISK” evolves from “RISKARE”, the Latin for “TO DARE”.   Amusingly, 
if we follow this logic, risk is a choice we make, not a fate.   
To explain the creation of universe, Greek mythology used a game of dice. Zeus, 
Poseidon and Hades rolled the dice for the universe.  Zeus won the heavens, Poseidon 
the seas and Hades ended up with hell, becoming master of underworld.  
Regardless of the fact that risk taking has been implanted in our existence from the 
beginning, development of the science of risk and of statistics has been somehow 
delayed when compared with other sciences. Astronomy, medicine, philosophy, physics 
and mathematics all have foundations in great ancient cultures of Egyptian, Persian, 
Greek, Roman and Chinese civilisations. On the other hand, the first serious study of 
risk happened during the Renaissance (Bernstein, 1996).  
There are two main reasons for this long delay (Sterman, 2000).  
Firstly, for too long the belief was that the future is shaped by the forces of gods and 
that human beings are not actively involved in shaping nature and consequently the 
future. Until the Renaissance, the future was regarded as an already written book. Fate 
was determined by the sins of the past and there was nothing human beings could do to 
change it.  People’s perception of the future was passive.  
Depending on different religions and cultures, for people of ancient times, the future 
was either a matter of luck or the result of closeness of their sins to their god’s wish.  
For thousands of years people’s lives were very static and the most important variable 
influencing their lives was the weather and other unforeseen natural elements. 
The second reason is a fact that the purpose of the numbering system at the time was to 
satisfy only the needs for recording of measurements but not for the calculations. Then 
Hindus developed the numbering system we use today, in about 500ad.  Arabs adopted 
this number system and spread it across the western civilisation through Spain. The 
centrepiece of the Hindu-Arabic system was the invention of zero. This supported rapid 
development of calculus and algebra. 
Modern mathematics is based on the work of Aristotle and the philosophers who 
preceded him. Their work has culminated in several “Laws of Thought”, sets of theories 
supporting concise and systematic approach to logic and later mathematics. One of the 
 Page 22  
 
most important laws was the “Law of Excluded Middle”. The law stated that every 
proposition must be either True or False.  Every statement is True or False, 1or 0.  
Nevertheless, the ancient Greeks gave a thought to probability theory. Socrates defines a 
meaning of Greek word “Eikos” (Εικοζ) as “likeness to truth”, and reveals an important 
phenomenon, “likeness to truth is not the same thing as the truth”. Plato in his work 
indicated that there was a third region, between True and False, a space where nothing 
was completely True or False, but that was as far as the ancient Greeks went.  
Only when the civilisation reached a phase of progress that required from humans to 
take charge of their own existence in order to secure further advance and control ever 
increasing pace of change, the need for prediction of future became necessity. During 
the renaissance the pace of social, cultural and environmental change increased 
dramatically.  People could not afford to be at mercy of fate any more, they could no 
longer remain passive in the face of unknown future.  
The intensifying pace of change and competition all around, forced transformation of 
mysticism into science and logic and the human race made the first attempt to liberate 
itself from self-imposed limitations. 
The mathematical foundation of the concept of risk, the theory of probability, is a result 
of joint efforts of two great minds of the time, Blaise Pascal, a French mathematician 
and Pierre de Fermat a lawyer and mathematician, who published their work in 1654. At 
about the same time, Antoine Arnauld, a theologian, was first to state that “Fear of harm 
ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of the harm, but also to the 
probability of the event”, or in other word, only the combination of likelihood of 
outcome and value of outcome should influence a decision.  
Methods of statistical sampling and the Law of Large Numbers were invented in 1703 
by Jacob Bernoulli. Abraham de Moivre discovered the concept and structure of normal 
distribution in1730. Around the same time Daniel Bernoulli defined the systematic 
process by which people make choices and decisions. Thomas Bayes discovered a way 
to make better-informed decisions by mathematically blending new information into old 
information, about 1750.  In 1875, Francis Galton, discovered regression to the mean 
and Harry Markowitz demonstrated mathematically why diversification is desirable in 
1952.  
Everyone knows that “uncertainty” affects a project manager about to define the price 
for the contract, an engineer about to sign replacement approval for piece of equipment 
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or a trespasser taking that first dangerous step. The concept of hazard comes about due 
to our recognition of future uncertainty, our inability to know what the future will bring 
in response to a given action today.   
Uncertainty implies that a given action, or non-action, has more than one possible 
outcome. 
‘Uncertainty’ in everyday use denotes unknown factors that influence outcomes of 
observed developments.  To analyse these more efficiently, one needs to consider 
several fundamentally different types of uncertainty (Waldrop, 1992), (Checkland, 
1984), (Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1991). 
The first category can be described in an Objective Probability Framework. This is 
suitable, for example in a Quality Control Methods context, where we monitor sample 
and ensure that required standards are met. We also frequently study the likely impact 
of changes in systems to see how we might improve efficiency or reduce costs.  
In the second category we will include all the uncertainties that arise at a fundamental 
level, that is the uncertainties that arise because parameters of the problem are non-
computable or are fundamentally non-deterministic. These kinds of problems are found 
most notably in the theory of computation and in quantum mechanics
1
 respectively.  
Some problems of uncertainty may not be easily classified in either of the two 
categories, possessing the elements from each.  We are able to predict, with significant 
accuracy safe operating limits for railway system. Here we deal with uncertainties of the 
first kind. Still, acts of terrorism, human error or foolishness, unpredictable nature of 
some mechanical failures all introduce uncertainties of second category to our analysis. 
The third type of uncertainties are introduced as a consequence of our ignorance of 
background theory, either conscientiously because it is impractical or unjustifiably 
costly to include these considerations into calculations, or as a result of unawareness of 
all parameters or laws governing the outcome. In these situations one chooses to treat 
the problem as one of the first two types. 
The third kind of uncertainty deals with potential hazards and exploring the unknown. It 
is often a subjective rather than objective exercise and our perceptions are an integral 
part of our assessment. The second type we will use to classify all the problems where 
uncertainty occurs as a result of essential difficulty in calculating results of a 
                                                 
1 These two types of problems can be argued to be formulations of the latter (quantum mechanical) on 
different levels of complexity, i.e. the fact that non-computable problems exist may well be a direct 
consequence of the existence of non-deterministic ones. This is since quantum mechanics is intended to 
be description of nature at the most fundamental level. 
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deterministic process. This includes chaotic systems (ones in which the outcome is 
deterministically dependent on initial conditions, but is also extremely sensitive to their 
change, making it practically impossible to predict it) and problems in which computing 
a solution is probably unfeasible.   
Problems of this class can be often met in a number of engineering fields, included are 
certain behaviours of a realistic pendulum, the rate at which a fluid is dripping from a 
tap or a problem of calculating most efficient ways of traversing complex networks as a 
model of routes taken by electric shocks and so on. 
In technical applications uncertainty can be categorised in three classes (Fenton and 
Hill, 1993): 
1. Incompleteness of relevant knowledge; 
2. Uncertainty of knowledge; 
3. Imprecision of knowledge. 
In most situations the relevant knowledge is incomplete. In these cases one is faced with 
the problem of deciding which one of potentially many different solutions is the true 
one. 
More often than not we are not sure that information we have is the absolute truth.  
Uncertainty of data relates to observations of nature or society. The observer is 
uncertain about what has actually been observed or about the measurements taken.  
Measurement and sampling are two sources of data uncertainty. There is always some 
uncertainty in any measurement, because of limited precision of the measuring device. 
This can usually be determined from the characteristics of the device and by repeated 
sampling and statistical characterisation.  
Imprecision of knowledge or rule uncertainty relates to reasoning about the 
observations.  The observer is doubtful about the conclusions drawn from the data. 
When considering systems, as defined in the section  “Definitions” (1.4), the uncertainty 
is related to incompleteness, uncertainty and imprecision of knowledge about systems 
constituents or objects that make up a system, the connections between these objects, 
organisation of objects, the system topology, the system environment  and interactions 
between the system and its environment.   
Most commonly, practical problems have uncertain factors of more than one type.  In 
real life the number of parameters influencing outcomes of all but the most trivial of 
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problems are so numerous that we usually decide to ignore most of them and describe 
them as ‘uncertainty’ in the problem, regardless of the type to which they belong.  
2.3 The Problem Area – detailed analysis 
 “Fear of harm ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of the harm, but also 
to the probability of the event” (La logique, ou l’art de penser (Logic, or the art of 
thinking); 1662 – Antoine Arnauld as cited in (Bernstein, 1996)). The safety is defined 
as freedom from harm.  
Before it is possible to proceed further, it is important to describe our world from the 
point of view of the person dealing with the uncertainty: 
1. Our world is speculative.  (“Our knowledge of the way things work, in society or 
in nature, comes trailing clouds of vagueness. Vast ills have followed a belief in 
certainty”.(Kenneth  Arrow as cited in (Bernstein, 1996)); 
2. Perfection implies repetition of assessment, estimation, calculation, evaluation, 
analysis and computation (Fenton and Hill, 1993);          
3. Precision is a measure of vicinity of the measurement to the correct value (Fenton 
and Hill, 1993); 
4. Both, the gauging of the tools used for measurements as well as the dimensions 
measured fluctuate constantly (Fenton and Hill, 1993); 
5. A degree of required precision, or in other words allowed level of uncertainty, 
depends on criticality of the measure to be used (Hessami, 1999b); 
6. Risk is directly proportional to uncertainty, the lesser the uncertainty, the lower  
the risk. Furthermore the more we know about the world the lesser is uncertainty;   
7. Risk and time are interrelated. Without time there is no risk. The risk is only 
relevant in relation to future. Passage of time transforms the risk and its nature. 
Therefore, in the simplified sense, every action is “uncertain”, from crossing the street 
to building a railway system.   
The term “hazard” is usually reserved, however, for situations where the range of 
possible outcomes to a given action is in some way significant. A significant outcome is 
a very loose definition, but in truth it is a highly flexible concept. The level of 
significance varies depending on the level of gain and human perception of acceptable 
uncertainty.  
Common actions like crossing the street are usually not “hazardous” while building a 
railway system can involve significant uncertainty.  Somewhere in between, actions 
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pass from being non-hazardous to hazardous.  This distinction, although vague, is 
important; if one judges that a situation is hazardous, the level of hazard becomes one 
criterion for deciding what course of action should be pursued.  
This research focused on the treatment of safety risks in railways. Existing 
methodologies for assessment and management of the safety risk on railways are mostly 
empirical and have been developed out of a need to satisfy the regulatory requirements 
and in response to a number of major accidents. Almost all of these processes and 
methodologies have been developed in support of approvals of specific products or very 
simple systems and do not add up to a holistic coherent methodology suited for analysis 
of modern, complex systems, involving many vastly different constituents (software, 
hardware, people, products developed in different parts of the world, etc.).  
Complexities of modern railway projects necessitate new approach to risk analysis and 
management. 
At the outset, the focus of the research was on the organisation of the family of existing 
system analysis methodologies into a coherent, heterogeneous methodology. 
Relationships between different methodologies and their properties were investigated 
seeking to define the rules for embedding of models into a hierarchical nest and relating 
their emergent properties.   
Once an outline framework has been created utilising the existing methodologies on  
real life projects, the research focused on development of methodologies in support of 
the activities not catered for, or not sufficiently supported by, existing methodologies 
and integrating these new methodologies with existing ones into a new process.  
In general any activity is undertaken (Hessami, 1999b) when there is a perception that 
the balance between the potential loss and the potential gain is such that it is worth 
pursuing the activity further. At that point, some form of risk analysis becomes viable. 
Most  authors define the risk as a combination of loss and frequency or probability of 
occurrence. However (Hessami, 1999b) other parameters define the risk as well: 
1. Nature of the consequent loss; 
2. Severity of the loss; 
3. The nature of initiating hazard; 
4. Affected party; 
5. Probability or frequency of occurrence of the consequence. 
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The detailed analyses of these can be very profitable. This, ‘more detailed analysis’ can 
extend to several levels to include above mentioned subjects of study, but the most 
common, as well as the simplest, is the one covered by probability and statistics.  
In engineering problems, detailed analyses of risk and its attributes can lead to 
significant savings in time and money (e.g. analyses of essentially chaotic behaviour of 
winds lead to notable improvements in designs of buildings and bridges, not to mention 
benefits of weather forecasting, a classic example of a chaotic system).  
During the research three high level principles of analysis of safety risks have been 
identified that must be respected and supported by adequate processes, because only by 
adhering to these principles one will be able to: 
1. Ensure completeness of analysis; 
2. Build a defendable argument in support of the final results (not forgetting that the 
choice based on the analysis may directly influence decisions potentially affecting 
human lives and costing millions). 
The first principle is that of Systematic Approach to problem solving. Planning the 
safety activities, documenting the work and enforcing rigorous configuration control of 
all important documents and data is the paramount. For different problems, different 
tools and techniques may be appropriate to ensure completeness of analysis. 
Holistic approach to the analysis is the second principle. From a systems 
perspective, safety is an emerging property of a system. When analysing the system, all 
elements of the system must always be taken into consideration (software, hardware, 
human factors, socio-political influences and environmental issues, to mention some), 
throughout the life cycle of the system. The information about the analysed system 
should be reliable and complete. 
The starting point of the safety management process is most of the time taken to be the 
risk assessment. More often than not, when doing risk assessment and analysis, the 
knowledge of experts in the particular field is exploited. Nowadays even apparently 
simple systems consist of parts designed by experts of different disciplines: electronics, 
mechanical, software and ergonomics come to mind first. On top of this, modern 
products are used in the wide variety of applications with different operational 
conditions. 
Finally, the third principle of safety risk assessment is necessity of extensive use of 
Domain Specific Expertise.  
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The systematic risk based approach to any undertaking has been developed within 
Railtrack PLC (now Network Rail) and has become a nationwide Engineering Safety 
Management guidance adopted by LUL and the whole of UK railways. Following are 
the risk assessment principles (RSSB, 2007): 
1. Hazard Identification; 
2. Causal Analysis; 
3. Consequence analysis; 
4. Loss analysis; 
5. Options analysis; 
6. Impact analysis; 
7. Demonstration of compliance with the bench mark. 
The following diagram depicts the above mentioned process in more detail.  
The 7 Stage Process assumes that the system is already well understood and defined. 
Several approaches to the hazard identification exist (for example guidance in (Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2006)), but the most common is in a form of a structured 
brainstorm where focus of the session is secured by consideration of the keywords, such 
as NOT, LATE, EARLY, ALSO, etc, on the problem domain.  
 
Figure 2-2: 7 Stage Process 
The result of hazard identification is a linear mass of information. Hazards are defined 
on their own without any reference to potential relations and dependencies to other 
hazards. It would be extremely difficult to analyse each of these hazards on its own and 
to simultaneously ensure that all interactions between different hazards and common 
dependencies of multiple hazards have been systematically analysed.  
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The final outcome of the analysis must not include any double counting or exclude any 
of the constituents of the system.   
This is why grouping of hazards of the same origin into larger entities referred to as core 
hazards, should be performed as the next step of analysis.  
On-line capture, using the projector and the laptop, of information during hazard 
identification session (and any other group workshop) has been proven to be extremely 
effective. The main benefit is that the panel can agree (or argue about, which is more 
usual) the final version of information to be captured (wording of the hazard and its 
consequences and mitigations, in case of hazard identification). Hazard identification 
session must be well structured and planned.  Participants must be allowed to express 
their opinion and encouraged to take an active part in the session.  
Domain Competence Requirements are determined by the problem under consideration. 
Care must be taken to ensure that expertise, related to all aspects of the problem area, is 
comprehensively incorporated into a study throughout the process. In order to secure as 
comprehensive as possible source of data and ideas, care should be taken to form groups 
with wide range of expertise. 
The aim of the causal analysis is to identify all the events/causes, and all the 
intermediate conditions which lead to a hazardous condition. 
Consequence analysis involves establishing the intermediate conditions and final 
consequences that may arise from a hazard. It involves bottom-up assessment of each 
hazard and is focused on the post hazard horizon. At each intermediate state existing 
defences against potential escalation should be identified. The defence may be 
equipment, procedure or circumstance. The sequence of the identified intermediate 
conditions is termed “the hazard development scenario”. Final consequences fit into one 
of the following categories: predominantly safety related consequence, predominantly 
commercial consequence, predominantly environmental consequence, broadly safe 
condition. 
Loss estimation is the process of estimating the losses that result from an accident or 
incident.  These losses may be of three kinds: commercial, safety and environmental.  
Under each of these categories there are a number of ways in which losses may be 
incurred.  These are termed loss mechanisms. 
Each of the loss mechanisms should be considered.  Therefore the first task is to identify 
each of the relevant loss mechanisms for a particular incident.  
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Having identified the relevant loss mechanisms it is then necessary to estimate the 
associated losses.  It is useful to rank the loss mechanisms in order of estimated 
magnitude, so that it is apparent if the losses are primarily commercial, safety or 
environmental.   
Safety losses in terms of injuries or equivalent fatalities are notoriously difficult to 
estimate.   
For major accidents, there is (fortunately) not a large enough sample for results to be 
statistically significant, so often it is necessary to make a (conservative) estimate.  
In order to normalise the units of loss (commercial, safety and environmental) and 
enable comparison of risks and gains, the safety loss is often converted into financial 
losses. In UK the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) Value for Preventing a Fatality 
(VPF) is often used.  This is £0.99 million for one or less equivalent fatalities and £3.12 
million for accidents involving more than one equivalent fatality, where 1 equivalent 
fatality = 1 fatality or 10 major injuries or 200 minor injuries. Safety losses are, by 
convention expressed in terms of Potential Equivalent Fatalities per annum.  
Options analysis is aimed at identification of potential reliability improvements and 
damage containment. This stage of the process is a creative phase employing the 
empirical knowledge and inspiring elicitation techniques. For each identified option 
following information should be elicited: 
1. Costs; 
2. Loss Prevention Capability; 
3. Resource & Competency Requirements; 
4. Time-Scales; 
5. Uncertainty & Dependency; 
6. Impact on Other Loss Dimensions. 
The systematic assessment of overall effect of each identified option on the potential 
risks is referred to as the impact analysis.  
Impact of each identified option on the reduction or containment of identified risks 
should be assessed.  
In case of safety risk, the demonstration of compliance in the UK involves comparison 
of the total individual risk arising from the malfunction of the system against the 
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industry benchmark as a minimum required safety performance and against the 
investment required to improve the system further.  
The first part of this stage is related to the maximum acceptable risk exposure which is 
in UK set by HSE (Health and Safety Executive, 2009).  
The second part of this stage is related to the foundation of the assurance that everything 
reasonable has been done in order to minimise the risk arising from the malfunction of 
the system. Each of the identified options should be assessed, the improvement that 
option can bring if implemented against the cost of the option implementation as well as 
other parameters defining the options listed above.  
The risk assessment can be qualitative or quantitative. Once all the reasonably 
practicable options have been implemented it can be demonstrated that the safety risk 
arising from the malfunction of the system is acceptable.  
Current practice in the UK demands demonstration of compliance with the As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle for any undertaking. This demonstration is 
typically structured in the form of a Safety Case. 
Very similar approach to the safety management is discussed in many other papers and 
standards ((SAMRAIL, 2004) to mention one) but all of these are very similar to the “7 
stage process” and to avoid duplication these will not be discussed here.   
The extension of the “7 stage process” is the rational approach to risk assessment, 
inclusive of both, rewards and risks of the enterprise, the benefits and the detriments 
brought by the system. Following this logic (Hessami, 1999a), if a hazard is the 
precursor to risk, the opportunity is the precursor to reward. Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the totality of the system has been analysed (for safety) it is necessary to 
assess the benefits of the system as well as risks. 
Safety assurance of a system covering the complete generic lifecycle could be split into 
two phases (CENELEC 1998), (CENELEC 2003), (Hessami, 1999b), (RSSB, 2007): 
1. Safety Engineering, covering design, development and realisation of the system; 
2. Safety Management, covering deployment, maintenance, retrofit and 
decommissioning. 
Generic lifecycle phase Principal ESM activities 
Concept and feasibility Preliminary hazard identification 
Establish the hazard log 
Define the preliminary safety plan 
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Generic lifecycle phase Principal ESM activities 
Requirements definition Hazard Analysis (and revisiting of hazard 
identification) 
Risk Assessment 
Establish safety requirements 
Define full safety plan 
Design Risk Assessment 
Safety Audit 
Implementation Risk Assessment 
Safety case 
Installation and handover Safety Assessment 
Safety Endorsement 
Transfer of safety responsibilities to the user 
Operations and Maintenance Update the Hazard Log and safety case 
Decommissioning and 
Disposal 
Update the Hazard Log and safety case 
Table 2-1: Principal engineering safety management activities. 
The safety engineering phase correlates with the pre operational phases whilst the safety 
management phase correlates with the application and maintenance aspects of the 
system lifecycle. Although these two phases are interconnected and overlap in many 
aspects, the methodology for management of risks and the tools and processes 
supporting the risk management are quite different. 
During the safety engineering phase the focus of safety risk management is on provision 
of a system with the potential to provide safe performance. The focus of the safety 
management phase is to realise that potential.  As part of the railways Engineering 
Safety Management (ESM) guide (RSSB, 2007) a detailed breakdown of activities, 
related to the system life cycle, required to ensure a safe delivery and use of a system is 
provided. 
Most of the existing processes and guidelines state what needs to be a result of the 
safety risk analysis, broadly outlining the expectations from each of the above listed and 
depicted activities.  Alternative methodologies exist, for some of the activities but not 
for all, each one invented and used in the context of different aspects of systems 
structure, behaviour and/or its emerging properties. 
However, none of these amounts to an integrated framework for the systems safety risk 
analysis and management. Many examples of failure to assure the clients and relevant 
authorities (Her Majesty Railway Inspectorate, for example) of satisfactory safety 
performance of the system exist in the railway industry. To mention one example, 
failure to demonstrate satisfactory safety performance of a novel signalling system 
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(upgrade of a railway junction on a main railway line) led to two year long delays in 
implementation and a mounting cost (some estimates are that the final cost of the 
system will be two orders of magnitude higher then original tendered cost). 
There are also examples of the opposite, where grossly underestimated cost of an option 
may have caused delay to the implementation of potentially almost equally efficient 
option. Following from the investigation into Clapham junction train accident in 1988 
(35 fatalities and 69 major injuries) lead by Sir Antony Hidden, a recommendation was 
made that the Automatic Train Protection system should be fully implemented within 5 
years of selecting a specific type of the system, with high priority being given to densely 
trafficked lines (Department of Transport, 1989), (Health & Safety Commission, 1998). 
Subsequently the recommendations from Hidden enquiry were reinforced in particular 
in the report into an accident at Cowden in 1994. However, the state of development of 
technology and consequently, the high cost of development and implementation at the 
time when recommendations were made, prevented the implementation of 
recommendations within the timescales suggested by enquiries. Furthermore, spiralling 
cost of failed implementation of the modern ATC (ERTMS/TCS) system along West 
Coast Main Line was a major cause of demise of Network Rail. During late 90s (Health 
& Safety Commission, 1998) TPWS was identified as a reasonable practicable 
minimum requirement. The rollout of this system has been successfully initiated in 
parallel with conclusion that introduction of ATP system may not be justified on the 
bases of cost until the technology developments advance further.  
If at the time of the first recommendation more measured view was taken of the whole 
life cost of ATP systems, TPWS could have been proposed as a pragmatic way forward 
much and implemented across the most critical parts of the network much earlier, thus 
potentially preventing some of the later accidents. This is an example of where the cost 
of safety must be analysed systematically and carefully, taking into account full life 
cycle cost, so to support the justifiable decision making.  
Furthermore, in different industries significantly different levels of investment are 
expected on health and safety. Thomas and Stupples (Thomas and Stupples, 2006) have 
devised a new approach to appraisal of reasonable practicability as part of the options 
and impact analysis. The J-value is the ratio of the actual spend and the maximum 
reasonable spend which in turn is a function of life expectancy, average income and 
work life balance. Number of case studies has been undertaken, including an assessment 
of J-value related to implementation of TPWS and ERTMS ATP systems. For both 
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(TPWS and ERTMS ATP) the J-value was found to be greater than unity, indicating 
that both are costing more than what it should. J-value for TPWS was found to be 
between 3.8 and 11.3, and for ERTMS ATP between 38 and 132, strongly supporting 
the argument that ATP systems are far too expensive for the realised benefit. 
All of this must be taken into account when options and impact analysis are undertaken. 
The root cause of the failure to undertake the complete, holistic analysis is twofold: 
1. Lack of understanding of the complexities involved in development of modern 
systems; 
2. None-existence of a holistic methodology, and the process supporting it, 
throughout the lifecycle safety analysis and management.  
As discussed later in this thesis, the complexity of modern projects and products 
demands the Systems approach to the analysis of Safety as an emerging property of the 
system, for a simple reason that with increased complexity of the systems produced by 
human kind our ability to comprehend the totality of the system without a structured 
methodical process is decreasing.  
2.4 Chapter Conclusion  
In this chapter the author outlined the background and the history of the human 
perception of risk. Since risk is an abstract, almost philosophical concept, this initial 
research and discussion was necessary to set out the scene for further research. 
Following form that, the author investigated the problem domain further, aiming to plot 
out direction for the research. The author identified the gaps in existing knowledge and 
application and outlined the high level requirements that a future framework must 
satisfy. This work is presented in this chapter as well.    
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CHAPTER 3:  BASIC SYSTEMS CONCEPT, MODELLING 
METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND 
LITERATURE 
3.1 Chapter Introduction  
The findings of the initial literature research are presented here. The research was 
conducted in two specific areas (as indicated by  
Figure 3-1 below), research of systems theory relevant to safety engineering and 
management and research of the tools and methods used for specific engineering safety 
problems.  
 
 
Figure 3-1: Structure of chapter 3 
 
 
3.2 Background to the notion of the system 
There are many different definitions of a system. 
Benjamin and Wolter (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998) conclude that a system is 
assemblage or combination of elements or parts forming a complex or unitary whole, 
such as a river system or a transportation system; any assemblage or set of correlated 
members, such as a system of currency; an ordered and comprehensive assemblage of 
 Page 36  
 
facts, principles or doctrines in a particular field of knowledge or thought, such as a 
system of philosophy; a coordinated body of methods or a complex scheme or plan of 
procedure, such as a system of organisation and management; any regular or special 
method of plan of procedure, such as a system of marking, numbering or measuring. A 
system is characterised by unity, functional relationship and a useful purpose. 
A system is a set of interrelated constituents working together toward some common 
objective or purpose. The set of constituents has the following properties: 
1. The properties and behaviour of each constituent of the set have effect on the 
properties and behaviour of the set as a whole; 
2. The properties and behaviour of each constituent of the set depend on the 
properties and behaviour of at least one other constituent in the set. 
3. Each possible subset of constituents has the two properties listed previously; the 
constituents cannot be divided into independent subsets.  
A system is more than a sum of its parts. However, the constituents of a system may 
themselves be systems, and every system may be part of a larger system in a hierarchy. 
Another, more pragmatic definition of a system comes from the internal document of an 
engineering company (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998): “A system is the interacting 
combination of equipment, people and processes designed to accomplish a defined 
objective. The environment is that part of the rest of the world that a system interacts 
with.” 
As a last example the following definition of a system is given by Norman Fenton and 
Gillian Hill (Fenton and Hill, 1993):”A system is an assembly of constituents connected 
together in an organised way and separated from its environment by a boundary. This 
organised assembly has an observable purpose, which is characterised in terms of how it 
transforms inputs from the environment into outputs to the environment. In order for 
systems to function effectively they generally require some kind of control mechanism. 
This monitors external behaviour, providing feedback and enforcing changes to the 
system where necessary.”  
In his book (Waring, 1996) Alan Waring defines the system in a similar manner as the 
above mentioned authors. 
Any system is characterised by its emerging properties, the properties that are an 
outcome of the joined act of the system parts. 
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The system constituents (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998) are the operating pars of a 
system consisting of input, process, and output. Each system constituent may assume a 
variety of values to describe a system state as set by some control action and one or 
more restrictions.  
Attributes are the properties of discernible manifestations of the constituents of a 
system. These attributes characterise the system. Relationships are the links between 
constituents and attributes.  
A purposeful action performed by a system is its function.  
A system is defined by its boundary or scope. Everything that is outside the boundary is 
considered to be the environment. No system is completely isolated from its 
environment. Material, energy, and/or information are passing through the boundaries 
as input to the system. In reverse the material, energy, and/or information that is passing 
through the boundaries from the system is referred to as output. That which enters the 
system as one form and exits from system in another form is known as throughput.  
Every system is made up of constituents, and in turn any constituent may be broken 
down into smaller constituents. If two hierarchical levels are involved in a given system, 
the lower is conventionally called subsystem.  
A subsystem (Fenton and Hill, 1993) is a system in its own right that is contained within 
some other system. Most real systems are so complex that the only way one can 
understand them is to understand their recursive structure by thinking in terms of their 
simpler, interconnected subsystems. 
If these systems are themselves too complex most often one again thinks in terms of 
their subsystems. This process of looking for simpler subsystems within subsystems is 
repeated as many times as necessary. The process is called top down decomposition and 
it gives rise to notion of levels of abstraction. It is the only known means of analysing 
complex systems. 
Some authors have made an attempt to classify systems. 
Benjamin and Wolter (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998) introduce the following 
classification: 
1. Natural and human made systems; 
2. Physical and conceptual systems; 
3. Static and dynamic systems; 
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4. Closed and open systems. 
Checkland (Checkland, 1984) supports the idea of 9 levels hierarchy of real world 
complexity:  
Level Characteristic Examples Relevant disciplines 
Structures, 
frameworks 
Static Crystal structures, bridges. Description, verbal or 
pictorial in any discipline. 
Clock-works Predetermined motion – 
equilibrium 
Clock, machines, the solar 
system. 
Physics, classical natural 
science. 
Control 
mechanisms 
Closed loop control Thermostats. Control theory, cybernetics. 
Open Systems Structurally self-
maintaining 
Flames, biological cells. Theory of metabolism 
(information theory) 
Lower organisms Organised whole with 
functional parts, blue 
printed growth, 
reproduction 
Plants. Botany. 
Animals A brain to guide total 
behaviour, ability to 
learn 
Birds and beasts. Zoology. 
Man Self-consciousness, 
knowledge of 
knowledge, symbolic 
language. 
Human beings. Biology, psychology. 
Socio-cultural 
systems 
Roles, communication, 
transmission of values 
Families, clubs, nations. History, sociology, 
anthropology, behavioural 
science. 
Transcendental 
systems 
Inescapable unknowables The idea of god.  
Table 3-1: Hierarchy of real world complexity 
the authors suggest the use of above classifications to aid choice of a method for system 
analysis. One other categorisation of complexity defines two types, essential and 
accidental complexity. 
Essential complexity, as named, is in the essence of the system. It is an inherent part of 
a system and cannot be eliminated but only minimised. Accidental complexity is not the 
“natural” attribute of the system but is a consequence of an accident. This type of 
complexity can be eliminated.  The following systems analysis methodologies are 
suggested (Checkland, 1984), (Waring, 1996), (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998): 
A. Hard system thinking including following steps: 
1. Doing the groundwork; 
2. Gaining awareness and understanding of the perceived problem; 
3. Establishing overall goals and set of objectives; 
4. Finding ways to reach objectives; 
5. Devising assessment measures; 
6. Modelling; 
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7. Evaluation; 
8. Making a choice; 
9. Implementation. 
B. Soft system thinking including following steps: 
1. Data collection; 
2. Analysis; 
3. Relevant systems and root definitions; 
4. Conceptual modelling; 
5. Comparisons to provide debating agenda; 
6. Discussing the agenda with the actors; 
7. Action for change; 
C. Systems failure thinking including following steps: 
1. Describing the failure situation; 
2. Comparison with paradigms; 
3. What do comparisons mean; 
4. Learning. 
With aspiration to unite the different approaches, soft, hard and systems failure systems 
thinking, the author will introduce a new generic definition of a system.  
3.3 The abstract notion of the system 
A system is a collection of interconnected, organised parts, embedded in the 
environment, that forms a whole which exhibits some new properties that none of the 
constituents possess on their own.  
From a point of view of a high level safety analysis strategy, if the definition of a 
system given above is adopted, the distinction between soft and hard systems and 
system failures is neither a natural nor a useful one. Any system, regardless of its 
attributes and nature, must be analysed in a systematic way and the generic approach 
should be the same.  
Following from that one can conclude that the methodology for system analysis should 
be the same for all systems but tools for analysis may be different. The classification of 
systems, based on the attributes of the system, enabling a selection of the appropriate 
tools for the analysis, would be much more useful. 
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Through the work on several projects (Lucic, 2003b) the following conclusions related 
to systems analysis have been drawn.  
The systems we are faced with are most of the time not uniform. Modern high reliability 
systems are often distributed and consequently the performance of their constituents, 
subsystems, differs in many aspects (environment, speed, timing) at different places 
throughout the system.  
Nevertheless, the system must be comprehensively defined to facilitate identification of 
all the hazards.   
In generic terms, any system is fully defined by its: 
1. Environment; 
2. Constituents (different authors use different name for the constituents, objects, 
parts, etc); 
3. Topology of the internal and external interfaces and  
4. State of the system. 
Environment is defined as the surrounding within which the system works, including 
people, weather, climate conditions, traffic density, etc. The system can be “self 
contained” i.e. there can be no interactions between the system and its environment or 
the system can be “embedded”, i.e. the system receives inputs from the environment and 
is passing outputs into the environment to fulfil its function. The “embedded” systems 
can also receive the behaviour rules and disturbances from the environment and can 
pass the disturbances into the environment.  
Constituents or objects are the parts which make up the system, its hardware, software 
and people. Objects are defined by their attributes which are identifiable and their 
possible measurable characteristics (Topintzi, 2001).  
Objects can be described as the “atomic transformation machines” that transform inputs 
into outputs in accordance to some transform function. The transform function can be 
“self contained” i.e. the control mechanism of the transform function can be entirely 
internal to the object, or it can be “externally controlled”, i.e. the measurement of the 
output can be passed out of the object and the corresponding control can be fed in the 
object.      
The structure and organisation of connections, interfaces, between the constituents 
themselves and the constituents and the environment is referred to as the topology of the 
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internal and external interfaces. The states of the objects and the nature of 
interconnections (interfaces) and their organisation defines the structure of the system 
(Topintzi, 2001).    
Constituents may change the way they transform inputs into outputs, they can be in 
different states or the network of interconnections may change its structure, nature or 
organisation, hence changing the properties and the state of the system. At any moment 
in time the system may be operating in different states.  
It is not unusual that states are grouped into as operational modes. For example, some 
constituents may be operating in the degraded mode of operation whilst some parts of 
the system could still operate in the normal mode of operation. In the case of large 
distributed systems some constituents of the system may operate in different states of 
operation as well. For example some constituents of the system may be in a preparatory, 
boot-up stage of operation whilst some of the constituents may be already in full 
operation. 
Formalisation of the notion of a system is offered in (Karcanias, 2003) identifying 
following definitions in relation to systems’ concepts: 
Definition 1:  A system is an interconnection, organisation of its constituents, 
objects that is embedded in a given environment.  
 SYSTEM Ù OBJECTS + TOPOLOGY OF RELATIONS + 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Definition 2:  An object is a general unit (abstract, or physical) defined in terms 
of its attributes and the possible relations between them. 
 
Definition 3:  For a given object, we define its environment as the set of objects, 
signals, events, structures, and conditions, which are considered 
topologically external to the object, and are linked to the object in 
terms of relations with its structure, attributes through interfaces 
with the object.  
 
Definition 4:  An attribute for an object is an identifiable and possibly measurable 
characteristic of the object. 
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Interfaces of the system, inputs and outputs of the system or a system constituent can be 
generalised in three   categories, each of which can be either transferred to other system 
constituents or be an output of the system:  
1. Energy in this case is assumed to be raw energy, motion, heat, electric power, 
chemical energy; 
2. The second category of input or output is defined as information, for example 
about a state of the nearby system constituent, measured speed or temperature, 
confirmation status, etc.; 
3. Finally the third category of input or output is an action.  Action is defined as an 
act of the system or constituent or environment, on a system, constituent or 
environment, resulting in a change of a status of the action recipient. 
Generalised, any system or a system constituent could be presented by the following 
diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Generalised presentation of the system 
Combination of the constituents defines the topology of the system, whilst the influence 
of the environment on the system can be presented as a special case of input/output. 
Combination of the constituents’ attributes with the environment attributes defines all of 
the emerging properties of the system. 
3.4 Systems Thinking and Reasoning  
An essential part of any problem solving, system analysis and decision making process, 
is reasoning.  Reasoning is a process of deducing information about a non-perceptible 
feature of the problem or non-measurable property of the system, based on the 
available, measured or observed, information about the problem or parts of the system 
(Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1991). 
In a general form reasoning activity can be structured as follows: 
1 Given/Known: 
Environment 
Input Output 
System  
or 
 Constituent 
Information
Energy
Action 
Information
Energy
Action 
Information Energy Action
Information Energy Action
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1.1 Information/Knowledge about the observable characteristics of a system/ 
problem; 
1.2 Information/Knowledge about the environment/domain to which the system/ 
problem belongs.  
2 Need to determine: 
2.1 Some information about some unobserved/unobservable characteristics of a 
system/ problem. 
Three concepts are defined in relation to any reasoning: 
1. Innate ideas refer to principles or theoretical truths about the nature in which the 
reasoner believes; 
2. The inputs are the experimental observations made by the observer; and 
3. The fact net is an interconnection of inputs and innate ideas constructed by means 
of a given set of relations and operators, it is a network of contingent truths.  
The Inquiry System (Portland and Turoff, 2002) is defined as a process followed by 
someone, a group of people or something with an aim to create a network of facts in 
order to establish the overall truth. The enquirer starts off the Inquiry System with an 
assumed “raw data set”. The data set is at the beginning considered to describe a 
characteristic property of the “real world”.  
This is because to begin describing the “world” and enquirer’s “knowledge” of “it”, the 
enquirer has to invoke a particular “conceptualisation” or Inquiring System 
characterisation of “it”.  
Next, the Inquiry System applies some transformation to the “raw data” creating an 
input to the model. The model or the fact net, which is any sort of a structured process, 
is in fact a set of rules. Rules may be either in the form of an algorithm or a set of 
heuristic principles.  
The model transforms the “input data” into “output information”. Finally the output 
information may be processed again to put it in the right form so that a decision-maker 
can use it.  
Inquiry Systems are differentiated from one another with respect to the priority given to 
the various steps of the process or the degree of interdependence assigned to the various 
steps of the process by each Inquiry Systems. 
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There are 5 core Inquiry Systems (Linstone and Turoff , 2002):  
1. Leibnizian Inquiry System: assumes the existence of an a priori model of the 
system (the innate ideas or the theory describing the system), and attempts to 
arrange the inputs as to suit the a priori model; 
2. Kantian Inquiry System: to begin with, this Inquiry System contains a set of 
independent models built around an independent set of innate ideas and 
potentially axioms, primitives and rules of inference. The Inquiry System selects a 
model from the collection and builds a Leibnizian fact net using this model as a 
base. Using a preset criterion the Inquiry System determines the extent to which 
the fact net is satisfactory. The model that produces the most satisfactory fact net 
is the solution to enquiry;   
3. Hegelian Inquiry System: is a dialectic Inquiry System. It seeks to acquire the 
ability to see the same inputs from different points of view.  The concept is based 
on the premise that for each thesis there is an antithesis. The antithesis does not 
have to be a logical negation of the thesis, it may be simply a thesis supporting a 
different view of the same input to the system or different understanding of the 
effect of the same input on the system. To begin with this Inquiry System contains 
a set of independent models built around an independent set of innate ideas and 
potentially axioms, primitives and rules of inference. The Inquiry System 
ascertains a model that demonstrates that there is a way to look at reality which 
fits the selected model. Following that the Inquiry System ascertains the model 
that supports the antithesis. The final step of the Hegelian Inquiry System is 
development of a “synthesis” model of the system, or a model that would examine 
and resolve the conflicts between the thesis and antithesis models;  
4. Lockean Inquiry System (Portland and Turoff, 2002) postulates that the truth 
content of a system being observed is associated entirely with its empirical 
content. A model of a system is an empirical model and the truth of the model is 
measured in terms of its ability to reduce every complex proposition to its simple 
empirical referents. The validity of each of the referents is assured by means of 
the widespread, freely obtained agreement between different observers. The 
accuracy of the model is not dependant on the prior assumption of any theory. The 
data input is not only prior to the formal model or theory sector but it is separate 
from it as well. The whole of the Lockean Inquiry System is built up from the data 
input; 
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5. Singerian Inquiry Systems: the truth content of a system is relative to the overall 
goals and objectives of the inquiry. It is said that for these Inquiry Systems the 
truth is pragmatic. A corresponding fact net or the model of the observed system 
is explicitly goal-oriented. The precision  of the model is measured with respect to 
its ability to define systems objectives, to propose alternate means for securing 
these objectives, and to specify new goals (discovered only as a result of the 
inquiry) that remain to be accomplished by some future inquiry. It is referred to as 
a teleological Inquiry System.  
Most of the time the information that is available to the Inquiry System is uncertain as 
described further, later in this report. In these situations the analyst (Bhatnagar and 
Kanal, 1991), (Portland and Turoff, 2002) is faced with following options: 
1. A Leibnizian approximate Inquiry System is concerned with determining the 
uncertainty associated with the proposed solution model given the uncertainties 
related to inputs and the innate ideas or determining the imprecise version of the 
solution model such that the solution can be proven to be correct (“true”) given 
the uncertainties related to the inputs and the innate ideas; 
2. A Kantian approximate Inquiry System would attempt to determine the ordered 
list of several models that provide the best explanation of the inputs. The 
imprecision associated the with solution model could be used as a criterion to 
select a preferred solution model; 
3. A Hegelian approximate Inquiry System would attempt to determine the pairs of 
models in support of thesis and antithesis. The precision of information embedded 
in the models would be then used as a criterion for selection of a solution model.  
4. A Lockean Inquiry Systems are the personification of experimental, consensual 
systems. Lockean Inquiry Systems create an empirical, inductive representation of 
a problem domain, starting from a set of elementary empirical judgments (“raw 
data,” observations, sensations). From these an ever expanding, increasingly more 
general fact net of the real propositions is created.  
5. Singerian inquiry is a nonterminating Inquiry System. Singerian inquirers never 
give final answers to any question although at any point they seek to give a highly 
refined and specific response. No single aspect of the system has any fundamental 
priority over any of the other aspects. The observed system is treated as an 
inseparable whole. It takes holistic thinking to the extreme and aims to constantly 
include new variables and additional constituents to broaden the base of concern. 
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It is an explicit postulate of Singerian inquiry that the systems designer is a 
fundamental part of the system, the system designer must be explicitly considered 
in the systems representation as one of the system constituents. The designer's 
psychology and sociology are inseparable from the system's physical 
representation. Singerian inquirers are the personification of interdisciplinary 
systems. In a way the Singerian Inquiry Systems are meta- Inquiry Systems, they 
constitute a theory about all the other Inquiry Systems (Leibnizian, Lockean, 
Kantian, Hegelian). Singerian Inquiry Systems include all the previous Inquiry 
System as submodels in their design.  
Different models of enquiry are better suited for different problems. 
The Leibnizian Inquiry System is an obvious choice in situations where it is known that 
a good model or theory is available.  
If we believe that the truth is equally dependant on the model and the data, then the 
most appropriate Inquiry System is the Kantian model.  
The Hegelian Inquiry System is most appropriate for ill-structured problems where the 
true is more likely to emerge from a clash between a thesis and antithesis.  
The Lockean Inquiry Systems are appropriate for problems where data are prior to the 
development of formal theory.  
The Singerian Inquiry Systems are best suited for complex system analysis problems 
where completeness of analysis is paramount.   
In addition to above described Inquiry Systems, a number of methodologies for 
structured group analysis have been developed as well. The most common one is known 
as Delphi.  
Delphi is a method for structuring a group communication process in support of an 
effective technique allowing a group of individuals to deal with a complex problem.  
There are two forms of Delphi method. The most common is the paper-and-pencil form, 
commonly referred to as a "Delphi Exercise." A questionnaire is designed and 
distributed to a group of experts. The questionnaire is evaluated and the results are 
distributed to the same group of experts who are given at least one chance to review the 
original answers. We shall denote this form conventional Delphi. The second form of 
Delphi technique, sometimes called a "Delphi Conference", utilises a computer 
programmed to carry out the analysis of the group results. This eliminates the delay 
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caused in analysing the results turning the process into a real-time communications 
system.  
Delphi process can be broken into 4 phases. The first phase is exploration of the subject 
under discussion. During this phase each participant freely contributes information 
pertinent to the analysed subject or system. The second phase strives to identify any 
disagreements between the participants. The third phase is aimed at resolving the 
differences and evaluating them. Finally when all previously gathered information is 
analysed and the results are fed back for consideration. 
3.5 Models and modelling  
Modelling is a process of approximation of the real world, in order to aid representation 
and understanding of the system and to predict the behaviour of the emerging properties 
of the system. 
Mathematical modelling is a term used to describe the method of approximation of the 
real world using mathematics (Open University Handbook).  A mathematical model is a 
mathematical relationship linking the variables representing the possible states of the 
real system. 
All models are characterised by their geometric/logical structure and if applicable, the 
algebraic structure providing the mathematical base of the model. 
The two main categories of models are: 
1. Descriptive models support understanding of the problem by means of providing 
structural insight; 
2. Decision models support the decision making process. The main requirement on 
these models is to order the preference of one option over another. 
Most of the models are causal models. These models are based on the knowledge of 
causality relationships which underpins the determination of relating events and the 
causal structure for a scenario.  
Tversky and Kahneman 1982, (Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1991), state “It is a psychological 
commonplace that people strive to achieve a coherent interpretation of the events that 
surround them, and that the organisation of the events by schemes of cause-effect 
relationships serves to achieve this goal.” 
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There are two approaches to modelling: 
1. Qualitative models describe the real world but do not provide any numerical 
information in relation to model attributes.  
2. Quantitative models, on the other hand approximate the real world using some 
form of numerical or combined graphical and numerical technique.  
The causal structure (Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1991) underlies observed symptoms of 
every situation. Most of the time the observable knowledge is incomplete and 
consequently it is difficult if not impossible to uniquely identify the underlying causal 
model.      
In situations like this one may need to develop number of different models and then 
select the most suitable one.  
Quantified risk based modelling is increasingly becoming the method of choice for risk 
assessment. However risk assessment models are notoriously difficult to validate and 
verify.  
Some scientists believe that it is not possible to verify and validate any model. This 
argument is based on the fact that natural systems are never closed and consequently 
models created to represent these systems are never unique.  Therefore, according to 
this school of thought (Saltelli, 2002), models can only be “confirmed” by the 
demonstration of agreement or non-contradiction between observation and prediction.  
Modelling as a process can be split into following steps: 
1. The first step of the modelling process is the identification of the problem, who or 
what is potentially affected by the problem and what are the parties involved in 
the problem; 
2. Prior to commencing modelling it is desirable to formally describe the system to 
be modelled. This stage of the modelling process is usually referred to as the 
Conceptual modelling. Conceptual modelling has three   distinct phases, 
elicitation, formalisation (processing) and representation of knowledge. This stage 
of modelling process provides a structured approach aimed at gaining the 
understanding of the problem domain and development of the description of the 
system to be analysed. 
Development of the model involves creation of the model to encompass all relevant 
factors within a logical structure capable of simulating the behaviour of the analysed 
system. This is an iterative process and involves refinement of the conceptual model and 
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the model itself. In some cases, if the analysed system is complex, it is necessary to 
produce a hierarchy of models.  
There are two types of complexity that may lead to the development of hierarchical 
models. If the analysed system is complex in terms of its size, number of elements and 
topological intricacy it may be prudent to develop a high level model describing the 
behaviour at the level of subsystems and more detailed models for each of subsystems.  
Subsequently these models can be integrated into a single model or all of the models 
can be treated as separate entities with the high level model being manipulated using the 
data derived through detailed models simulations. If the analysed system is complex in 
terms of diverse nature of behaviour or characteristics of system constituents, for which 
different modelling techniques are required, it may be necessary to use different 
modelling techniques to model different constituents of the system. Once the analysis is 
completed, these models can be integrated as well. 
After the modeller is satisfied with the model it can be used in support of system 
analysis and evaluation of different options for design or change to be introduced to the 
system. Important part of this stage of modelling is Sensitivity Analysis, the exploration 
of uncertainties in the model and how these can be apportioned to different sources of 
the uncertainty in the model input. 
3.6 Review of existing analysis methodologies  
  3.6.1 System Description Models  
Many different methods are used to represent a system. Broadly these may be 
categorised in two groups: 
1. Static models describing the system constituents and their interactions; 
2. Dynamic models describing systems behaviour. 
Static models mainly describe the system and its constituents. The most frequent model 
is the System Decomposition Model. System decomposition models often have a 
hierarchical structure whereby at the highest level only the large subsystems are 
presented and then each of the subsystems is broken down into more detailed 
presentation and so on. These models are essentially directed graphs, where shapes 
(nodes) present system constituents, and directed arrows (edges) represent their internal 
and external interfaces.  
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Often, these models are used to capture/represent more than just the basic information 
such as: 
1. Type of interface (command/information); 
2. Type of system/subsystem constituent (hardware/software/human) and 
3. Boundaries between system and its environment including interactions between 
the system and environment. 
The example of these models is presented by Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 below.   
 
Figure 3-3: An example of the system decomposition model.  
This type of the system decomposition models is often referred to as the “Bubble 
Diagram”, bubbles represent the subsystems and rectangles constituents at lower level 
of decomposition. Directed lines are interfaces that link up subsystems and constituents 
into a system.  
 
Figure 3-4: An example of the system decomposition model. 
A common feature of all decomposition models is that system constituents (constituents 
or subsystems) are presented by shapes and internal and external interfaces (action, 
energy or information “carriers”) by directed lines, indicated direction of the exchange.  
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Of dynamic models the State Transition and Sequence and Collaboration models are 
seen as the most useful.  
The State transition models consist of states (all possible states of the system), triggers 
(triggers for a system to enter or exit a state) and arrows indicating a direction of a 
change of a state.  An example of the state transition diagram is presented in Figure 3-5 
below. 
 
Figure 3-5: State transition diagram of a railway system from a train point of view. 
State Transition Models (Pukite and Pukite, 1998) are directed graphs, representing the 
state space of a system in a given context, the events that cause the transitions and 
transitions between the states and resulting actions. These models are used to capture 
knowledge about the system behaviour and can be translated into other models (for 
example Markov models as discussed later in the report) to support quantified analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6: An example of sequence and collaboration diagrams 
Sequence and collaboration diagrams (models) are interaction models that capture 
dynamic nature of energy, information or action exchanges between system constituents 
or a system and the environment. For each state of the state transition model a sequence 
and collaboration model can be produced to represent the system interactions for each 
system state.  
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System constituents are represented by shapes (usually rectangles) from which a vertical 
line (representing the existence of the relevant shape in time) is drawn downwards to 
capture the time and directed lines (arrows) representing the exchanges between system 
constituents. Shapes (usually folded corner rectangles) represent the entry and exit 
points. 
These models are useful in support of system conceptualisation and definition and 
analysis as they are capable of encapsulating information related temporal and spatial 
aspects of the system behaviour.  
This technique has been used by the author of this report in support of a large scale 
project aiming to define safety requirements for European Railways Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS).  
  3.6.2 System Dynamics 
System Dynamics is defined (Topintzi, 2001), (Sterman, 2000) as a rigorous method for 
qualitative description, exploration and analysis of complex systems in terms of their 
processes, information, organisational boundaries and strategies; which facilitates 
quantitative simulation modelling and analysis for the design of system structure and 
behaviour . It is a quantitative technique for evaluation of the dynamic behaviour of 
socio-technical systems and their response to the stream of decisions created in response 
to changing inputs of information. 
Systems Dynamics modelling methodology is used to investigate the combined effects 
of individual changes made at different points in a system.  The model-building 
approach of System Dynamics attempts to include and quantify all factors that influence 
the behaviour of the observed system or its parts. Two basic symbols are used in System 
Dynamics modelling: 
1. Accumulation of something (information, energy, etc), represented by rectangle; 
2. Flow or movement of anything (people, action, etc), represented by directed lines.  
Together these basic elements, form cause and effect loops  
A vital principle of System Dynamics is to incorporate all information believed to 
significantly influence behaviour into the model, leaving out unnecessary detail. System 
Dynamics is also problem-centred, or goal-centred. 
Together, accumulations and flows form cause-and-effect loops that model problem 
development over time and identify the likely consequences of the system.  
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Systems dynamics methodology was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology professor Jay W. Forrester in 1961. 
As a methodology for analysis (and management) of complex feedback systems, it has 
been used to address practically many different kinds of feedback system. The System 
Dynamics caters for description of the behaviour over continuous time and 
identification of a system boundary to include the areas of interest for research and 
analysis. 
It provides a structured format for identifying and depicting feedback system elements, 
goals, discrepancies, levels, rates and flows of information and controls.  
The author of the thesis did not use this methodology in practice for following reasons: 
1. System Dynamics modelling as a technique is suitable for high level abstraction. 
However models required to support systems analysis on railways must be 
capable of supporting relatively detailed, low level of abstraction; 
2. It appears that in cases of more complex System Dynamics models, and in case 
of railways certainly the system models are very complex, it is practically 
impossible to calibrate these models.  
  3.6.3 Risk Matrix (Rapid Ranking)  
Frequency-severity risk matrices are often used in support of risk analysis. They are 
matrices of likelihood and consequence categories. Individual risk values of cells of the 
matrix are assigned using qualitative analysis. However, risk matrices are only 
appropriate for prioritisation of risks to be further analysed or acted upon. 
The Risk matrices are deficient for following reasons: 
1. Subjective and without auditable justification; 
2. Coarse, usually leading to overestimation of risk; 
3. Based on extrapolated judgmental assessment of frequency of safety consequence 
arising from a hazard, missing the consequence analysis and therefore not 
covering the intricacies of all risk mitigation measures nor including the related 
consequences of other hazards. 
  3.6.4 Failure Mode and Effects (and Criticality) Analysis  
Failure Mode and Effects (and Criticality) Analysis (FMEA/FMECA) are structured 
methodologies for identification and analysis of effects of latent equipment failure 
modes on the system performance. This is a bottom-up process starting with the failure 
of a constituent/subsystem and investigating the effect of this on the system. It should 
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be conducted by a team of experts with cross-functional knowledge of the analysed 
system, process or product. The methodology consists of the following steps: 
1. Identify the object of the analysis (part, subsystem, step in the process, etc); 
2. Identify the function related to the object of analysis; 
3. Identify the failures of the object of the analysis; 
4. Identify the effects of different failures on the object of analysis and the system 
which the object is part of; 
5. Identify the causes of the failures; 
6. Identify and analyse existing controls in place to mitigate the failures; 
7. Identify any additional potential controls; 
8. Prioritise implementation of corrective actions using a consistent standard; 
9. Recommend actions to implement to minimise the risk. 
The criticality analysis includes the estimation of probability of occurrence and severity. 
  3.6.5 Theories of probability  
The two probabilistic theories that will be mentioned in this thesis are conditional 
probability and Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). 
Conditional probability theory was developed a long time ago, but still is one of the 
most useful tools for analysis of uncertainty. Let us consider two variables A and B with 
the associated sets of their possible values (a1, a2, a3, …, an) and (b1, b2, b3, …, bn).  
Now if we know the conditional probability of P(ai ⎢bj), whenever the event B=bn is 
observed, the probability value of unobserved event A=am can be calculated.  
Bayesian Belief Networks are directed acyclic graphs. The nodes represent uncertain 
variables and the edges are the causal or influential links between the variables. 
Associated with each node is a set of conditional probability values that model the 
uncertain relationship between the node and its parents.  
The theory of BBN combines the Bayesian notion of conditional independence and 
probability theory. Once a BBN (Fenton, Neil and Forey, 2001) is built, it can be 
executed using an appropriate propagation algorithm.  
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This involves calculating the joint probability table for the model (probability of all 
combined stages for all nodes) by exploiting the BBNs conditional probability structure 
to reduce the computational space:   
evidence
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Following diagram is a representation of a BBN. 
 
Figure 3-7: BBN representation 
Once a BBN has been compiled it can be executed and exhibits the following two key 
features: 
1. The effects of observations entered into one or more nodes can be propagated 
throughout the net, in any direction, and the marginal distribution of all nodes 
updated; 
2. Only relevant inferences can be made in the BBN. The BBN uses the conditional 
dependency structure and the current knowledge base to determine which 
inferences are valid. 
  3.6.6 Monte Carlo Simulation models  
Monte Carlo methods are statistical simulation methods that use sequences of random 
numbers to perform the simulation. With these methods, a large model of a system is 
sampled in a number of random parametric configurations, and the resulting data is used 
to describe the emerging properties of a system as a whole.  
As opposed to a conventional numerical solution approach, which would start with the 
derivation of differential equations describing the mathematical model of the physical 
system, and then discretising the differential equations to solve a set of algebraic 
equations for the unknown state of the system, the Monte Carlo methods use random 
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sampling techniques to arrive at a solution of the physical problem. Sometimes it is 
necessary to use other algebraic methods to manipulate the outcomes of Monte Carlo 
simulations.   
When using Monte Carlo methods, the real, physical process is simulated directly, and 
there is no need for derivation of the differential equations to describe the behaviour of 
the system.  
The only prerequisite is that the system or a model of the system can be described by a 
probability density functions. However, obtaining the accurate probability values and 
understanding the probability density functions can be difficult. 
Sometimes it may be necessary to carry out supplementary experiments or develop 
additional models in order to obtain sufficient information to input into the Monte Carlo 
model.    
In many applications, it is possible to predict the statistical error (the “variance”) of the 
result, and consequently it is possible to estimate the number of Monte Carlo trials that 
are needed to achieve a given error intervals. 
  3.6.7 Theory of Evidence  
In 1976, Shafer (Bhatnagar and Kanal, 1991) developed the theory of evidence.  
Probability theory states that if “S” is the universal set of events, then the uncertainty 
information consists of a probability density function, “p” such that  
p: S → [0, 1] and 1)( =∑∈Ss sp      Equation 2: Theory of evidence 
In the theory of evidence a mass function is used. The mass function is induced by the 
available evidence and it assigns parts of finite amount of belief to subset of “S”. Each 
assignment of a mass to a subset “s” of “S” represents that part of our belief that 
supports s without being able to allocate this belief among strict subsets of s.  
The degree of belief in a subset “A” of “S”, “bel(A)”, is defined as the sum of all 
masses that support either “A” or any if its strict subsets:  ∑ ∅≠∈= XAX XmAbel , )()( .      Equation 3: Degree of belief 
The degree of plausibility of a subset “A” of “S”, “Pl(A)” is defined as  ∑ ∅≠∩= AX XmAPl )()(       Equation 4: Degree of plausibility 
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or the sum of all the masses that can possibly support “A”. The possibility of a subset 
“s” supporting “A” means that the mass assigned to “s” can possibly gravitate to that 
strict subset of “s” which is also a subset of “A”.  
  3.6.8 Reliability Block Diagrams and Network models 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) are used to show a highly abstract (Pukite and 
Pukite, 1998) view of the system redundancy. The RBDs are simple, well known and 
easy to evaluate. They use blocks to represent system constituents (Goble, 1998).  
The blocks are arranged to correspond to constituents required for successful operation. 
If there is a path through the block diagram with all the blocks being successful this 
constituents the operation being successful.  
However, only two states can be represented for each constituent by RBD. This is a 
serious limitation since more often than not it is necessary to consider more than two 
states of each system constituent as part of the analysis. Network models are very 
simple models consisting of nodes and communication links. They are used to represent 
communication networks with individual links.  
  3.6.9 Fault Trees - Event Trees  
Fault and Event Trees are formalized diagrammatical models that trace paths from a top 
Hazard (unwanted event) to the basic input events via logic gates and development of a 
Hazard through to the consequences resulting from success or failure of systems 
intended to mitigate effects of the initiating event.  
A starting point of the Fault-Event Tree (FET) analysis is always the Hazard (Goble, 
1998), (Hessami, 1999a), (RSSB, 2007). 
These models can be used qualitatively, to capture and represent the scenario that gives 
a rise to a hazard and subsequently to its consequences, thus supporting options analysis 
and identification of new potential mitigations.  
Moreover these models are used to quantify the frequency/probability of occurrence of a 
hazard and its consequences, thus potentially supporting impact assessment. An 
example of the Fault –Event Tree is presented in Figure 3-8 below.  
 
Although the Fault –Event Tree models are used frequently, these modelling technique 
has some serious limitations: 
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1. The FET analysis is capable only of presenting a snapshot in time. Therefore if 
different system configurations exist during different phases of a mission, this 
technique cannot be readily used; 
2. The FET analysis does not include loss analysis therefore it does not support the 
complete risk assessment as such, but only a part of it; 
3. Temporal and spatial aspects of the system behaviour cannot be modelled by this 
technique; 
4. The FET model can only represent one system configuration at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8: An example of Fault and Event Tree 
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  3.6.10 Markov models 
Markov models use state transition diagrams as its base. This technique uses only two 
symbols (Rouvroye, 2001); a circle to represent the successful/failed system 
constituents and a directed arc to represent possible constituent failure and repair.  
The Markov models consider system states and possible transitions between them 
(Pukite and Pukite, 1998). The basic assumption in a Markov model is that the system 
has no memory and that consequently, transitional probabilities are defined purely by 
the present state and not its history.  
Probabilities of operation are calculated in each state as a function of time taking into 
consideration the failure rates and repair rates.   
  3.6.11 Petri Nets  
Petri nets are a graphical and mathematical modelling tool (Pukite and Pukite, 1998) 
and (Topintzi, 2001).  
Basic objects of Petri nets are places (represented by circles), transitions (represented by 
bars), and arcs that connect them. Input arcs enter transitions from places and output 
arcs start leave transitions and enter places. More symbols can be used. 
Places represent discrete states whilst transitions are active constituents. They model 
activities which can occur (the transition fires), thus changing the state of the system 
(the marking of the Petri net).  
Transitions are only allowed to fire if they are enabled, which means that all the 
preconditions for the activity must be fulfilled (there are enough tokens available in the 
input places).  
When the transition fires, it removes tokens from its input places and adds some at all of 
its output places.  
As a graphical tool, Petri nets capture and represent the dynamic and concurrent 
properties of system.  
It is possible to set up state equations, algebraic equations, and other mathematical 
models governing the behaviour of systems.  
Petri nets can model a variety of situations and are easy to understand.  
However, the underlying model is difficult to solve. A larger model may become very 
complex and a solution may require use of Monte Carlo tools. 
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  3.6.12 Theory of Fuzzy Sets  
Fuzzy logic simulates human decision making process, with ability to generate precise 
solutions from certain or approximate information. While most of the other conceptions 
require an accurate mathematical model to simulate real-world behaviours, fuzzy logic 
is capable of using real-world human logic and even language.  
Using fuzzy logic reduces the time required to interview and interpret a domain expert’s 
knowledge of risk sources and consequences, while still capturing any uncertainty in the 
expert’s opinion.  
Fuzzy logic is an alternative way to simulate uncertainty. Fuzzy number sets have a 
range, the wider the range the more uncertainty introduced in the system. Fuzzy 
numbers have a degree of membership between zero and one associated with each point 
in the range.  
The degree of membership is not a probability density function.  The mean of the degree 
of membership curve can be found mathematically as the centroid of an area defined by 
the curve.  The degree of membership curve does not need to integrate to 1, and 
integration of the curve does not produce a cumulative density function. There is no 
probability associated with the extremes of the range or any point within the range. 
Monte Carlo simulations are not needed for fuzzy numbers.  
Fuzzy logic is a superset of Boolean logic, which has been expanded to accommodate 
the concept of the degree of truth-values, between the “absolutely true” and “absolutely 
false”. 
The concept allows for mathematical modelling of the modes of approximate reasoning. 
The essential characteristics of fuzzy logic are: 
1. Exact reasoning is perceived as a limiting case of approximate reasoning; 
Everything is a matter of degree; 
2. Any logical system can be fuzzified; 
3. Knowledge is interpreted as a collection of elastic or, equivalently, fuzzy 
constraints on a collection of variables; 
4. Inference is viewed as a process of propagation of elastic constraints.  
All the decisions humans make are based on rules, if-then statements. Rules relate ideas 
and link one event to another, establishing cause-consequence relationships.  
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Fuzzy logic mimics these decision making processes; a decision and the means of 
choosing that decision are replaced by fuzzy sets and the rules are replaced by fuzzy 
rules. Fuzzy rules operate using a series of if-then statements.  
Each fuzzy rule defines a “patch”, a segment, of the decision making process curve. A 
finite number of patches can cover a complete curve, defining the complete “decision” 
curve. If patches are large, then the rules are loose, if patches are small then the rules are 
refined.      
 
 
 
Figure 3-9: Fuzzy Patches 
Fuzzy processors use expert knowledge expressed as a set of rules instead of, for 
example, differential equations to describe the system. A set of rules can be defined 
based on the expert knowledge using linguistic variables, which are described by fuzzy 
set.  
A linguistic variable is a quintuple (X, T(X),U,G,M), where “X” is the name of variable, 
T(X) is the term set, set of names of linguistic values of “X”, “U” is the universe of 
discourse, “G” is the grammar to generate the names and “M” is a set of semantic rules 
for associating each “X” with its meaning.   
Three steps are taken to create a fuzzy process: 
1. Fuzzification (Transformation of measurements/crisp values into fuzzy values); 
2. Rule evaluation (Application of fuzzy rules, also known as inference); 
3. Defuzzification (Obtaining crisp values or actual results). 
The employment of Fuzzy Processors is recommended for very complex processes, 
when there is no a simple mathematical model, for highly nonlinear processes and if the 
processing of linguistically formulated knowledge is to be performed.  
If we define a process surface as a hyper-plane derived from a multiple set of process 
inputs/output relationships it will be possible to relate inputs to outputs, and tune the 
processor by altering the rulebase and comparing the effect on the process surface. Each 
point on the plane has its coordinate, [x y z], defining the position within the envelope 
relating inputs, [x y] to output [z]. This means that the fuzzy processor can be tuned by 
shaping the process surface, rather than by adjusting numerical gains.  
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Furthermore it allows for complex, multiple process goals nonlinear systems to be 
defined by relatively simple distortion of the process surface shape. Each rule in the 
rulebase defines a separate processor goal. Changes to individual rules do not have a 
global effect on the process surface thus the processor action can be locally tuned to suit 
specific need. 
Overlaps of the fuzzy sets, allowing a smooth transition between rules, define an area of 
the input range where multiple input sets can be activated. This area is known as the 
Area of Influence. Increase of the overlap level, between the fuzzy sets, increases the 
proportion of the process surface contained within the Area of Influence.  
Since the de-fuzzified crisp value of the process output is located within the Area of 
Influence, increase of the proportion of the process surface contained within the Area of 
Influence, smoothes the processor action. In order to smooth the process action, but 
keep the ability to distinguish between the regions of the process surface at the same 
time, an overlap of the fuzzy sets should not extend over more than 50%. 
In order to compromise between the smoothness of process and resolution of surface, it 
is possible to use more advanced sets of shapes as membership functions, such as bell 
shaped membership functions instead of simple triangular shaped ones, to describe the 
fuzzy set.   
  3.6.13 Weighted Factors Analysis  
Weighted Factors Analysis (WeFA) methodology is a creative knowledge capture, 
representation and evaluation methodology (Lucic, 2004a), (Hessami, 1999a), 
(Hessami, 1999b) and (Hessami and Hunter, 2002). It enables the knowledge about the 
given problem to be captured and represented at a high and strategic level. WeFA 
methodology supports a holistic approach to problem solving.  
In contrast with a risk based perspective focusing on hazards alone, WeFA analysis also 
highlights the opportunities which require effort at enhancement and optimisation 
alongside reduction in risks. The knowledge elicitation process is group based, 
exploiting the diversity of expertise and perspectives. This, first, stage of the analysis is 
focused around a task identification of an AIM. The AIM is common goal/objective of 
the undertaking or a system being analysed. 
Once an AIM is defined and agreed (for example the AIM may be “Enhancements of 
the system performance”) the group is encouraged to identify the highest level 
DRIVERS and INHIBITORS which are likely to influence the AIM. The DRIVERS are 
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defined as factors that contribute to the AIM and the INHIBITORS as factors that are 
detrimental to the AIM. 
An example is presented by  Figure 3-10 and Figure 3-11 below. Let us assume that the 
study seeks to analyse factors influencing safe driving.  So, the agreed aim is “Safe 
Driving”. Furthermore, let us assume that the workshop participants concluded that 
clarity of rules and procedures and good, comprehensive training enhance the ability of 
the driver to drive safely. These two will be the DRIVERS. In the same fashion, let us 
assume that the workshop participants concluded that bad weather conditions could 
hamper driver’s attempts to drive safely.  This is the INHIBITOR in the WeFA 
terminology.   
The elicitation process should continue for each DRIVER and INHIBITOR depending 
on the need to understand its properties. The elicitation is terminated within the branch 
when the group feels sufficient clarity has emerged and further decomposition is not 
likely to add value. Figure 3-11 below, illustrates this approach. 
 
Figure 3-10: WeFA example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-11: WeFA example (expanded) 
WeFA underpins following principles: 
1. Definition and group argument on the focus of the analysis; 
2. Consideration of inherent polar opposites as influencing factors; 
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3. Hierarchical and successive decomposition; 
4. Consideration and inclusion of hard and soft factors into analysis; 
5. Simple graphical representation of knowledge; 
6. Weighting of factors according to their degree of influence; 
7. Explicit representation of dependency between factors; 
8. Potential for quantification and treatment of uncertainty; 
9. Problem resolution through options identification and evaluation. 
the author of this paper used the WeFA methodology in support of a data elicitation for 
a strategic railway project and it was observed that the WeFA methodology is especially 
beneficial when used in support of high level, strategic knowledge elicitation (Lucic, 
2001).  
Although several different technologies have been tried (BBN, Fuzzy) at the moment 
the general mathematical theory for quantified WeFA analysis is not available.  
  3.6.14 Advanced Cause – Consequence models  
Once the significant hazards within the scope of a product, process or undertaking are 
identified and recorded, it is desirable and constructive to understand their causality.  
This may help in eliminating the hazardous condition altogether or to take actions to 
reduce its likelihood or frequency. The process is referred to as Causal Analysis. The 
Modelling methodology used in support of Causal Analysis is commonly known as 
Fault Tree Methodology.  
Irrespective of the extent of preventative measures taken, hazards do occur. It is also 
desirable to develop an understanding as to how a given hazard is likely to escalate in 
the real world once it has occurred and what range of incidents and accidents are likely 
to arise from a hazard.  
The idea being that even in occurrence of a hazard, a range of measures may be 
available to detect, control and avoid accidents or minimise losses associate with such 
accidents. This process is referred to as Consequence Analysis. Consequence analysis 
involves establishing the intermediate conditions and final consequences that may arise 
from a hazard.  
It involves bottom-up assessment of each hazard and is focused on the post hazard 
horizon. The sequence of intermediate conditions identified is termed “the hazard 
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development scenario”. Defences against potential escalation (the defence may be 
equipment, procedure or circumstance) are referred to as ‘Barriers’.  
The Consequences of a hazard are categorised into three   broad categories, Safety, 
Commercial and Environmental.  An example of basic Cause- Consequence risk model 
structure is given in Figure 3-12.                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-12: Basic structure of the Cause-Consequence Model 
The following are objects that are defined within the framework of the advanced cause 
consequence model: 
1. Base Events represent different failure modes and events that may trigger the 
hazard and are related to failures of system constituents. Base events are 
numerically expressed as failure rates or probabilities.   
2. Logical gates “AND” and “OR” are used to mimic possible logical combinations 
of different failures and therefore describe the hazard evolution scenario. Together 
with base events they make up a “fault tree”. 
3. Hazard or Critical Event whose probability or frequency of occurrence is 
calculated by the fault tree. 
4. Barriers are defences against a hazard. Once a hazards is already “alive” usually 
there are still some defences, prevention measures which avert the hazard from 
becoming a consequence. Barriers are defined by the probability of success of the 
barrier working and therefore preventing the consequence. Therefore barriers have 
one input, the probability of a hazard occurring, and two outputs, the probability 
of the barrier working (success) and that of it not working (failure) There are three   
different types of barriers:     
a. Physical Barrier; equipment based protection measure, for example fire 
alarm; 
b. Procedural Barrier: procedure based protection for example evacuation 
Base Events
Core Hazard
Barrier
Consequence
 Page 66  
 
procedure; 
c. Circumstantial Barrier: if consequence is avoided by pure luck. It is 
beneficial to record these, as it may be possible to turn them, in future, into 
a physical or procedural barrier and therefore mitigate against the hazard 
better.  
5. Consequences are defined as the final outcomes of the hazardous scenario, for 
example a collision between two trains. The Cause Consequence model calculates 
the probability or frequency of occurrence of a consequence. To evaluate the risk 
of a consequence it is necessary to estimate a potential loss associated with each 
of the consequence. The estimation is not part of cause consequence modelling 
tool. Consequences are grouped into 4 categories as follows: 
a. Predominantly Safety Related Consequence: If predominant loss associated 
with the consequence is safety related then the consequence is classified as a 
safety consequence; 
b. Predominantly Commercial Consequence: If predominant loss associated 
with the consequence is commercial (damage to property, loss of service, 
etc.) then the consequence is classified as a commercial consequence; 
c. Predominantly Environmental Consequence: If predominant loss 
associated with the consequence is environmental (damage to nature, release 
of contaminated materials, etc.) then the consequence is classified as an 
environmental consequence; 
d. Broadly Safe Consequence: if a hazard occurs but due to Barriers working 
does not give a rise to a safety, commercial or environmental consequence, 
in other words if accident is avoided, then this outcome of the hazard 
development scenario is defined as a Broadly Safe consequence; 
6. Internal to model connectors, “OUT” and “IN”: due to the complexity of some of 
the cause consequence models, the modelling technique allows for models to 
spread across several pages, “work sheets” and for outputs of model elements to 
be transferred across different “work sheets”. This is realised through use of 
“OUT” and “IN” symbols. This is purely linking functionality and does not 
transform the transferred probability or frequency in any way.    
Standard Fault Tree analysis rules apply, including a need to ensure that Base Events 
are independent from each others. It is possible that the same base event may need to 
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several different consequences and hence appear in several places in the same model. In 
such cases it must be assured that the base events and relevant data are described and 
justified within the specific context each time. This can be achieved by means of use of 
logical gates to combine these Base Events with other ones to capture the specific 
context. 
The Advance Cause Consequence Modelling technique has been further developed into 
parametric modelling technique and used on several railway projects. The most recent 
application of the technique is described in the following chapter of this thesis. 
3.7 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter the author presented the findings of the literature research the author 
carried out. Two specific areas of interest were subject of the research.  Firstly system 
theory applicable to safety engineering, the notion of a system, formal definition of the 
system as a concept, the modelling process and the reasoning process were investigated 
and are summarised here. The knowledge gained from this activity has been used as an 
essential building block in the later development.  Following from that, a review of the 
existing analysis tools and methodologies was carried out and findings from that 
research are summarised here as well. A more detailed critique of these is provided in 
chapter 5 of the thesis.  
The main criticism of the existing methodologies is that they do not make a holistic, 
integrated and heterogeneous framework.  
However, each of the methodologies described in this section is useful on its own right, 
and should be used in support of analysis of specific problem area.  
Figure 3-13 below provides an overview of all the methodologies reviewed here and 
their applicability on the problem domain.  
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Figure 3-14: Overview of analysed methodologies and their applicability on the problem domain. 
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CHAPTER 4:  The Application Area & Initial Development 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
As already discussed in the previous section the existing techniques for analysis and 
assessment of safety risk as an emerging property of the System, do not amount to an 
integrated methodology for analysis and assessment of complex systems.   
Some of the techniques (detailed earlier) the author used in practise, to support delivery 
of four different projects.  
However, it was necessary to develop these techniques further, and in some cases 
develop new ones, and then integrate them into a coherent, consistent methodology.   
Although these four projects provided a drive for further development and a novel 
approach, due to the limited scopes of the projects at that stage it was not necessary to 
develop a holistic integrated methodology the Engineering Safety and Assurance 
Process (ESAP), mentioned earlier in the thesis, as an integrated framework. The 
Victoria Line Upgrade Programme (detailed later in the thesis) which was at an early 
stage in its lifecycle (sufficiently early in the project, at design stage) provided a 
drive/need for and justified the evolution of the processes and the methodology, using 
the experience and knowledge gathered trough work on the four projects depicted in this 
section, into ESAP.   
As part of the research, these projects have been used to test some of the novel concepts 
and approaches.   
The following is the description of the practice and the processes followed. Novel 
applications of existing methodologies and development of novel methodologies by the 
author are indicated appropriately.  
The structure of this chapter is outlined by Figure 4-1 below. 
For each of the projects, the author outlined the purpose and scope of the project and 
presented the work and research carried out, development of new techniques and results 
of the work.  
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Figure 4-1: Outline structure and the argument presented in Chapter 4
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4.2 First Project: Large Scale Safety Risk Modelling – ERTMS 
The modelling technique used on the project is novel. The technique and the tools 
supporting it were developed by the Risk Analysis Unit team of Railtrack Plc. The 
author was involved in the development of the process and the tools as a member of the 
team and has developed the algorithms and specification for extension of a tool in 
support of modelling work as outlined later.  
  4.2.1 Purpose and Scope of the Project  
The purpose of the project was to define and quantify the safety requirements for 
European Railways Traffic Management System (ERTMS). The European Commission 
for Transport is managing the project, the biggest pan European engineering 
undertaking ever in terms of finances involved, geographical spread, required workforce 
and the complexity of technology involved.  
The aim is to connect all European countries with a fully compatible high speed rail 
network (500 km/hour). Later phases of the project are envisaged to include other 
former eastern European countries, the  Balkans, Greece, Russia and Asian countries.  
Standardised safety requirements and safety targets are necessary to achieve full 
compatibility between trains, railroads (track, signalling, power supply, 
telecommunications, etc.) and operating rules. A number of novel techniques and 
extensions of the existing techniques and tools have been used to enable safety risk 
modelling as follows: 
1. Use of state transition and sequence and collaboration models in support of 
Hazard Identification; 
2. Creation of a reference, virtual, railway system used to derive a common data set 
to enable development of the unified risk model; 
3. Extension of existing tools and techniques in support of model integration of 
individual models into an integrated model, risk profiling and apportionment 
(Advanced Cause Consequence Modelling has been developed further into the 
Parametric Advanced Cause Consequence Modelling technique supported by a 
tool “Integrated Safety Assurance Environment (ISAE)”). 
These developments are depicted in following sections.  
  4.2.2 Problem Description and Conceptualisation 
The analysed system is not a uniform system; it is different in many aspects at different 
places throughout Europe. At the time of the project, three   different technical 
solutions, each with several variants, were planned, to suit diverse needs of national 
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railways as well as varied financial potential of EU member states.  Nevertheless, it was 
necessary to define the system to facilitate identification of the hazards resulting in a 
common, universal set of safety targets.   
The following is a list of the problems the project has to resolve: 
1. No detailed specification; 
2. No single system solution; 
3. No generic description of a system; 
4. Different operational rules in different countries; 
5. Different operational environments; 
6. Different safety cultures and legal regimes throughout the EU; 
7. No uniform data collection system; 
8. Different stake-holders; 
9. Different activities, tools and techniques; 
10. Different degrees and measures of control; 
11. Vastly different time-scales & costs; 
12. Vastly different risk profiles; 
13. Different people and competencies; 
14. Different needs (freight versus passenger services, etc.); 
15. Different levels of technological development and density of existing 
infrastructure. 
However, initial analysis showed that the system is sufficiently known in generic terms 
that can be broken down into elements that broadly fit into one of three   categories: 
1. Environment; 
2. Constituents; 
3. Operational modes. 
Environment is defined as the environment within which the system works, including 
people, weather, climate conditions, traffic density, etc.  Constituents are constituents of 
the system, its hardware and software and people. Different operational modes are in 
fact dictated by different technological and procedural solutions to the same problem 
namely: 
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Level 1  operational mode or the railway system as it is now, but operated in 
accordance with new synchronised operational rules; 
Level 2   operational mode or ‘in cab’ signalling systems where information to the train 
is transmitted via short distance transmission antennas positioned between 
rails at carefully chosen places so to mimic the functions of the conventional 
signal;  
Level 3   operational mode or ‘in cab’ signalling where information to the train is 
transmitted via radio signal securing continuous and almost instantaneous 
information update. 
Within any operational mode described above a number of operational states, generic 
situations, was identified, in such a way that, one could say that at any moment in time a 
train has to be in one and only one state or situation. 
  4.2.3 System representation and scoping 
In support of the system representation and scoping, existing modelling techniques, 
“State Transition” and “Sequence and Collaboration” modelling were used in a novel 
way. A high level generic system description has been developed and used as the 
starting point of analysis, using the state transition model. The focal point of this 
representation is a train (Figure 3-5, earlier in the report).  This, high level description, 
referred to as “ERTMS State Transition Diagram”, depicts all the possible transitions 
between different states of a train within the ERTMS operational environment.   
Three main classes of system behaviour have been identified:  
1. Static States: The train does not move, none of the vital train management 
functions are engaged and the train is either shutting down or powering on; 
2. Pre & Post Process: Preparation for the journey, arming of the computer or 
resetting the computer data and waiting for change towards “preparation for next 
mission” ; 
3. Traffic Management States: The actual journey including all possible states of a 
normal journey as well as emergencies and degraded operations. 
In total 13 states have been identified: • Shut Down; • Scheduled Stop; • End Mission. • Power On-Cab Not in Service; • Rescue / Assist  • Stand-By; • Shunting;  • Prepare For Next Mission; • Emergencies;  • Protected Movement; • Degraded Mode;  • Begin/Restart Mission; • Failed Mode;  
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For each identified state a so called pseudo-Spec has been developed, depicting the state 
itself and transitions from one state to another including the description of the transition 
trigger. 
Subsequently, the “ERTMS State Transition Diagram” has been further analysed and 
each of the individual states has been described in detail using the “Sequence and 
Collaboration” analysis (Figure 4-2).   
 
Figure 4-2: Authorised Movement - Staff Responsible [Sequence & Collaboration diagram] 
All the actors/constituents of the system taking part in a states’ existence are positioned 
on the top of the diagram. The vertical axis represents time and horizontal directional 
lines define exchanges between the actors.  
These exchanges can be communication or command/control exchanges and are 
distinguished by use of full and dotted lines respectively. Transition points (entry to the 
state and exit from the state, including transition triggers) have been described as well.  
These representations have been used as a base of the hazard identification process. 
Each of these exchanges has been analysed one by one.  
  4.2.4 Focus and Identification 
Hazard Identification 
Usually a Hazard Identification (HAZID) session is structured around loose system 
descriptions or system block diagrams. However in support of the HAZID for this 
project, the system scope and context was depicted using the State Transition and 
Sequence and Collaboration (S&C) Modelling.  This novel use of existing modelling 
techniques, in support of the hazard identification resulted in a structured and systematic 
base for the hazard identification as the hazards resulting from each process or 
interaction were elicited (Lucic, 2005c).  A common method by the consideration of 
keywords (such as NOT, LATE, EARLY, ALSO, etc) in relation to each exchange of 
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the S&C models was used to support the HAZID process.   
In addition, a novel function of the context diagram was to identify the experience and 
expertise required from the hazard identification panel. Participants were allowed to 
express their opinion and encouraged to take an active part in the session.  
In order to secure as comprehensive as possible source of data and ideas care has been 
taken to form groups with wide range of trans-national expertise: 
1. Engineers with design experience; 
2. Operation managers; 
3. Maintenance engineers; 
4. Performance and Safety Performance managers; 
5. Safety & Standards managers; 
6. Train drivers. 
Identified hazards were carefully recorded to be used as the base of further analysis.  
There are many benefits of “on-line” capture, the main one being that the panel can 
agree (or argue about, which is more usual) the final wording of the hazard and its 
consequences and mitigations. The form, designed in Microsoft ACCESS and projected 
on the wall during the HAZID sessions was used to capture all the elicited information.  
Analysis of hazards  
Around 150 hazards were identified. This is too many hazards to analyse individually 
and furthermore many are related anyway. Consequently all similar and/or related 
hazards were grouped into higher level groupings, clusters of hazards, labelled Core 
Hazards.  
Core Hazards were the base cells of knowledge integrated into the knowledge structure. 
In a way, the Risk universe was partitioned into galaxies of hazards. 
Initially, a “risk universe” with 10 “galaxies”, Core Hazards, was formed: 
1. Less Restrictive Movement Authority; 
2. Driver Exceeds allowable Movement Authority; 
3. Train Exceeds allowable Movement Authority; 
4. Inappropriate Routing of Train; 
5. Errors & Failures during Shunting; 
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6. Errors & Failures during Rescue; 
7. Errors & Failures during Coupling/Joining; 
8. Errors & Failures during Shutdown/Power up; 
9. Errors & Failures during Standby/Prepare for Next Mission; 
10. Inappropriate Level Transitions. 
However, some of the Core Hazards were too complex to be modelled, hence some of 
them were divided into a Number of Sub-Core Hazards. At the end 19 Hazard 
Groupings were established. Following the analysis of each core hazard, 40 Cause – 
Consequence models have been developed, because for some of the core hazards, more 
than one  model was needed in order to adequately model the safety risk. 
  4.2.5 Core Hazards Modelling 
Causal Analysis and Modelling is the first part of the modelling process.  The aim of the 
causal analysis is to identify all the events/causes, and all the intermediate conditions 
which lead to a hazardous condition (Lucic, 2005d). 
Each of the Core Hazards has been analysed in turn, attempting to determine all the 
causalities of the Core Hazard and logical relationships between identified causalities 
leading to the materialisation of the Core Hazard. As result of this, a fault tree has been 
developed for each Core Hazard. 
In a fashion similar to causal analysis, consequence analysis of each core hazard has 
been undertaken. Consequence analysis involves establishing the intermediate 
conditions and consequences that may arise from a hazard. It involves bottom-up 
assessment of each hazard and is focused on post hazard horizon. At each intermediate 
state existing defences against potential escalation have been identified. The defence 
may be equipment, procedure or circumstance.  
The sequence of identified intermediate conditions is termed “the hazard development 
scenario”.  
The consequences fit into one of the following categories: predominantly safety related 
consequence, predominantly commercial consequence, predominantly environmental 
consequence, broadly safe condition.  
The combination of a causal model of a core hazard and the consequence model, of the 
same core hazard, results in the Core Hazard Cause-Consequence Model. The model 
calculates the frequencies or probabilities of occurrence for all the consequences within 
the model.  
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To estimate the risk that each of the consequences brings to the system it is necessary to 
calculate the loss that each consequence may give rise to. To estimate the loss for each 
of the consequences a software based tool has been used, General Loss Estimation 
Engine (GLEE).  
Loss for each consequence has been characterised through the following categories: 
1. Safety loss to Passengers: 
a. Minor Injury; 
b. Major Injury; 
c. Fatality; 
d. Equivalent fatalities; 
2. Safety loss to Worker: 
a. Minor Injury; 
b. Major Injury; 
c. Fatality; 
d. Equivalent fatalities; 
3. Safety loss to Neighbour: 
a. Minor Injury; 
b. Major Injury; 
c. Fatality; 
d. Equivalent fatalities; 
4. Commercial loss (damage to property); 
5. Delays to service; 
6. Environmental damage.  
The tool is based on use of the accident data from European railways to calculate 
estimated cost of safety, commercial and environmental losses.  
The tool provides separate cost calculations for each of the above categories and has 
integral treatment of uncertainty and modular structure providing a flexible and 
expandable environment. The tool works in two modes: 
Site-specific:  allows the user to fully specify the region in which the incident occurs, 
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including other input parameters such as types of train involved, time 
of day etc. 
Network:  the user is required to input only the type of incident and then the 
losses are calculated for averaged input parameters for a specified 
network (e.g. nationwide). 
As result of that the risk prediction from the model is expressed in 15 categories 
corresponding to 15 loss categories as detailed above.  
In order to support  risk profiling, integration of individual core hazard models into one, 
overall safety risk model and options analysis,  the existing technique cause 
consequence modelling was developed further as detailed in related sections below.  
  4.2.6 Model Data  
Because the project was pan-European, inclusive of all European railways, the model 
had to take into account all the different system configurations across Europe.  
Hence, the only pragmatic solution to the problem was to invent a virtual railway line, 
depicted by the parameters averaged (worst case from each line) across 5 European high 
speed railway lines.  
Parameters identified as significant to our modelling have been normalised to produce 
the European Reference Operational Environment (Lucic, 2005d). Following is a 
sample of used parameters:  
1. Number of level crossings; 
2. Number of stations; 
3. Number of signals; 
4. Average train speed; 
5. Number of trains; 
6. Number of passengers; 
7. Average train weight; 
8. Number of trackside workers.  
These parameters were used to calculate failure rates for the model elements, base 
events and barriers. For example, a failure rate of a subsystem is a function of number 
of trains passed and their average speed and weight, or probability of worker protection 
procedures being successful is a function of the average train speed, number of trains 
passing and number of workers on the line.  
Collated together the information about parameters forms a Parametric Data Set (PAD).  
Following from that, a data set containing all the parameters used to calculate base 
event and barrier values has been defined.  
The parameter values from the data set were “fed” into the model, the calculations were 
run and “Crisp value” absolute risk for each consequence was calculated. 
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4.2.7 Integration of Individual Models into a Holistic System Safety Performance 
Model – Development  
Initially individual Core Hazard models have been developed. However the reality does 
not consist of a number of standalone hazards. Clusters of Hazards, referred to as Core 
Hazards interact with each other defining all the properties of the “Risk Space”.  
Hence, it was necessary to identify all the dependencies between the Core Hazards.  
Some of the models where in fact, feeding into other models, defining the failure rates 
of higher level base events, or barriers as represented in Figure 4-3 below.  Once all of 
the dependences were identified, the individual core hazard models were integrated into 
a “system safety performance model” (Lucic, 2005d).  
In addition to the integration into a “system safety performance model”, it was 
concluded that grouping all the similar consequences together into a so called virtual 
consequence would be very useful; if the virtual consequences correspond to accident 
categories collated by industry or regulatory bodies since these can be used to calibrate 
the model against the historical data.   
A simple criterion for grouping of consequences was developed specifically for that 
purpose: 
Total System 
Consequence 
Level 4 virtual 
consequence 
Level 3 
virtual 
consequence 
Level 2 virtual 
consequence 
Level 1 
virtual 
consequence 
Real 
consequences  
Σ of all risks 
Safety 
Consequences   
Train 
Accidents 
Movement Collisions 
Derailments 
Level Crossing 
Accidents 
Non-movement In Stations 
Other premises 
Other 
(explosions, 
fires, structure 
failures, etc.) 
Predominantly 
Passenger 
Related 
NA 
Predominantly 
Neighbour 
Related 
NA 
Predominantly 
Worker Related 
NA 
Commercial / 
Environmental 
Consequences 
Train 
Accidents 
Delays NA 
Infrastructure 
Damage 
NA 
Environmental 
Damage 
NA 
Other Delays NA 
Infrastructure 
Damage 
NA 
Environmental 
Damage 
NA 
Table 4-1: Consequence Groupings 
Consequences 
emerging from 
core hazards 
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Consequences emerging directly from the core hazard models were grouped simply, by 
summing all the same risk categories together. For example predictions for two 
consequences are: 
1. For consequence “A”: 2 fatalities per annum, 5 major injuries per annum and 34 
minor injuries per annum;  
2. For consequence “B”: 4 fatalities per annum, 7 major injuries per annum, 55 
minor injuries per annum and  £2,000,000.00 of commercial damage per annum.  
An integrated consequence “C=A+B” is: 6 fatalities per annum, 12 major injuries per 
annum, 89 minor injuries per annum and  £2,000,000.00 of commercial damage per 
annum.  The Total System Risk prediction is simply a sum of all the consequences 
together.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Core hazards models hierarchy 
Virtual consequences  
                   (groupings of  real  
                      consequences) 
    Real consequences 
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consequence feeding 
the virtual 
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Two outputs of 
different models 
processed into one 
feed into a 
consequence 
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the author specified and carried out further upgrade of ISAE tool (Lucic, 2005e), 
assisting development of integrated/correlated models through introduction of new 
objects within the ISAE. 
Four new functions and types of linking were identified during the integration process: 
1. An output of one core hazard model determining the frequency of a Base Event, the 
constituent of another core hazard model structure. There are two possible ways that 
this link may happen: 
a. A link between two models is established/identified to pass the frequency of the 
consequence originating from one model to the base event of another model (the 
information passed is the calculated frequency of the consequence). This 
frequency becomes the frequency of the base event occurrence;  
b. A link between two models is established/identified to pass the frequency of the 
critical event originating from one model to the base event of another model 
(the information passed is the calculated frequency of the critical event). This 
frequency becomes the frequency of the base event occurrence; 
2. A fault tree determining the probability of success of a barrier, within one model. 
Sometimes a barrier is defined by a combination of events. In that case a fault tree 
is required to describe and define performance of the barrier; 
3. A real/virtual consequence feeding the virtual consequence. In the case of the 
linking between the models being established by linkage of real consequences into 
virtual consequences, the information passed from the real consequence should be 
calculated risk for each loss category;  
4. Intermediate processing. Regardless of the type of the link, information carried by 
the link could be processed in several different ways:  
a. Logical processing in terms of “AND” and “OR” logical operations performed 
on combined  links;  
b. Splitting of links into several outputs with distributed weighting; 
c. Transform function performed on combined links producing single or multiple-
weighted outputs; 
d. Simple addition of multiple links of the same type into a single link. 
Following from the above identified novel functions two different modelling 
environments were identified as well: 
1. Individual models worksheets: Within this environment, modelling of individual 
models is carried out. Basic characteristics of this environment are same as the 
characteristics of the previous cause-consequence modelling environment, with 
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following exceptions: 
a. New inter-modal IN and OUT symbols were introduced, in support of 
integration and linking of outputs from one model to inputs into base events or 
barriers of other models; 
b. Facilities to support three   dimensional classification of base events were 
incorporated, as detailed later in section 4.2.10 Derivation of Requirements; 
c. Enhanced apportionment engine was incorporated into as detailed later in 
section 4.2.10 Derivation of Requirements; 
2. Model Integration Environment: This is a completely new working/modelling 
environment developed within the ISAE tool.  
New objects “operating” within this environment are first listed below and described in 
detail in APPENDIX B: 
1. Critical Event Model super object (real consequences and base events of the 
model) to enable graphical linking of models into an integrated super-model;  
2. Transfer Function intermittent operator;  
3. Splitter intermittent operator; 
4. Logical Gates (AND, OR) intermittent operator;  
5. Super Connectors intermittent operator; 
6. Virtual Consequences; 
7. Links from real/virtual consequence to virtual consequence; 
8. Links from real consequence to base event; 
9. Links from the critical event to the base event. 
These additional objects are necessary and sufficient to support inter-modal integration 
process. 
Inter-modal, model integration environment is illustrated by Figure 4-4below. 
Following integration of the Core Hazard Models, it was possible to calculate 
contributions of individual model elements to the total System Risk.  
Overall the integrated model consists of 40 individual models, corresponding to 19 core 
hazards (some core hazards could not be analysed by a single model, and were broken 
into smaller, more manageable pieces referred to as sub-core hazards). In total the 
integrated model consist of 583 base events, 240 states, 499 barriers and 365 
consequences.  
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Figure 4-4: Model integration environment 
   
HP600
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
 
COS----NAME 
COS----NAME 
HP200 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
 
COS----NAME 
COS----NAME 
HP300
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
 
COS----NAME 
COS----NAME 
Splitte
HP500 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COC----NAME 
 
75%25%
HP700
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COC----NAME 
 
HP700
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
BEIN---NAME 
COS----NAME 
COS----NAME 
 
VRBC-
 
VRSC-
 
VREC-
 
VRSC-
 
VRSC-
 
VRSC-
 
VRCC-
 
VRCC-
OR &
Modification 
Function 
  
Page 84  
 
 
  4.2.8 Output Generation and Normalisation 
The following is a sample of some of the forecasts:  
 
Consequences 
Ref Description Annual Frequency 
1.1 Collisions 2.6 
1.2 Derailments 1.1 
1.3 Other Movement Accidents 0.2 
1.4 Commercial Only Accidents 1600 
1.5 Null (no consequence) 2900 
1.6 Level Crossing Accidents 0.00088 
 
Table 4-2: Sample of ERTMS study result data 
Thus the predictions are 2.6 collisions per annum, 1.1 derailment per annum, other 
movement accidents 0.2 per annum (or twice each 10 years), 1600 accidents resulting in 
commercial risk only each year, 2900 times nothing will happen though the hazard will 
exist (or in other words the accident will be averted)  and 0.00088 level crossing 
accidents per annum.  
Safety targets as stated by European Commission for Railways are (per year per 
exposed person): 
1. Average population safety target –> 1.0E-05; 
2. Passenger risk of fatality -> 3.3E-06; 
3. Workers risk of fatality -> 3.3E-06; 
4. Neighbours risk of fatality -> 3.3E-06. 
Comparing the first forecasts against the above targets clearly indicates that the original 
model predictions for the safety performance of the system were unsatisfactory.  
Comparison of virtual consequences against railway accident reports was used to 
calibrate the models against the historical data.  The review of data and logic resulted in 
several corrections to the logic and data of the model, until a model was accepted as 
representative (Lucic, 2005d).  
  4.2.9 Risk Profiling 
The first step towards risk profiling was to define the parameters not as crisp values but 
as statistical distributions, with minimum and maximum values and a distribution.  
Consequently calculated risks are articulated as statistical distribution.  
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This type of risk profiling is referred to as “One Dimensional Risk Profiling”.  
By defining the parameters as functions of time and space, the risk calculations become 
three-dimensional, distribution functions of time and space.  
This type of risk profiling is referred to as “Three Dimensional Risk Profiling”.  
  4.2.10 Derivation of Requirements 
Apportionment and Importance 
Although risk profile is extremely useful, being able to identify the contribution of 
model elements, or in other words the contribution of equipment and procedural failures 
and human errors to the total risk is even more desirable. This process is referred to as 
“apportionment”. 
The following problem was encountered on the onset of the apportionment study:  
Base events and barriers actually represent failures of equipment and procedures, which 
in different scenarios cause different problems, thus what is required is to ascertain the 
absolute level of reliability of equipment and processes, necessary to achieve in order to 
produce a safe system. However, the integrated model is very large and complex, with 
many instances of the same equipment or process failure causing different 
consequences.  
For that reason it was necessary to find a way to distinguish the model elements 
representing the same type of the failure.  
As a solution to this problem a three tier classification system was introduced, 
differentiating between:  
1. A function provided by the system or constituent (primary classification), for 
example Train Speed Control; 
2. A function provider (secondary classification), for example Automatic Train 
Protection System on board of the train; 
3. A function environment (tertiary classification), for example failures arising 
During Protected Movement. 
Therefore, part of description of each model element (Base Event and Barrier) is its 
three parameter classification vector {x,y,z}. 
For each classification group, primary, secondary and tertiary, a substantial number of 
classifications have been identified and the data on classifications is kept as a separate 
table depicting all the classifications and classification coding (abbreviations). 
Combining tables of classification coding with data sets containing parameter values (or 
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functions) results in a data set referred to as a General Parametric Data Set (GPAD). 
The GPAD contains all the parametric information and classification descriptions 
feeding into the model.  
Most of the configuration management of the model was concentrated on the GPAD. 
This is because once the model logical structure is developed and confirmed as a correct 
one, this part of the model becomes almost static and the changes introduced to the 
model are mostly related to changes of parameter values and classifications. The GPAD 
must be carefully configuration managed since a small change in one of the parameters 
may have large impact on the total risk prediction calculated by the model, and it is 
necessary to know to what data set the calculations relate. By simply changing the 
GPAD data it is possible, using the same logical structure, to simulate different system 
configurations. This is a great advantage, since until the system solution becomes stable, 
potentially many different system configurations are possible and representing each one 
separately through a direct change in the model would be extremely time consuming.  
By adding together contributions of all the model elements with the same classification 
code, the overall contribution of individual equipment, groups of people or procedures 
to the total system risk was calculated using new algorithms developed in support of 
this modelling technique.    
Analysis was performed on 4 different levels for each risk category: 
1. Apportionment of a virtual consequence to lower layer virtual consequences 
feeding it; 
2. Apportionment of a virtual consequence to “source” consequences; 
3. Apportionment of a virtual consequence to Core Hazards (Critical Events); 
4. Importance of a virtual or a “source” consequence relative to Base Events and 
Barriers.   
The author developed algorithms for all 4 calculations as outlined in the APPENDIX A 
of the thesis.  
Requirements 
Estimating risks emerging from a system is useful but what is required is a target rate 
for each core hazard/sub core hazard or Tolerable Hazard Rates. 
For each of the core hazards an annual rate that would satisfy the Safety Targets as 
specified by European commission for transport has been calculated. The hazard rate is 
expressed as an annual frequency of occurrence.  
Following from that, the results of modelling were used to establish the target Safety 
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Integrity Levels (SIL) for Control Command Constituents (subsystems of the train 
control system). Using calculated minimum and maximum annual failure rates and 
probability values SILs were allocated to subsystems (Lucic, 2005f). 
  4.2.11 Optioneering application 
The most beneficial use of the modelling is in support of options and impact analysis. 
Using the model it is possible to identify the most important contributors to the risk and 
concentrate efforts to improve the performance of the system on these critical model 
elements (Lucic, 2005f).  
An important part of options analysis is apportionment to the model elements. As 
already mentioned earlier, it is possible to distinguish three apportionment categories: 
1. Apportionment to failures of functions within the system; 
2. Apportionment to failures of function providers and 
3. Apportionment to failures of function providers operating in specific mode. 
For example, apportionment of total equivalent fatalities to equipment (control 
command constituents) and subsequently to functions provided by each control 
command constituent (the model indicates that 17% of risk comes from the subsystem 
“L” (vital computer), where of total failures of vital computer 35% happen during data 
entry, 19% during start up and test, 18% during train trip, 14% happen when protection 
for passing trains is activated, 16% happen when external alarms are activated).  
There are two ways to utilise the model for optioneering and impact analysis.   
Firstly it is possible to change the parameters values and shape of distribution and see 
the impact of these changes on model predictions.  
Secondly, a new base event or a barrier (a new model element) can be implanted and the 
impact of the change assessed.  
In both cases of optioneering it is the impact of the change, from original risk profile to 
new risk profile that is being analysed. Using these results it is possible to justify either 
additional investment to implement new mitigation measure or improve performance of 
existing equipment or reasonably reject implementation of suggested mitigation 
measure using as an argument a line of reasoning fact that investment is grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits new mitigation measure could create if implemented.     
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4.3 Second Project: Axle Counter modelling 
  4.3.1 Purpose and Scope of the Project  
In this section a risk modelling process as the author applied it on a real life project, 
from the initial stages of elicitation to final stages of testing and application is 
presented. 
Axle counter application risk models have been developed aiming to support derivation 
of Safety Cases for individual axle counter installation projects. In accordance with the 
UK safety case regime, each project will have to prove that the technological and 
procedural solution accepted for the project is the As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP) solution.  
To achieve this, each individual project will have to demonstrate that a number of 
different options have been considered and that the most suitable solution has been 
selected. In addition to this, the project will have to prove that the safety risks 
introduced to the railway system by introduction of new technology are acceptably low.  
In this section the focus will be on a model supporting analysis of the Reset processes, 
the Failures during reset model. The aim of this section is to: 
1. Depict the development of Axle Counter Application Models; 
2. Describe the process followed during the development of the models and; 
3. Outline the process for future use of models. 
  4.3.2 Axle Counter Train Detection Concept  
The overall behaviour of an axle counter is represented by the state-space diagram in 
Figure 4-5.  
Essentially, an axle counter detects the passage of train wheels at the entrances and exits 
to a section of track, and increments or decrements a count accordingly.   
If the count is more than zero, then the track section is set to occupied, and if less than 
zero the section is set to undefined. If the count is zero, and if internal safety checks, 
which will depend on the specific design of the axle counter in question, are satisfied, 
then the track section will be indicated as clear.  
Thus, when the first wheel of a train entering the section passes over a detection point, 
the section will be indicated as occupied. As each subsequent wheel passes over the 
detection devices in the same direction as the first (usually called “counting heads”) the 
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internal count will be incremented.  As the train leaves the section, the count will be 
decremented for each wheel that passes over the counting heads. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5: State-space diagram 
When the last wheel leaves, the count will return to zero, and provided the internal 
safety checks have been satisfied, the section will once again be indicated as clear.  
An important safety check, which is common in principle to all types of axle counter, 
concerns the detection of any event which could have interrupted the ability to detect 
and count wheels at any entrance or exit points.  Such events might include interruption 
of the power supply, loss of communication with a detection point, or temporary 
removal of detection devices.   
If such an event occurs, then it is possible that a train may have entered or left the 
section undetected, and it is essential that the axle counter should default to a non-clear 
state until it has been brought into correspondence with the actual state of the railway.   
The default state, which is generally, designated the “disturbed” or “undefined” state of 
the axle counter, will typically be treated as equivalent to an occupied state by the rest 
of the signalling system.   
Recovery from the disturbed state can normally be achieved only by the operation of an 
external reset control, although it may be possible with certain designs of axle counter 
for the recovery to be achieved automatically following the successful completion of a 
complete count in – count out cycle as a train occupies and clears the section.  
The latter arrangement would be possible only for certain, very specific types of 
disturbance. The external reset facility resets the axle counter to a clear state on all types 
of axle counter considered to date. 
  4.3.3 The Modelling Technique and the Tool 
The technique used for the development of the risk models is known as Advanced 
Cause-Consequence Analysis and is described in previous section. The tool used for 
development of these models is Integrated Safety Assurance Environment 8 (ISAE8). 
The Integrated Safety Assurance Environment assists development of Cause- 
OCCUPIED CLEAR
UNDEFINED 
COUNT IN
COUNT OUT 
FAULT FAULT 
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Consequence risk models by organising the input, ensuring that all details captured are 
recorded, and allows the analysis of models using graphical worksheets. 
Once the models are complete, ISAE8 can then generate a mathematical model and will 
allow different scenarios to be run to assess the influence of different factors on the 
model. 
Whilst ISAE8 is a good analysis tool, it must not be the basis on which decisions about 
life and death situations should be based. However it does provide an insight into the 
model, and may focus the further studies and analysis required.  
The ISAE8 system is split into three distinct areas: 
1. Pre-Processing; 
2. Core Functions; 
3. Post-Processing. 
Pre-Processing: includes all the functions required to set up the project management 
information and the initial data collection. The following are constituents of the Pre-
Processing module of ISAE: 
The Hazard Log, should be used initially to record information about the Hazards. 
The System Parameters. The tool supports parametric modelling (numerical values of 
model elements can be expressed as fixed numbers, parametric functions or statistical 
functions. This module of the tool allows for information about parameters to be 
defined. Sets of parameters can be organised in different Parametric Data Sets, 
corresponding to different scenarios to be modelled.  
The Classifications. As the risk analysts construct the model, additional data is captured 
at significant points in the design in the form of classification codes. When the model is 
complete the models can be calculated based on the apportionment of risk based on 
these classification codes. So when preparing ISAE for use in a new project, it is 
important to enter the Classification Codes early in the process to be used should be 
entered in the system. 
The management side involves setting up and maintaining information about: 
1. Organisations involved in the project; 
2. The hazards within the project; 
3. The project team; 
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4. Project documents; 
5. Project tasks. 
Core Functions: includes the main Causal and Consequence modelling element of ISAE 
and allows the user to produce a risk model using various building blocks (Base Events, 
Logical Gates, Critical Events-Hazards, Barriers and Consequences), which can be 
drawn onto one or more Worksheets to model the Hazard. Once the risk scenario has 
been drawn it is validated and an Excel compatible Algorithm File (ALF) can be 
generated for subsequent simulation. It is also possible to define formulae for the losses 
pertaining to each Consequence or Accident. The Core Functions module also supports 
integration of models of individual hazard scenarios into one integrated, holistic model. 
Post-Processing: allows further evaluation of the risk model by generating “What-if” 
scenarios. It also includes a reporting facility and the apportionment function to 
calculate the risks apportioned to selected elements. 
Accurate and reliable train detection is an integral part of a safe railway signalling 
system.  The principal method of train detection, in the UK, has been by the use of track 
circuits.   
The widespread introduction on the UK Railways, of axle counters for train detection 
where track circuits would otherwise have been used, is a strategic decision made by the 
Network Rail (UK Railways custodian).   
Axle counters have only been used in specific applications in the UK, generally in small 
quantities. The large scale, widespread application of axle counters is new to the UK 
railway industry.  
The Concept Safety Case (ATKINS, 2002) was developed to demonstrate that axle 
counter systems can be implemented safely on Network Rail controlled infrastructure 
where track circuits would otherwise have been used.  
The Concept Safety Case does not attempt to show that risks associated with axle 
counters are ALARP in an absolute sense. It does show that the risks associated with 
axle counters can be made as low, or lower than, those associated with track circuits.  
It provides a framework so that individual application safety cases can demonstrate that 
the type of axle counter system that is being commissioned on a particular project 
reduce the risks to ALARP (relative to provision or retention of track circuits). 
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Application specific issues cannot be addressed at the concept level. To demonstrate 
ALARP, it is necessary to consider the application in conjunction with the Concept 
Safety Case, as the latter cannot deal with reasonable practicality in all situations.   
What is reasonably practicable is dependent on the specific technology of the axle 
counter, and of the signalling system of which it forms part, and the specific 
circumstances of the application.  
Thus, provided individual Project and Application Safety Cases demonstrate that they 
have met the safety targets, the integrity requirements and the generic safety 
requirements provided within the Concept Safety Case, and that they have mitigated the 
specific project and application hazards, the Project Safety Case demonstrates that axle 
counters can be used safely as the sole train detection system where track circuits would 
otherwise have been used on Network Rail controlled infrastructure (ATKINS, 2002).  
There are many factors to consider on UK railways infrastructure, all of which vary 
considerably throughout the UK: 
1. Traffic density; 
2. Rolling stock; 
3. Traction systems; 
4. Procedures; 
5. Clearances; and 
6. Control systems. 
Consequently the model developed to support individual axle counter projects, had to be 
generic, independent of any particular project solution and application but capable of 
simulating the particular project solution and environment. 
  4.3.4 Analysis Approach  
Scope of analysis and modelling included all interfaces between the signalling system 
and the axle counter system, taking into account all the processes related to axle counter 
operation including control, command and communication exchanges.  
Capability to realistically represent any chosen application is achieved by complete 
separation of logical structures and underlying data.  
By changing the dataset used to run model calculations it is possible to simulate 
different, project specific solutions.  
The process adopted for the development of models consists of 7 stages: 
1. Review of existing related information; 
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2. Definition of the system; 
3. Identification of hazards; 
4. Analysis of hazards in terms of grouping and structuring; 
5. Cause-Consequence analysis - Development of logical structures; 
6. Cause-Consequence analysis-Parameterisation; 
7. Testing, reviewing and gathering of data for testing. 
The high level overview of the signalling system has been developed in support of the 
identification of hazards and options for mitigation of hazards. The signalling system 
overview used as a base for hazard identification and modelling, defines all potential 
interfaces between the signalling system and the axle counter system, taking into 
account all the processes related to axle counter operation including control, command 
and communication exchanges.  
The main elements of an axle counter and the associated parts of the overall system are 
shown in Figure 4-6.  The following are the primary interfaces with the axle counter 
system: 
1. The rails; 
2. Train wheels/axles; 
3. Communications. [Note: the communications system(s) may or may not be part of 
the Axle Counter System but are be considered to be part of the train detection 
system]; 
4. Human Machine Interfaces (HMI), that provide the Reset/Restoration 
requests/commands and an indication of the status, (occupied, clear or undefined) 
of the track section and diagnostics; 
5. Interlocking / signal controls including level crossing controls; 
6. The power supply. 
The operational environment for axle counters has been developed and is described by 
the “Typical operational environment and Application Diagram for Axle Counters” 
(Lucic, 2004a). This description includes all the elements of an operational 
environment; structures, passengers, staff, constituents of the signalling system, 
environmental factors, railway neighbours and their infrastructure, constituents of 
telecommunication and electrification systems and trains and engineering machinery.  
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Figure 4-6: Axle Counter System 
Identification and Analysis of hazards  
Extensive and systematic hazard identification has been carried out based on the system 
description and description of operational environment (Lucic, 2003b). All of the 
hazards identified during the hazard identification study have been analysed, structured 
and mapped to the Core Hazards (higher level hazard groupings) originating from the 
Axle Counter Concept Safety Case aiming to support development of Cause-
Consequence models for the project.  
Two Core Hazards have been identified as related to the process of resetting the Axle 
Counter section: 
1. Failures during reset (excluding level crossings); 
2. Failures during reset (on level crossings). 
Within the two core hazards clusters of Causalities and Defences have been identified. 
These were further analysed during the modelling stage of the project. 
Model logic development 
Risk models have been developed aiming to support any individual axle counter project. 
Consequently models’ logical structures are generic, independent of any particular 
project solution and application (Lucic, 2004a).  
Capability to realistically represent any chosen application and vary any relevant 
parameters is achieved by complete separation of logical structures and underlying data.  
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By changing the dataset used to run model calculations it is possible to simulate 
different, project specific solutions. Cause-Consequence models developed for this 
project can be separated in two discrete but completely integrated parts:  
1. Cause-Consequence trees (logical structures); 
2. Parameterisation of logical structures. 
The models have been developed with the aim to support comparative safety analysis of 
different procedural and technological options for implementation of axle counter 
technology on different projects.  
The models are inclusive of all potential system solutions. 
The following are areas where different options that may affect the outcome are likely: 
1. The nature of the reset/restore procedure used; 
2. Type of technical controls involved in the process;  
3. The nature of the signal aspect given to the driver of the "next train";  
4. The requirement for the signaller to apply protection to the section to be reset 
should occur before the reset, but has an effect when the incorrect reset has 
occurred; 
5. Availability of different types of communication means between the train driver, 
signaller, technician and other railway staff. 
Fault Tree methodology has been used for causal analysis. The causal parts of both 
models are almost identical, the only difference being a model element calculating the 
proportion of hazards happening on the level crossing section.  
The fault tree is structured in three main branches: 
1. The elements resulting in a failure whilst attempting to reset a section with more 
than one section requiring reset; 
2. The elements resulting in a failure whilst attempting to reset a section with only 
one section requiring reset; 
3. The elements resulting in a completely unintended reset of a section. 
4. The consequence parts of the two models are different. For the model of “Failures 
during reset (excluding level crossings)” the Consequence tree is structured in 
three main branches: 
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5. Occupying train moving on plain line; 
6. Occupying train moving at points; 
7. Occupying train not moving. 
The structure of the “Failures during reset (on level crossing)” model is very simple.  If 
the section controlling the level crossing has been incorrectly reset then the outcome 
depends on the presence or absence of road traffic and on the actions of the road user 
and/or the driver of the "occupying train".  
The model covers all types of level crossings - the likelihood of a particular level-
crossing being affected by the reset of the axle counter and the potential to warn the 
driver of an approaching train that the crossing is not protected.  
For each model element, detailed descriptions are provided within the modelling tool 
environment. The frequency of occurrence of the hazard is measured in "number of 
incorrect resets per year" or frequency of failures during reset per year (how many times 
an occupied section has been reset each year). 
Parameterisation 
The use of parameterisation allows generic risk modelling of the Axle Counter 
Application.  Whilst, Cause-Consequence trees have been developed to include all 
potential operational and engineering solutions to the application of axle counters in any 
geographical area, ease of customisation of models to a geographical area or a project is 
achieved through parameterisation (Lucic, 2004a).  
Parametric functions are used to evaluate numerical values (frequencies of occurrence 
and probabilities) of all the model elements. Parametric functions replace the crisp 
values for frequencies and probabilities of occurrence/failures of base events and 
barriers.  
Numerical values of parameters within the parametric expressions are defined within 
the data-set. This technology allows for an easy and auditable way of changing the base 
data for the model and recalculation of estimates for different variations of the source 
data.  
Data-sets are defined as lists of parameters used to calculate numerical values of model 
elements.  
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Parameters depict numerical values arranged in a number of data-sets describing 
different parts of the railway. Therefore, when the model is to be calculated, prior 
selection of the data-set to be used is necessary.  
This approach allows for increased flexibility in use of the generic model’s logical 
structure.  It also removes many of the undocumented assumptions hidden within fixed 
values that could result in an imprecise application model. 
Parametric functions and data sets are used to analyse effects of the timetable related 
variations in operational performance, analysed scenario evolution elapsed time and 
spatial variations affecting the operational performance.  
Some of the parameters, such as average headway and average speed, are related to the 
timetable and topology of the analysed route.  
These parameters, if taken across the large area of the network, as the difference 
between the minimum and maximum values of the parameter increases, introduce 
significant margins of uncertainty.  
If parameters such as average headway and average speed, averaged across large area, 
are used to support the modelling, modelling outputs will be of sufficient quality to 
permit coarse estimation of risk fluctuation caused by replacement of track circuits by 
axle counters.  
It also allows for elapsed time to be taken into account as values of relevant model 
elements are calculated by the parametric formulas containing elapsed time parameters.  
The project only considered model structure and data issues and any inter-dependencies 
between these in so far as was necessary to derive review and test the parameterisation.  
The main deliverable was the model database populated with parametric expressions, 
rationales for these expressions and parameter definitions. 
The overall parameterisation methodology is illustrated by Figure 4-7. This 
methodology is described in detail as follows: 
I. Initial Review of Models and Documentation:  
 A review was carried out of the models and relevant documentation including the 
Axle Counter Concept Safety Case and the Axle Counter Template Application 
Safety Case. 
 
II. Criteria:  
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 The aim of this model development work is to allow the axle counter risk models 
to support the safety arguments in the axle counter template application safety 
case.   
 The documents reviewed above were used in the development of these criteria. 
III. Workshop:  
 Having developed a set of criteria, a workshop was held to review the set of 
models. 
IV. Model Update: 
 The models underwent a series of model updates.  These formed the input for the 
next phase of model review.   
 After each model update, the model was reviewed and parametric expressions 
developed.  
 A record of all the changes to the model is kept. 
V. Development of parametric expressions: 
 Parametric expressions were developed based upon a review of the model 
structures.  A rationale for each expression was drawn up and is given as part of 
the model element rationale. 
VI. Parameter List: 
 A list of each of the parameters used in the formulae together with their 
definitions and units was produced.  
 This underwent a number of review stages to ensure that the parameter 
descriptions were at an appropriate level of detail.   However it should be 
recognised that for some parameters, (particularly those which are simply a 
statement of a base event or barrier probability) a complete understanding of the 
scope or context of the parameters can only be provided by reference to the model 
structures. 
VII. Testing: 
 Testing of expressions is described in more detail in the following paragraphs of 
this paper (Lucic, 2003c). 
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Figure 4-7: Parameterisation methodology 
The parametric expressions were developed based upon the model review.  A rationale 
for each expression was drawn up and is given as part of the model element rationale.  
These were entered into the model database together with the formula rationale.  For 
consistency any parameter that represented a probability of success or failure was 
worded to represent failure.   
Parameter units were made consistent and are as follows: 
Time:  hours or years;  and    
Length:  kilometres  
  4.3.5 Tests  
The complexity of the models developed during the modelling enhancement project, 
dictated structured and comprehensive testing (Lucic, 2003c).  Testing of models 
encompassed the following model constituents: 
1. Parametric Functions; 
2. Logical Structures; 
3. Model Predictions; 
4. Data. 
The required tests can be grouped into two categories: 
1. Tests performed prior to application of models to the particular project, 
encapsulating testing of Logical Structures and testing of Parametric Functions of 
the generic models; 
2. Tests to be performed in preparation for and as part of application of models to the 
particular project, encapsulating testing of Model Predictions and testing of Data.  
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In support of thorough and auditable testing of models, a Test Plan has been developed. 
Firstly, as part of the models’ development process, all models have been reviewed by 
domain experts at different stages of the project.  
The final version of models’ logical structures has been agreed between all involved as 
accurate presentation of reality. However, further reviews of models should take place 
prior to their application on each specific project.   
A second set of tests concentrated on Parametric Functions. The aim of these tests was 
to ensure mathematical correctness of the Parametric Functions and eliminate logic 
errors in their definition. The data for these tests was supplied by Network Rail. This 
data is a coarse estimate of possible parameter values and expected values for some 
model elements (Base Event, Barriers, Critical Events and Consequences).  
In the absence of real life data, either for a specific application or for expected results, 
the aim of testing was to show that the result calculated by the formulae is of the right 
order. The format of this data was as follows:   
1. For each data item a logical Minimum value has been estimated; 
2. For each data item a logical Maximum value has been estimated; 
3. For each data item an average value has been estimated as a range. 
Subsequently, each model has been run using the above-described data sets. Any 
mathematical or logical inconsistencies discovered have been resolved or explained.   
Results of these calculations have been compared against estimated expected values for 
model elements whose values are calculated by parametric functions (Base Events, 
Barriers, Critical Events and Consequences). All inconsistencies discovered have been 
resolved or explained.   
For each future application of models to the real project additional tests should be 
carried out to ensure correctness of models with regards to the particular application. 
These tests should be based on coarse project specific data elicited for testing purposes 
only. The data should be a coarse estimate of possible parameter values and expected 
values for some model elements (Base Event, Barriers, Critical Events and 
Consequences). The format of this data should be as described above.   
Subsequently, each model should be run using the above described data sets. Any 
mathematical or logical inconsistencies discovered should be resolved or explained and 
documented. 
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Final tests should be carried out using real life data collected in support of a specific 
project.  
In addition to this, a number of model elements calculated by parametric functions 
(States, Barriers, Critical Events, and Consequences) should be identified and where 
possible, values for these should be ascertained based on historical data or estimates. 
Subsequently, each model should be run and the results of these calculations should be 
compared against the historical/estimated data described above. Any mathematical or 
logical inconsistencies discovered should be resolved or explained and the process 
should be documented. 
When applying models to a particular project, whenever possible, the data for modelling 
should be obtained from multiple sources and the best quality data should be used for 
the analysis.  
However, some of the parameters needed for analysis are not readily available and will 
have to be estimated. In order to assure consistency of certainty boundaries for 
estimated parameters, it will be necessary to specify a common approach to estimation 
of parameters of similar nature, for example all parameters related to human 
performance beings should be estimated using the same carefully specified process. 
  4.3.6 Application  
Following completion of all the above described tests, gathering of data for a specific 
project was carried out. The first use of the models has been for analysis of different 
options for reset of an Axle Counter controlled Signalling Section after planned 
maintenance (Lucic, 2005a). Simulation of different options has shown significant 
differences in safety risk. Two options have been simulated. 
The first option involves removal of technical protections of the signalled section that 
has been reset after maintenance. This option assumes that the first train coming along 
after the completion of the maintenance and reset of the section will enter the section 
without any technical caution. Following model elements have been affected by the first 
option: 
1. Protection not properly applied before reset; 
2. Route set for next train through affected section; 
3. Driver of next train not cautioned; 
4. Driver shown a special aspect; 
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5. Driver shown a red restricted by interlocking aspect; 
6. Driver shown yellow restricted by interlocking aspect; 
7. Driver pass auto signal at red but not cautiously; 
8. No examination of the line with next train through (after maintenance). 
The second option is introduction of an unconditional reset facility to the system. 
Unconditional reset facility provides means for a reset of axle counter section without 
any hardware or software self checking measures.  
Only one model element, “unconditional reset facility used” is affected by this option. 
In both cases, procedural protections will be introduced to ensure that the section is 
clear (not occupied by trains, engineering vehicles, tools or other large objects) prior to 
reset and removal of protections protecting the section. 
Models have been run for three different sets of data: 
1. Baseline data set containing data gathered during a number of structured 
workshops for a specific project; 
2. Data set based on the baseline dataset reflecting implementation of the first option 
described above; 
3. Data set based on the baseline dataset reflecting implementation of both, the first 
and the second option described above. 
Comparison of relative change of hazard and consequence frequencies related to 
changes being assessed shows increase in safety risk of two orders of magnitude.  
In order to support the options analysis further, sensitivity analysis on the models 
should be performed to identify the model elements which contribute most to the risk. 
These are the model elements the most worthwhile to focus the analysis with aim to 
improve the safety performance of the system.  
These models have been developed to the point of test application. Prior to use of 
models for any project testing of the models on the project should be carried out in 
accordance with the testing specification.   
For each individual project test plan should be prepared. Sensitivity or importance 
analysis should be used to identify those model elements for which the overall risk is 
most sensitive and particular emphasis placed on the testing of these model elements. 
The parameters that are very hard to estimate accurately should be identified.  
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In order to assess the impact that accuracy of these parameters has on the overall risk, 
importance analysis should be undertaken. Particular emphasis should be placed on 
derivation of the critical parameters. Derivation of barrier probabilities should always be 
done using the model structures as an aid to analysis.  
Use of graphical models increases transparency of modelling and enables the user to see 
all the factors, which define the numerical values (failure rates/probabilities or 
frequencies/probabilities of events occurring) of model elements.  
Parameters that define the barriers are contextual and conditional in nature, and it is 
necessary to pay attention to the context of a barrier and related parameters during the 
data elicitation process.   
4.4 Third Project: Complex Railway Project Safety Management – 
Manchester South Capacity Improvement Project 
  4.4.1 Purpose and Scope of the Project  
The Manchester South Capacity Improvement Project (MSCIP) was being undertaken 
as part of the West Coast Management Unit (WCMU) programme of works, with the 
purpose of providing additional capacity by upgrading the railway infrastructure in the 
South Manchester area.  It was a multi-discipline Alliance Project covering track 
renewals and realignment, overhead line equipment renewals, power supply renewals 
and changes and resignalling.   
The project was realised in a number of stages: 
1. The Stage A work was a ‘Technology Demonstrator’ for the application of the 
novel Italian signalling system, never before used on the Network Rail 
infrastructure. This stage was commissioned in April 2003; 
2. The Stage A+ works built on Stage A with the implementation of Train Protection 
and Warning System, and formed the next stage of the phased implementation of 
the signalling system. This stage was commissioned in December 2003; 
3. The next phase was the Sandbach/Wilmslow (SHWW) Phase 1, with the purpose 
to close out Stage A/A+ issues and de-risk the SHWW Phase 2 stage, which 
followed; 
4. When the SHWW Phase 2 stage was commissioned in summer 2006 the new 
signalling system was still not fully operational but main functionalities were 
provided; 
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5. Final commissioning took place in spring 2007, with the complete set of 
functionalities provided as planned.  
A Project Definition Document and an Outline Project Specification were developed 
aiming to define the scope of each project phase.  
  4.4.2 Concept of Change Management 
Each project has a duty of care to show that the railway as delivered is safe and to do 
this and show that it has been done, must subject each change to the railway system to 
safety analysis. However these changes vary enormously in significance, so safety 
analysis processes must be scaleable. The initial remit for each stage of the project will 
require the Project to make certain changes to the railway. 
As the stage proceeds, changes may be made to the remit as part of a formal change 
control process.  
The total change made to the railway is a combination of the two as the following 
diagram illustrates: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Concept of change 
The safety analysis process for the project applies to: 
1. All changes to be made to the railway which are defined in the initial remit for a 
project stage;  
2. All changes subsequently made to that remit. These are typically described in 
Engineering Change Requests (ECRs). However the procedure also applies to 
non-engineering requests, such as proposals to change maintenance regimes, 
which may be documented elsewhere or records within the DRACAS. 
The analysis focused on identification of novel interfaces and their further safety 
analysis, where novel interfaces are defined as: 
 
 
 
                     Real change to the system 
New system 
System before change 
Planned change 
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1. Interfaces between novel equipment; 
2. Interfaces related to or controlled by novel procedures; 
3. Interfaces between conventional equipment but operating within the novel 
environment; 
4.  Interfaces related to or controlled by conventional procedures equipment but 
operating within the novel environment. 
All the interfaces are initially classified into one of four levels of safety significance. 
This process is referred to as Initial Change Safety Analysis (ICSA).  
The process categorises each change into four categories by safety significance, as 
follows (Lucic, 2003d): 
Category 0:  No hazards; 
Category 1:  All hazards controlled by existing standards or existing Hazard 
Log mitigations; 
Category 2:  Interface is novel but sufficiently simple and conventional that 
hazards can be analysed with reference to experience with 
existing equipment; 
Category 3:  Significant complexity and/or novelty. 
Category 0 and Category 1 changes do not require safety analysis and a generic process 
is defined for Category 2 changes. Category 3 changes have to be analysed according to 
their specific attributes.  
The process of analysis of Category 2 and Category 3 changes is referred to as Change 
Safety Analysis (CSA).  
Detailed process is explained below. 
Category 0 Changes: The Entry Criteria, Safety Analysis Process and recording 
requirements for the Category 0 changes are presented in the table below: 
Category 0 Changes  
Entry 
Criteria: 
No credible condition or scenario can be identified in which the 
process of making the change or the changed part of the railway 
could contribute to an accident.  
This is a strong criterion, which even very straightforward changes 
may fail, but will certainly apply to changes to the remit which do not 
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Category 0 Changes  
affect the railway at all – for instance addition of a requirement to 
carry out a study. 
Safety 
analysis: 
None. 
Records: Reasons for categorisation. 
Table 4-3: Category 0 Changes 
 
Category 1 Changes: The Entry Criteria, Safety Analysis Process and recording 
requirements for the Category 1 Changes are presented in the table below: 
Category 1 Changes  
Entry 
Criteria: 
All hazards related to the process of making the change or the 
changed part of the railway are satisfactorily mitigated by 
authoritative good practice (such as Railway Group or Network Rail 
Company Standards) or by existing provisions of the System Hazard 
Log and the mitigation measures defined are being put into practice. 
Safety 
analysis: 
None. 
Records: Hazards; mitigation measures (by reference to authoritative good 
practice or the Hazard Log); confirmation that these mitigation 
measures are being put into practice. 
Table 4-4: Category 1 Changes 
Category 2 Changes: The Entry Criteria, Safety Analysis Process and recording 
requirements for the Category 2 Changes are presented in the table below: 
Category 2 Changes  
Entry 
Criteria: 
The change is of small or moderate complexity and all hazards 
related to the process of making the change or the changed part of the 
railway are sufficiently similar to hazards in existing railway 
equipment that they can analysed with reference to experience with 
existing equipment. 
Safety 
analysis: 
A Change Safety Analysis Briefing Note should be prepared 
containing: 
1. A description of the functionality of the change; 
2. A description of the physical configuration of the changed 
part of the railway; 
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Category 2 Changes  
3. A description of the context of the changed part of the 
railway, identifying people, systems and equipment with 
which the changed part will interact. 
A Working Group with sufficient knowledge and expertise should 
assess the safety implications of the change. The Working Group 
should analyse the change as follows: 
1. Confirm that the change is correctly categorised and that the 
Group has sufficient competence to analyse it; 
2. Review the System Hazard Log to identify previously defined 
hazards or hazard causes which relate to the change; 
3. Review the intended functionality of the change to identify 
hazards or hazard causes which could arise from correct 
operation or plausible deviations; 
4. Review the physical configuration of the change to identify 
hazards or hazard causes which could arise from failure of the 
constituents; 
5. Review the context of the change to identify hazards or 
hazard causes which could arise from interactions between the 
change and its environment; 
6. Identify from the System Hazard Log, the description of the 
change and knowledge of the existing railway, measures 
planned or in place to mitigate hazards or hazard causes 
identified; 
7. Assess the adequacy of these mitigation measures and, if 
necessary, propose additional ones. 
The process should be recorded in a Change Safety Analysis Report 
and the System Hazard Log should be updated in line with the 
Change Safety Analysis Report. 
Records: Change Safety Analysis Briefing; Change Safety Analysis Report. 
Table 4-5: Category 2 Changes 
Category 3 Changes: The Entry Criteria, outline of the Safety Analysis Process and 
recording requirements for the Category 3 Changes are presented in the table below: 
Category 3 Changes  
Entry 
Criteria: 
Any change which does not meet the entry criteria for levels 0, 1 and 2. 
Safety 
analysis: 
The scope of hazard analysis activities related to Category 3 changes is 
to be defined for each change individually. Following information for 
each of the hazards should be collected prior, during or after the hazard 
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Category 3 Changes  
analysis activity: 
1. Reference to the hazard analysis undertaking; 
2. Reference to the system/sub-system/interfaces being analysed; 
3. Reference to a life-cycle stage or stages that the hazard is applicable 
to (e.g. a life-cycle should be precisely defined within the briefing 
documentation); 
4. Hazard item identification number; 
5. Hazard item description; 
6. Description of causes of the hazard item; 
7. Description of consequences of the hazard item; 
8. Action related to further investigation of a hazard item (if required); 
9. Additional comments; 
10. Nominated authority/owner of the hazard (where it can be 
ascertained); 
11. Reference to the analysis Briefing Note for Category 3 change 
including the following: 
12. Session title; 
13. Description of the system to be analysed (with clear definition of 
session boundaries/interfaces); 
14. Description of all assumptions made; 
15. Clear indication of the scope of the hazard analysis undertaking 
(including reference to the life-cycle and system states); 
16. Explanation of the process and structure of the session including the 
clarification of the terminology to be used; 
17. Competencies and expertise required for undertaking the session; 
18. List of participants including an outline description of their 
expertise. 
Records: All hazards identified through hazard identification activities, as well as 
any hazards recorded/transferred from other sources (and where 
accepted by the Hazard Manager) must be recorded within the System 
Hazard Log. 
Table 4-6: Category 3 Changes 
Cross references between the System Hazard Log entries related to novel interfaces and 
the system description were maintained.  
A Project Definition Document (PDD) was reviewed and ICSA was carried out for all 
the changes planned for the project phase. Proactive safety analysis activities were then 
carried out for all the Category 2 and Category 3 changes. 
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CSA was carried out on all changes in the PDD; these were split into two and analysed 
as separate activities. Changes/novelties analysed during the CSA were identified as 
differences between the railway system configuration corresponding to the previous 
phase of the project and the current one. However the identified changes were then 
analysed against the standard railway system as a reference. 
All CSA (Lucic, 2003d) activities covered operations under normal conditions, 
degraded mode and emergency conditions (where appropriate), from a wider point of 
view, inclusive of transitions from and to the operational mode. While the boundary of 
the CSA was defined as the boundary of the project scope, the CSA activities also 
considered the operational interfaces with adjacent control areas, maintenance and 
emergency services.  
As part of the activities, a review was carried out of the impact of changes to be 
introduced by a new phase of the project on the existing mitigations (identified and 
implemented during previous project phase) aiming to confirm the validity of these 
mitigation measures. 
Changes additional to those identified in the PDD were identified by Engineering 
Change Requests (ECR). These changes were reviewed, classified and analysed in 
accordance with the ICSA process. The results of all the analyses and related actions 
were kept in the ICSA register and on file. 
All DRACAS records that were identified as having safety implications were referenced 
in the System Hazard Log. In cases were a DRACAS entry did not correspond to any of 
the existing System Hazard Log entries, it was subjected to safety analysis. 
  4.4.3 System Scoping and Conceptualisation 
The system was depicted in the “System Architecture” document. The “System 
Architecture” describes all significant subsystems and internal and external interfaces of 
the system. The system architecture is presented in three levels of detail.  
Starting with the highest level, depicting interfaces with objects outside the project 
scope and outside the railway, the second level provides a description of the main 
subsystems and their internal (internal to the system – scope of the project) relationship 
and finally providing the detail internal to the subsystem at the 3
rd
  level of the 
description.  
The system architecture was accompanied with an Objects & Interfaces database. All 
objects and their interfaces where described it this database.  
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Information about the changes to these interfaces throughout the project life (for each 
stage), detailing the changes was kept in this database. This information was then used 
to support ICSA and CSA sessions. 
An example of the “System Architecture” diagram is on Figure 4-9 below. 
 
Figure 4-9: An example of the “System Architecture” diagram 
  4.4.4 Identification and Analysis of Hazards 
Identification of Hazards was structured in the three parts (Lucic, 2004b): 
1 Characterisation of Change and Identification of Safety Benefits; 
2 Hazard Identification – Human Factors and Operational Issues; 
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3 Identification of Hazard Mitigations and Actions required which was undertaken 
in parallel with Hazard Identification. 
Characterisation of Change and Identification of Safety Benefits 
The purpose of this part of the study was to agree the scope, extent and purpose of the 
change in a form suitable for later stages of analysis and to identify the safety benefits 
of the change.  
This was achieved by considering the following questions:  
1 What is the change? 
2 What is the rationale behind the way in which the changes are applied? 
3 What is the intended function of the new equipment? 
4 What is the environment in which the new equipment will be installed? 
5 What does the new equipment interface to? 
6 What non-equipment changes, if any are being made at the same time? (For 
instance, changes to maintenance regime or operational rules). 
7 Which aspects of the equipment and its application are novel and which have been 
proven in service?  
8 What are the safety benefits? 
Identification of Hazards 
A hazard is any possible state or behaviour of the signalling system or operator 
interaction with any inherent equipment within the system which might contribute to an 
incident. Actions of passengers and members of the public were not considered by CSA 
as these interfaces were outside of the project scope.  
A brainstorm workshop was conducted to identify hazards, during which the changed 
functions, interfaces and equipment were considered. It was considered that the topic 
was well understood and that a structured brainstorm would be an efficient method of 
analysis.  
The standard guide words, listed in Table 4-7 below, were applied to each interface 
affected by the change as described above. This provided structure to the hazard 
identification process.  
The fact that a potential hazard was fully mitigated was not grounds for removing it. It 
was recorded in order to take full credit for the mitigation of the Hazard. 
Guideword Meaning Sample Interpretations 
NO or NOT 
The complete negation 
of the intention 
No execution, missing information, not ready, 
delay, earlier or later 
MORE/EARLY Quantitative increase Parameters & items - too many time & range - too 
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Guideword Meaning Sample Interpretations 
high, too long (both singly and in combination) 
LESS/LATE Quantitative decrease 
Parameters & items - too few                                     
time & range - too low, too short (both singly and 
in combination) 
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase 
Parameters - extras, incorrect input, extra 
extension, different format   actions - too many, 
too often, redundancy (in functions) 
PART OF Qualitative decrease 
Incomplete input/operation, truncated, execute 
part of 
REVERSE 
The opposite of the 
intention 
Opposite sign, feedback, inverse, negative 
parameters, go back 
OTHER THAN / 
WRONG 
Substitution of the 
intention 
Intended input, intended operation, redirection of 
input, similar command, configuration control, 
wrong manual, wrong file, wrong value, 
unrequired act performed.  
    Table 4-7 : Hazard identification Standard Guide words 
Mitigation of Remaining Hazards 
The purpose of this part of the study was to identify any existing and planned, technical 
and procedural measures which mitigate the hazards remaining after the analysis 
performed above. 
Following is an example of the outcome of the CSA workshop. For an interface: IF 13 
(Diagnostics): From ACC Subsystem to Technician. 
Characterisation of Change and Identification of Safety Benefits 
What is the change? (Confirm 
correctness of information in the 
Hazard Identification Study 
Briefing Document) 
IF13.1. (P1): UK1 platform will have increased 
diagnostic. The maintainer gets a new alarms window 
which;  • shows the alarms on the system as they happen, 
and displays a hierarchical version of the system 
which can be navigated  • allows the maintainer to sort the alarms  • allows the maintainer to suppress alarms from a 
specific part of the system, thus reducing the 
number of irrelevant alarms  • notifies the maintainer when the alarm status is 
not available or reliable for a specific part of the 
system  • notifies the maintainer when there is an alarm 
present in a specific part of the system  • notifies the maintainer if the alarm is intermittent 
- i.e. comes and goes, thus reducing the number 
of irrelevant alarms displayed  • suppresses alarms on equipment where a fault in 
the system makes the alarm status for that 
equipment unavailable or unreliable 
(Alarms are expected to latch. It is to do with ACC only 
no On-Line Diagnostic Terminal (i.e. SIM PC) 
(Action on G Lewis: Confirm that alarms for UK1 (Phase 
1) are latching (as defined in the alarms specification) 
IF13.2. (P2): number of screens increased, screen 
configuration changed 
What is the rationale behind the DRACAS 
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way in which the changes are 
applied? 
Different management of alarms needed 
What is the intended function of 
the new function? 
Improve alarms management 
What is the environment in which 
the new equipment will be 
installed? 
Same as before 
What does the new equipment 
interface to? 
Same as before 
What non-equipment changes, if 
any are being made at the same 
time? (For instance, changes to 
maintenance regime or 
operational rules) 
Maintenance regime of monitored equipment 
Possible change to operational rules should the 
equipment as implemented not function according to 
current Rule Book assumptions 
Which aspects of the equipment 
and its application are novel and 
which have been proven in 
service? 
Novel to the UK, used in Italy. 
Safety benefits of change For IF13.1. (P1): Improved maintenance gives you better 
system availability, which provides robust railway 
For IF13.2. (P2): Optimal visual presentation of 
information 
Table 4-8: Characterisation of Change and Safety Benefits 
And finally an example of the table of the records for the above interface, from the 
workshop: 
Change 
Ref 
Hazard Cause Mitigation Action/Actionee Guide 
word 
IF13.1 No immediate hazard 
(Failure of 
diagnostics needs to 
be rectified as 
required) 
Failure of diagnostics 
(no or wrong alarms) 
  No(info), 
part of 
IF13.1 Unable to distinguish 
critical alarms 
Too many alarms Alarms level and 
thresholds should be 
set at appropriate 
level 
J Bloke- Ensure that 
this is correct 
Too early 
(report 
failures 
before 
they 
happen) 
IF13.1 Not use the system 
properly, shift to 
unnecessary 
degraded mode of 
operation 
Use of over 
restrictive controls 
Design and testing of 
system to appropriate 
standards 
 Wrong 
(info) 
Table 4-9: An example record from the CSA workshop. 
  4.4.5 Comparative Risk Assessment 
All of the hazards were grouped in two categories:  
1. The risks associated with the hazards that are understood and currently mitigated 
as standard practice; i.e. the risks are mitigated by following standards or other 
established authoritative good practice, and the project is actually following these 
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standards or other authoritative good practice. These hazards were not analysed 
further. 
2. Novel hazards that originate from novel equipment, interfaces, or procedures, or 
from conventional equipment or procedures operating within the novel 
environment. These hazards were analysed further. 
The risk associated with each novel hazard was categorised as follows: 
BETTER:  if the risk is assessed as significantly better than would be achieved 
with established conventional (like for like) means ( in case of 
railway signalling for example with existing Solid State Interlocking, 
conventional UK signal heads etc); 
OR 
WORSE: if the risk is assessed as significantly worse than would be achieved 
with conventional (like for like) means; 
OR 
COMPARABLE: if the risk is assessed as neither Better nor Worse than would be 
achieved with conventional (like for like) means; 
AND 
MINOR: if there are other hazards associated with the scheme that have a risk 
at least an order of magnitude greater;  
OR 
MAJOR: if there are no other hazards associated with the scheme that have a 
risk at least an order of magnitude greater. 
The risk associated with a hazard is considered acceptable only if it is: 
MINOR and COMPARABLE or MINOR and BETTER or MAJOR and BETTER. 
In general, the Hazard was declared as closed (managed to sufficiently safe level) when: 
1. The risks associated with the hazards could be shown to be comparable with, or 
better than would be achieved with, a conventional scheme and no further 
reasonably practicable mitigation could be identified; or  
2. In case of standard hazards or hazards originating from either the conventional 
systems already in use or standard procedures already applied on the railways, the 
closure of these hazards is justified through application of well established good 
practice, including Railway Group Standards and Network Rail Company 
Standards.  These hazards were not further assessed.  
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Within the project timescales, options analysis concentrated on hazards classified as 
MAJOR, COMPARABLE which account for the majority of the risk. Each MAJOR, 
COMPARABLE hazard remaining at the end of the project phase was subjected to 
options analysis to underpin an argument that there are no reasonably practicable 
tactical options to reduce risk further.  
A list of factors which act to drive risk up or down with respect to a conventional UK 
resignalling system was collected in support of a qualitative but rigorous argument that 
risk would not be reduced in the long-run by the strategic option of replacing the ACC 
with a conventional UK resignalling.  
The ALARP argument rests in part on the conclusion that there are no tactical or 
reasonably practicable strategic options, which would reduce risk further. 
As part of the options analysis, a list of performance metrics that would allow the 
project, to make a quantitative assessment of the risk associated with MAJOR, 
COMPARABLE hazards at a later stage was identified.   
A recommendation to Network Rail to collect performance metrics was made. 
  4.4.6 Management Process 
This section describes how project hazards will be identified, analysed and tracked to 
formal closure.  Figure 4-10, below describes the Hazard Identification, Analysis and 
Management Process. Inputs to the process are: 
1. Detailed description of interfaces extracted from a system Breakdown Structure. 
All interfaces were subjected to ICSA process as described above. To support the 
process it is necessary to understand the nature of interface, its performance 
limitations, operating environment, etc. All this information should be provided as 
part of interfaces description; 
2. A detailed description of a change to the system subsequent to changes defined in 
the initial scope of the system change. This was done through Engineering 
Change Request process, where each change was recorded and subjected to ICSA 
process; 
3. DRACAS process records were subjected to ICSA process as well. A review of 
the DRACAS records served dual purposes. Firstly, to assess safety impact of any 
changes to be introduced to the system and secondly to confirm correct 
functioning of identified and implemented mitigation measures. 
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Each change is subjected to ICSA, Category 2 and 3 changes are subjected to CSA. The 
results of the CSA are kept in the System Hazard Log, as well as references related to 
Category 1 interfaces. The System Hazard Log is used as a tool supporting the 
management process.  
Each identified mitigation has been allocated to a responsible person on the project to 
implement. Proof of implementation was referenced/recorded in the System Hazard 
Log. These were subjected to a review by a team of suitably selected experts, to confirm 
satisfactory implementation of the mitigation measure. Upon agreement from the 
Hazard Forum (Lucic, 2002) the action to implement mitigation would be closed.  
Each hazard was subjected to an Options Analysis process as well, as described above.    
The deliverables of the process are: 
1. Initial Change Safety Analysis Records: ICSA of an ECR was recorded in a 
spreadsheet and these records were kept under strict configuration control; 
2. Change Safety Analysis Briefing Document(s) Change Safety Analysis Briefing 
Documents were produced to: 
a. Provide practical details such as location of the meeting and agenda for the 
day; 
b. Summarise the process to be followed for the session; for example the process 
to be followed for the identification of hazards; 
c. Provide a technical description of the scope of the workshop. 
3. Change Safety Analysis Records: The output of Change Safety Analysis 
activities were recorded in Change Safety Analysis Records.  These records 
accurately document the process followed to clearly identify the agreed output.   
The Change Safety Analysis records were reviewed and approved by the Hazard  
Forum.  
4. System Hazard Log was the central repository for all system safety hazards 
identified for the project.  The System Hazard Log was produced and maintained 
in accordance with the Project Hazard Log Management Procedure and according 
to the overall requirements of the Hazard Management Plan.  
All system safety hazards identified across the project, by whatever means, were 
tracked to closure via the System Hazard Log.  A key function of the System 
Hazard Log was to provide traceability from each hazard to all evidence used to 
justify its elimination or mitigation. 
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5. System Hazard Reports were issued at key milestones throughout the project, 
reporting on the status of all hazards within the System Hazard Log.  These 
reports include a summary of the number of hazards in the System Hazard Log for 
each hazard classification (e.g. open, closed, mitigated etc).   
6. The System Hazard Log Report contained the following information: 
a. System Hazard Log Section, which describes the purpose of the System Hazard 
Log, its context in the history of the Project, the development of the System 
Hazard Log, its scope, use and underlying assumptions and constraints as well 
as a key to the fields in the Hazard Record Sheet and Hazard Summary List; 
b. Journal of changes to the System Hazard Log;  
c. Summary list of hazards and their status; 
d. Hazard Record Sheets contain following information: 
i. Information on the hazard: its unique reference number, description, and 
status. Information is also provided on the hazard’s worst-case 
consequences should it occur, and the assessed frequency, probability and 
consequences of occurrence.  
ii. A cross-reference is provided to the hazard’s original source; 
iii. Each cause of the hazard is uniquely numbered (with numbering derived 
from the hazard’s number) and described; 
iv. For each cause a listing of the actions to be taken and mitigations already 
in place is also provided; 
v. Each action is uniquely numbered (with numbering derived from the 
relevant cause of the hazard) and described. Each action is allocated a 
nominated person to resolve the action, together with information 
supporting the action taken and/or mitigation proposed. 
e. Directory of safety documents on the project.  
f. List of consequences identified for all the hazards in the System Hazard Log. 
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7. The System Hazard Log Implementation Audit Report presented findings of 
the Project Hazard Log Implementation Audit (Lucic, 2003d). 
 
Figure 4-10: Management Process 
4.5 Fourth Project: High Level Railway System Study - POLAND 
  4.5.1 Purpose and Scope of the Project  
The Technical Assistance for Preparation of the Modernisation of Corridor II – 
Remaining Works project was aimed at enabling the Government of the Republic of 
Poland to make strategic decisions and financial commitments regarding the 
Modernisation of the Corridor II railway link.  The geographical scope of the project 
includes the E20 section of the railway, Warszawa – Rzepin (excluding Poznań node), 
and the CE20 railway section, Łowicz – Skierniewice – Łuków. 
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The technical assistance project was realised in 5 stages: 
Stage I:     Feasibility Study - Cost Benefit analysis of three proposed options; 
Stage II:   Feasibility Study – Safety, Environment, Economic and Financial 
Analysis; 
Stage III:  Preliminary design; 
Stage IV:  Preparation of Application for EU funds; 
Stage V:   Elaboration of Tender documentation for contracts. 
The author led the work at Stages I and II.  
Three potential options were suggested: 
Option 0:  Basic construction work required to provide a minimum set of 
requirements with maximum limitations, resulting in a conventional 
railway line achieving the ERTMS compatibility at operational level 
only; 
Option 1:  Modernisation and upgrading of the infrastructure to Technical Standards 
for Interoperability of Conventional Rail System and AGC and AGTC 
standards for international corridors (maximum speed of 160km/h for 
passenger trains and 120km/h for freight trains). Therefore this option 
will mean introduction of ERTMS Level 2 railway line; 
Option 2: Extension of option 1 to enable maximum speed 200 km/h, assuming use 
of tilting passenger trains, resulting in introduction of ERTMS Level 2 
railway line as well. 
For each Project Option, a number of different System Solutions is suggested. 
As part of the activities within the first two stages of the project, a cost benefit analysis 
of the proposed three options and system solutions was carried out.  
In order to achieve this it was necessary to identify relevant, high level, safety, RAM 
and environment protection requirements for each of the three proposed project options 
and to identify potential benefits that each proposed project option could bring. 
In terms of compliance with EU standards and directives with regards to safety, the 
project had to, broadly, follow guidance provided in EN50126 and to be compliant with 
Control Command and Signalling (CCS) Technical Specification for Interoperability 
(TSI) Mandatory Specifications as follows:  
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1. Index 27: UNISIG SUBSET-091 Safety Requirements for the Technical 
Interoperability of ETCS in Levels 1 & 2; 
2. EN50126: Railway applications - The specification and demonstration of 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS). This standard is 
applicable to the whole of EU;  
3. Other Specifications/Standards/Documents mandated by the TSI’s; 
and Informative Specifications as follows: 
1. B43: 04E083 “Safety Requirements and Requirements to Safety Analysis for 
Interoperability for the Control-Command and Signalling Sub-System”. Being a 
type “1”, these specifications represent the current state of the work for the 
preparation of a mandatory specification still “reserved”; 
2. B44: 04E084 “Justification Report for the Safety Requirements and 
Requirements to Safety Analysis for Interoperability for the Control-Command 
and Signalling Sub-System”. Being a type “2”, these specifications give 
additional information, justifying the requirements in mandatory specifications 
and providing help for their application. 
With regards to RAM there are documents produced in relation to ERTMS similar to 
safety which the projects have to comply with and refer to.  
4.5.2 The Process for derivation of Safety & RAM requirements & Hazard   
Identification 
Process-wise, the derivation of safety and RAM requirements was carried out in two 
steps, corresponding to the first two stages of the project, Stage I and Stage II: 
Step 1: Identification of the high level safety, RAM and environment protection 
requirements for each of three proposed project options, as well as the benefits 
that each proposed project option, can bring to the system, for inclusion in the 
high level requirements baseline. At this stage of the project a very high level 
set of qualitative system requirements/policy statements, cross referenced to 
related standards (listed above) was identified, aimed at synchronisation of the 
project requirements with local Polish and ERTMS standards and high level 
requirements.  For this step the requirements were defined in relation to overall 
system performance. The Polish railways do not have established safety targets 
for the railway network or railway lines, and therefore the project had to 
propose the approach to derivation of overall safety targets to Polish railway 
authorities (PKP) and the Safety Authorities.  
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Since the E20/CE20 railway line is part of TEN lines and the line is to be 
equipped with ERTMS Level 2 railway control system, it was logical to expect 
the safety performance to be at the same level as of other ERTMS fitted or 
planned lines in EU.  
Consequently, the project made use of work done by UNISIG (RAMS target 
set at 10
-9
 dangerous failures for on board and track side ERTMS/ETCS 
equipment). Following the logic that safety performance of conventional 
signalling system must be same as that of ERTMS hence, the overall safety 
target for conventional system should be 10
-9
, i.e. SIL4 (Safety Integrity 
Level).  
Step 2: Derivation of more detailed requirements specification in support of tender 
documentation entailing apportionment of the identified/agreed overall system 
RAM and safety requirements to main system constituents. The RAM 
requirements were set at a different level of system decomposition to safety 
targets. At this stage a more detailed set of requirements was derived.  
In order to do that, the project had to develop a high level functional system 
description inclusive of ERTMS and conventional system constituents and to 
identify interfaces for which the safety and RAM targets will be identified. 
Identification of the interfaces for which the project needs to define 
requirements, was dependant on the contracting/supply policy adopted by the 
project.  
Using that system description, the HAZID study was organised to identify high 
level hazards which were mapped or cross referenced to existing list of CCS 
hazards as defined in B43: 04E083 and B44: 04E084.   Other, non CCS parts 
of the railway system and related hazards were treated separately. This resulted 
in a complete list of railway system hazards and forms an initial hazard log for 
the project.  
The outcome of Step 2 activities was: 
1. A paper, for inclusion in tender documentation, stating: 
a. References to relevant standards and directives; 
b. System description used in support of the work; 
c. List of RAMS requirements; 
d. List of Assumptions, Dependences and Caveats; 
e. List of identified system hazards. 
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2. A hazard log: 
a. Hazard log in “paper” format for inclusion in tender documentation; 
b. Hazard log database for handover to railway authorities and contractors. 
  4.5.3 System Scoping and Conceptualisation 
In support of the first step (as defined above) a very high level of a system 
conceptualisation was developed (Lucic, 2006).  It is possible to define 8 classes of 
different railway system constituents:  
1. Controlled infrastructure; 
2. Maintenance, Tools, equipment, machinery; 
3. Trains; 
4. Stations; 
5. Stabling areas; 
6. People (Procedures); 
7. Railway neighbourhood; 
8. Environmental factors. 
Each of these can be broken into more detailed subclasses, as follows: 
Class/Subclass 
1. Controlled Infrastructure 
  1.1 Civil structures 
  1.2 Infrastructure based Communication Systems 
  1.3 Electrification 
  1.4 Level Crossings 
  1.5 Permanent way 
  1.6 Plant 
  1.7 Signalling (Conventional) 
  1.8 Signalling (ETCS trackside) 
  1.9 Infrastructure in general 
2. Maintenance, Tools, Equipment and Machinery 
  2.1 Maintenance Regime 
  2.2 Manual Tools 
  2.3 Instrumentation 
  2.4 Spares 
  2.5 Power Tools 
  2.6 Machinery(e.g. diggers) 
3. Trains 
  3.1 Braking Systems 
  3.2 Train Based Communication Systems 
  3.3 Doors 
  3.4 Running Gear 
  3.5 Traction systems 
  3.6 Train - Materials of Construction 
  3.7 Train Control (e.g. AWS, TPWS) 
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Class/Subclass 
  3.8 Trainborne ETCS 
  3.9 Auxiliary Systems and Supply 
  3.10 Freight 
  3.11 Rail Based Machinery (e.g. ballast cleaners, tampers) 
  3.12 Material/Fuel 
  3.13 Other (i.e. technical or undetermined issues) 
  3.14 Corporate responsibility 
4. Stations 
  4.1 Escalators 
  4.2 Lifts 
  4.3 Non-public areas 
  4.4 Platform areas 
  4.5 Other station areas 
  4.6 All station areas 
5. Stabling Areas 
  5.1 Depots/workshops 
  5.2 Sidings 
6. People (Procedures) 
  6.1 Control room staff 
  6.2 Emergency response staff 
  6.3 Neighbours 
  6.4 Passengers 
  6.5 Station staff 
  6.6 Infrastructure maintainers 
  6.7 Train crew 
  6.8 Train maintainers 
  6.9 Operational Staff 
  6.10 All Staff 
  6.11 Corporate responsibility 
  6.12 Axle Counter operation specific procedures 
  6.13 Training 
7. Railway Neighbourhood 
  7.1 Construction 
  7.2 Hospitals 
  7.3 Housing 
  7.4 Industry/Factories 
  7.5 Roads 
8. Environmental Factors 
Table 4-10: Railway system constituents classes and subclasses 
 
In support of the Second step (as defined above) a more detailed, but still high level, 
system conceptualisation was done as presented on Figure 4-11 below. 
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Figure 4-11: Railway System Model
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A system boundary for which the analysis was to be done was identified and the 
relevant interfaces marked by different colours to denote different suppliers delivering 
different system constituents. All coloured interfaces are the boundary interfaces.   
Each identified boundary interface, was reviewed to identify those interfaces (for each 
project option) that are not covered by existing standards, and for which it is necessary 
to identify the requirements and related potential hazard. Following table contains a 
sample of this information.  
Requirements 
 to be defined, 
hazards to be 
identified 
Interface 
number 
Interface between  
Object Object 
Yes I01 Infrastructure Condition 
Monitoring 
Infrastructure failure data 
No I02 Maintainer workstation Infrastructure Condition Monitoring 
Yes I03 Trackside ERTMS equipment 
status 
Infrastructure Condition Monitoring 
No I04 Functionality of Level Crossings Infrastructure Condition Monitoring 
Table 4-11: An example of interfaces description 
  4.5.4 Derivation of High Level Safety Requirements 
For each option, all of the classes listed in Table 4-10 above were reviewed to carry 
out identification of high level safety, RAM and environment protection requirements 
and benefits. The analysis was focused on identifying only those requirements that are 
not covered by existing Polish standards, for each class, during the review the basic 
stages of the system lifecycle were considered: 
1. Installation; 
2. Commissioning; 
3. Operation (including maintenance); 
4. Decommissioning. 
The following table provides an example of the identified requirements not covered by 
existing standards for all project options, and the benefits.  
Requirement 
Type/Benefiting area 
Project 
option 
Requirement/ Benefit description  Comment 
Environment Options 
1 & 2 
Noise management. Average level of noise, 
throughout the day, and during specific periods 
(day-time, night-time), should be kept within 
allowed limits. Possible approaches are:  
1. Screens 
2. Restricted use area procedure 
3. Speed limit 
Level of noise is 
likely to increase 
over time, if the 
infrastructure or 
rolling stock are not 
maintained correctly.
RAM Options 
1 & 2 
Point heating needs to be adequate for speed 
and frequency of traffic 
 
Safety Options 
1 & 2 
Project should consider/analyse EMI issues in 
consideration of supply of electricity to 
neighbours. 
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Requirement 
Type/Benefiting area 
Project 
option 
Requirement/ Benefit description  Comment 
Environment Option 1 Minimising risk of ground and surface water 
contamination by hazardous goods in regular 
operation. 
 
RAM Options 
1 & 2 
Improved technical condition of structures.  
Commercial Option 2 Adjustment of whole line for 200km/h for 
option 2, leads to significantly reduced travel 
time 
Only applies to E20 - 
not CE20. 
Safety Options 
1 & 2 
Improved safety at road/rail crossings  
Table 4-12: Example of high level safety requirements 
  4.5.5 Identification of Hazards 
This analysis has been based on the above system description. In support of this 
analysis the author prepared a list of 32 high level railway hazards. A sample from the 
list of hazards given in the Table 4-13 below was reviewed by the team of experts to 
establish its completeness.  
Ref. Hazard name Hazard Description/Scope 
CH1. Abnormal 
deceleration 
The hazard “Abnormal deceleration” includes only those instances of a 
train’s slowing sharply when not actually as a part of a derailment or 
collision scenario.  Includes all 3 groups, Passengers, Neighbours and 
Workers. 
CH2. Contaminated water 
and/or land and/or 
air 
The Hazard for Contaminated Water and/or Land has been defined as the 
release of harmful substances likely to cause contamination of the 
environment.  This allows the consideration of detection, mitigation and 
remediation barriers in the consequence domain.  The release of toxic 
gases likely to cause harm to workers or neighbours has also been 
considered under this core hazard. 
This Core Hazard considers harm to workers or neighbours as a result of 
coming into contact with land, water or air contaminated with harmful 
substances, rather than coming into contact with the harmful substances 
themselves - although the toxicology is similar, the frequency and 
dispersion will differ.  Includes Neighbours and Workers. 
CH3. Crossing running 
railway at level 
crossing  
Includes all situations in which a user (i.e. a Neighbour) is present on a 
level crossing without the intended degree of protection from trains.  This 
may arise from intentional or inadvertent misuse of the crossing by the 
Neighbour as well as from failures and errors in railway equipment and 
procedures. 
The definition excludes situations in which harm may arise when using a 
level crossing as intended, for example if a user falls and injures 
themselves on a crossing but is still able to cross within the design time 
limit.  The hazard excludes incidents at level crossings resulting from 
suicide or attempted suicide - these are assumed to be covered under 
Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour 
The hazard is limited to Neighbour hazards and thus does not consider 
hazards at worker crossings provided within stations, depots, sidings etc.  
Unauthorised Neighbour use of such crossings should be regarded as 
Abnormal or Criminal Behaviour, being a form of trespass.  (Unauthorised 
passenger use is covered in Hazard Inappropriate Separation between 
Running Railway and people.) 
CH4. Electro-Magnetic 
Interference (EMI) 
caused to by 
railway operations 
EMI Caused by Railway Operations to Businesses, General Public, 
Adjacent Buildings, Hospitals, has been developed to include those 
situations where EMI from the infrastructure or rolling stock could affect 
the safety of neighbours directly.  This hazard does not include EMI 
caused by infrastructure or rolling stock to signalling and track circuits, or 
interference between the rolling stock and infrastructure.  Such 
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Ref. Hazard name Hazard Description/Scope 
interference could be considered part of the causes for other hazards. 
CH5. Inappropriate 
separation between 
trains 
The hazard Inappropriate separation between trains includes the scenarios 
in which the determined separation between trains, normally provided by 
the signalling system, has broken down.  This hazard is defined such that 
there is no interface between it and the “Loss of Balance” hazard. 
Includes all 3 groups, Passengers, Neighbours and Workers. 
CH6. Inappropriate 
working 
methods/environme
nt 
The scope of this hazard was defined to include most “occupational” 
accidents where typically a single worker is affected. Also included is the 
case of crane loads and other mechanical equipment fouling trains passing 
nearby as this was always due to operator error. 
Table 4-13: High level railway hazards 
Each identified interface was reviewed against a list of hazards and related to 
applicable hazards as in a Table 4-14 below. 
Related interfaces 
(interface reference: from 
“subsystem” to “subsystem”) 
Related core hazards 
I088: Civil Structures - 
PWay 
CH27. Unsound/unsecured structures; 
CH15. Incompatibility of train and structure gauge; 
I089: PWay - Drainage CH27. Unsound/unsecured structures; 
CH03. Contaminated water and/or land and/or air; 
CH18. Loss of train guidance (derailment); 
CH30. Loss or degraded train detection 
I084: PWay - Traction 
Power Supply 
CH06. Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) caused to by railway operations; 
CH13. Inappropriate separation between uninsulated live conductors & people; 
I085: PWay - Overhead 
line 
CH13. Inappropriate separation between uninsulated live conductors & people; 
CH15. Incompatibility of train and structure gauge; 
I086: PWay - Trains CH09. Impact from railway construction/maintenance works; 
CH20. Objects/Animals on the line; 
CH18. Loss of train guidance (derailment); 
CH02. Abnormal deceleration; 
CH31. Loss of adhesion (abnormal acceleration/deceleration) 
Table 4-14: Initial System Hazard Log sample (Core Hazards referenced to originating system 
interfaces) 
The result of this study established a hazard log for the project and was used to 
evaluate different project options and choose the most appropriate one for 
implementation within the funding scope and proposal for modernisation of the 
Corridor II.  
4.6 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter the author depicted the experience and findings related to an application 
of some of the existing methodologies on 4 very different railway projects as well as 
the background to and results of the implementation of several innovative 
methodologies that the author developed whilst working on these projects.  
A more detailed critique of the methods detailed here is provided in the next chapter. 
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The safest road to hell is the gradual one - the gentle slope, soft 
underfoot, without sudden turnings, without milestones, without signposts 
- C.S.Lewis 
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CHAPTER 5:   CRITIQUE OF CURRENT THINKING, 
AVAILABLE TOOLS AND PRACTICE           –        
A  RESEARCH AGENDA 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
The requirements for the new system based framework for system safety analysis and 
management are identified and outlined in this chapter. Based on that existing tools 
and methodologies have been assessed for compliance with requirements and a 
research agenda set out.
 
Figure 5-1: Structure of chapter 5 
5.2 Summary of Requirements for new framework 
Following generic safety risk analysis and management stages applicable to any 
system (or undertaking) have been identified as part of this research: 
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1. System Conceptualisation, Representation and Scoping (System Analysis). This 
stage of the analysis is often omitted from safety literature and standards. This 
preparatory phase is necessary in order to provide a structured framework and 
systematic approach for the hazard identification and risk assessment and 
support a holistic approach to the analysis. Some form of system description 
model, for example state transition model or sequence and collaboration diagram 
should be used as the basis for hazard identification, as the hazards resulting 
from each system interface, process or interaction can be elicited. The novel 
approach, developed as part of the research, to system conceptualisation in 
support of safety analysis is discussed later in the thesis; 
2. Information processing can be further structured in a number of activities: 
a. Hazard identification. The purpose of this stage of the process is to 
identify dangerous states associated with the system and its operation as 
detailed earlier (BS EN 50129, 2003), (CENELEC 1998), (CENELEC 
2003), (BS EN 50126: 1999), (BS EN 50129: 2003), (BS EN 61508: 
2003), (RSSB, 2007). Although hazards and identification of hazards is at 
heart of any safety analysis, not much work has been done defining the 
properties of hazards. A formal definition of a hazard and the properties of 
the hazard has been developed and is presented later in this thesis. Also in 
combination with the novel approach to system conceptualisation, a formal 
process supporting hazard identification has been developed;  
b. Analysis of causalities and consequences. The objective of the causal 
analysis is to determine the relevant factors, which act singularly or in 
combination, in the realisation of a hazard. The objective of the 
consequence analysis is to identify the scenarios arising from a hazard to 
consequences and the consequences themselves (BS EN 50129, 2003), 
(CENELEC 1998), (CENELEC 2003), (BS EN 50126: 1999), (BS EN 
50129: 2003), (BS EN 61508: 2003), (RSSB, 2007). As part of the hazard 
identification a structure is provided in support of the cause and 
consequence analysis;  
c. Loss estimation, is about the assessment of the magnitude of the 
detrimental impact associated with consequences (BS EN 50129, 2003), 
(CENELEC 1998), (CENELEC 2003), (BS EN 50126: 1999), (BS EN 
50129: 2003), (BS EN 61508: 2003), (RSSB, 2007); 
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d. Estimation and apportionment of the safety risk to the source causes and 
failures of preventative measures is important to enable identification of 
the most critical constituents of the system and focus the improvement 
efforts in the most fruitful areas of the system. Some work has been done 
in this area (Saltelli, 2002). The author developed a novel, formal 
methodology to perform the apportionment of risk within the cause-
consequence modelling environment (Lucic, 2004a). This novel 
methodology is discussed further later in the thesis; 
e. Risk profiling. Risk profile is a multi dimensional presentation of forecasts 
for future accidents for a system. Additional dimensions introduced, may 
be time, space, or some other important variable parameters. A novel 
approach to risk profiling has been developed including supporting tools 
(Lucic, 2003a), (Lucic, 2004a) and is discussed later in the thesis; 
f. Identification of different solutions and mitigation measures (options and 
impact analysis) is a prerequisite to any claim that the safety risks of the 
system are As Low As Reasonably Practicable. This involves 
identification of any additional potential mitigation measures or different 
options to a system solution or implementation that could further reduce 
the safety risk (Health and Safety Executive, 2009), (RSSB, 2007). A 
structured approach to conceptualisation and hazard identification 
developed as part of the research supports this stage of the analysis in a 
novel way, as discussed later in this thesis; 
g. Optimisation of the system and selection of the most gainful options and 
mitigations is carried out to ensure the safest possible solution (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2009), (RSSB, 2007). This can be done using a 
quantitative or qualitative methodology. Both methodologies are further 
developed and discussed in this thesis; 
h. Analysis of uncertainties includes assessment of a level of imprecision of 
numerical data or understanding of the system composition and behaviour 
and appraisal of the potential impact of this uncertainty on the analysis; 
i. Completeness analysis is necessary to confirm that none of the possible 
system’s states or configurations or potential scenarios is overlooked. As 
part of a novel system conceptualisation approach, a framework for 
completeness assessment and assurance has been development; 
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3. Derivation and management of requirements. Outputs of the analysis process are 
identified mitigations or options to be implemented in the system, or identified 
limits of safe operational envelope for the system. These need to be expressed as 
requirements and managed throughout the life of the systems. Confirmation that 
the requirements are implemented is usually obtained through the verification 
and validation process (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998). Derivation and 
management of safety requirements is important as one of the options to confirm 
final safety performance of the system is through verification and validation of 
safety requirements; 
4. Presentation of results and construction of safety knowledge net. Throughout the 
analysis, knowledge about the system is collected in a number of cycles 
(preliminary analysis, design analysis, system change analysis, etc.) 
corresponding to the principal engineering safety management activities, 
mentioned earlier. As development of the system is progressing, more 
knowledge is gathered and merged with already processed information. This 
accumulated knowledge is then manipulated to generate the forecasts for the 
system’s safety performance.  
 Often the complexity of analysed system dictates that the problem domain is 
broken into digestible chunks. Prior to analysis, the system is broken into 
subsystems, elements of the big puzzle that can be comprehended. The analytical 
work is performed on these palatable chunks to produce constituents of the 
concluding result. Finally, using the elements of the answer, the freshly formed 
cells of knowledge are merged into a net defining the new understanding of the 
analysed system. This approach enables easy update of understanding of the 
system with new information.  
 One of major aims of risk assessment is to ascertain the safety performance of 
the system and determine if it is satisfactory. Decision about the adequacy of the 
safety performance of the system is based on knowledge gathered during the 
analysis. Structuring of safety arguments into knowledge net enables systematic 
review of gathered knowledge. Furthermore, it is necessary to create different 
views on the information, a person responsible for implementation of a 
mitigation measure may not need the same information as the tester of the same 
mitigation, or maintainer of the subsystem that provides the mitigation. It is, 
therefore necessary to identify these different view points on the knowledge net, 
and make it possible to create the required output (Kelly and Weaver, 2004), 
  
Page 133 
 
(Kelly, 2001). A novel process developed as part of the research and presented 
latter in this thesis, extends beyond the existing knowledge management and 
presentation methods brought by the Goal Structuring Notation (Kelly and 
Weaver, 2004), (Kelly, 2001); 
5. Management support. Any safety management process, must be capable of 
supporting management and recording any activities related to the analysis, 
implementation of mitigations, options and requirements, verification and 
validation and finally testing (RSSB, 2007), (Hessami, 1999b). Processes 
supporting the management needs, are embedded in the novel process developed 
as part of the research and presented latter in this thesis; 
6. Configuration control. All the time configuration control of all the information 
must be kept, all our assumptions must be documented and the work must be 
transparent and understandable to others (RSSB, 2007); 
7. Continual appraisal and knowledge update. As the system is being developed, 
used and decommissioned, it is necessary to monitor the safety performance of 
the system, and to update the knowledge base as required. It is only if the 
knowledge about the system is up to date that the safety management of the 
system can be effective (RSSB, 2007). A novel process developed as part of the 
research and presented later in this thesis also facilitates appraisal and 
knowledge update and management. 
Any new framework for analysis and management of system safety needs to include 
all of the above stages into a holistic methodology.  
In addition to above the methodology must be able to cope with the added 
complexities of staged project implementation, intricate supply chains and delivery 
organisations pertinent to so many contemporary projects. 
5.3 Critique of current thinking 
The work done under the general umbrella of safety management is in fact knowledge 
elicitation and gathering and subsequent knowledge and corrective action 
management. 
Information is collected, presented in a hopefully easy to understand form, more 
information is collected and merged with already processed information, accumulated 
knowledge is manipulated and the arguments in support of derivation of a safety case 
generated. 
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Once the initial phase of the project is completed the stakeholder should continue with 
the maintenance of the knowledge base and management of corrective actions until 
decommissioning.  
All the time configuration control of all the information must be kept, all the 
assumptions must be documented and the work must be transparent and 
understandable to others.  
From the start to the end of the process the complexity of modern systems 
(engineering and organisational) necessitates the need to break the problem area into 
digestible chunks. Prior to analysis, the system is broken into subsystems, elements of 
the big puzzle that can be comprehended. The analytical work is performed on these 
palatable chunks to produce constituents of the concluding result.  
Finally, using the elements of the answer, the freshly formed cells of knowledge, 
“freshly trained neurons”, are merged into a large “brain” containing new 
understanding of the analysed/managed system.  
Development of models in support of this process has the potential to greatly improve 
the development of conclusions underpinning safety arguments. The individual 
projects can be supported by models as follows: 
1. Models are an instrument that enables better understanding of a system being 
implemented/maintained; 
2. Development of the comprehensive set of safety arguments would benefit from a 
good set of models describing the system and supporting the risk assessment; 
3. Safety risk based, quantified comparison of effectiveness of different solutions 
in support of options analysis; 
4. Quantified estimation of safety risk introduced to the system by implementation 
of new technology and processes, in support of ALARP argument; 
5. Model logical structures can be used in support of systems analysis enhancing 
the understanding of the technological and procedural solution for the project. 
Use of modelling on a project is not a prerequisite for a successful conclusion of the 
undertaking, but it supports efficient, concise and structured knowledge gathering, 
structuring of the argument and enables quantified support to the decision-making 
process.    
However, modelling of any kind is expensive and the Systems Safety Analysis and 
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Management budget should be carefully balanced to enable completion of all steps of 
the process. If a decision has been made to develop models in support of the project, 
the complexity brought about by increased sophistication in modelling should be 
balanced against the difficulties in understanding by experts and the likelihood of 
introducing systematic errors. As already mention earlier in “Objectives and Aim of 
the Research“, a number of generic activities of safety risk analysis and management 
process have been identified.  
The table below provides an overview of these activities in relation to methodologies 
reviewed in the previous sections of the thesis. Although all of the above mentioned 
methodologies are useful on their own, none of these covers the complete set of 
activities required to support the system safety risk analysis and management process, 
as depicted above. 
At the moment an integrated framework for the system safety risk analysis and 
management does not exist. Currently, the most advanced and structured process for 
Systems Safety Analysis and Management is presented by the 7 Stage Process and its 
extension Risk and Opportunity paradigm. 
The ISAE8 (a tool set used for development of parametric models described later in 
the thesis) is a very comprehensive as it brings together following facilities: 
1. Hazard log; 
2. Risk modelling environment; 
3. Reporting. 
However most of the other generic activities are not part of the process or the tool. 
Most of the methodologies listed above are not particularly user friendly and are very 
difficult and expensive to implement and maintain on the large scale project. As the 
complexity of the analysed system increases the models produced using the existing 
techniques tend to increase in complexity at even faster rate, resulting in extremely 
complex models, that are difficult to validate and test, and finally, due to their 
complexity, end up not being used in support of the projects.  
Although some of the models are capable of supporting the analysis of temporal and 
spatial aspects of the systems safety risk, the results are snapshots in time and do not 
land themselves to profiling of risk. Furthermore apart from the Weighted Factors 
Analysis none of the methodologies are capable of taking into account effects of both 
detrimental and beneficial facets of the systems behaviour to the safety of the systems.  
  
Page 136 
 
   
     Methodologies      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activities 
S
y
st
em
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 M
o
d
el
s 
 
S
y
st
em
 D
y
n
am
ic
s 
F
ai
lu
re
 M
o
d
e 
an
d
 E
ff
ec
ts
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
T
h
eo
ri
es
 o
f 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
M
o
n
te
 C
ar
lo
 S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 M
o
d
el
s 
T
h
eo
ry
 o
f 
E
v
id
en
ce
 
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
 B
lo
ck
 D
ia
g
ra
m
s 
an
d
 
N
et
w
o
rk
 M
o
d
el
s 
F
au
lt
 T
re
es
 –
 E
v
en
t 
T
re
es
 
M
ar
k
o
v
 M
o
d
el
s 
P
et
ri
 N
et
s 
T
h
eo
ry
 o
f 
F
u
zz
y
 S
et
s 
W
ei
g
h
te
d
 f
ac
to
rs
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
A
d
v
an
ce
d
 C
au
se
 C
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
 
M
o
d
el
s 
P
ar
am
et
ri
c 
A
d
v
an
ce
d
 C
au
se
 
C
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
 M
o
d
el
s 
System 
analysis/conceptual
isation 
9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Hazard 
identification 
9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Analysis of 
causalities 
n/a n/a 9 9 n/a n/a 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Analysis of 
consequences 
n/a n/a 9 9 n/a n/a 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Loss estimation n/a 9 9 9 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 9 
Apportionment n/a n/a 9 9 n/a n/a n/a 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 9 
Options analysis n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Impact assessment n/a n/a 9 9 9 n/a n/a 9 9 9 9 n/a 9 9 
Risk Profiling n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 
Optimisation n/a n/a n/a 9 9 n/a n/a 9 9 9 9 n/a 9 9 
Construction of 
safety arguments 
network 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Requirements 
derivation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Configuration 
control 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Management 
support 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Continual appraisal 
and knowledge 
update 
n/a n/a n/a 9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Reporting.  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Table 5-1: Comparison of facilities provided by different methodologies. 
Development of the methodology supporting the generic activities of safety risk 
analysis and management process for any system would bring benefits to the industry. 
Moreover, since the current practice in the UK is that demonstration of compliance 
with the ALARP principle is structured in the form of a Safety Case, the process needs 
to support the development of the Safety Case.  
5.4 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter the author identified and outlined the requirements for the new system 
based framework for system safety analysis and management. Furthermore, using the 
framework requirements as the baseline, the author analysed the existing 
methodologies, drawing on the experience depicted in Chapter 4, and summarised the 
critique of current thinking in this chapter. 
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Our plans miscarry because they have no aim. When a man does not know which 
harbour he is making for, no wind is the right wind - Senecca 
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CHAPTER 6:  A NEW SYSTEMS BASED APPROACH TO 
SYSTEM SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS AND 
MANAGEMENT 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
The findings of the initial part of the research, development of a new system based 
approach to safety risk analysis and management theory is discussed here.  
Before one can begin defining the process for information gathering, conceptualisation 
and representation (System Analysis) in relation to safety risk analysis, assessment and 
management, it is necessary to define the properties of the hazard, as an element of the 
risk, and outline the requirements and structure of the Safety Case as a final 
deliverable of all the analysis.   
Hence the first two sections of the chapter are presenting the research findings 
regarding this subject.   
Discussion about the development of the new framework follows in rest of the 
sections in this chapter.  Integration of the novel methodologies discussed in Chapter 4 
and some of the existing methods outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, into a new framework 
is presented and discussed.   
Figure 6-1 below provides an overview of the structure of this chapter, presents the 
lines of reasoning followed in support of the development and indicates which parts of 
the process (or which methodology) is newly developed or is a new application of 
existing one.  
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Figure 6-1: Structure of chapter 6 and the argument in support of the claim that a newly developed process is sound and complete 
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6.2 The Hazard 
A hazard is characterised by its potential to cause an accident, as already discussed 
earlier.  However, the real picture is more complex.  
Different sets of attributes define different objects that make up each hazard, as well as 
the relationships between each individual hazard and all the different hazards that are 
parts of the entirety of “safety performance” as an emergent property of any system 
under observation.  
Furthermore, each of these sets of attributes and their internal and external 
relationships is characterised by its own properties.  
We will refer to this entirety as the “hazard universe”.  
It is possible to identify at least two different (but related) view points on the problem 
domain: 
1. Analytical or System Safety point of view; 
2. Management point of view.  
Both of these will be analysed separately and a unified, holistic relational data 
structure depicting the “hazard universe” will be proposed.  
Analysing the hazard, from a systems safety point of view, it is possible to define the 
“hazard universe” as a hierarchical net, consisting of a number of different objects, 
interacting to define the Safety Performance as an emerging property. 
 If we analyse the hazard from a systems point of view, it is possible to distinguish 
between three sets of attributes related to each hazard: 
1. Attributes related to the origin of the hazard, causality of the hazard (spatial and 
temporal); 
2. Attributes related to the evolution of the hazard, post hazard horizon, (spatial 
and temporal) into a consequence or set of consequences, defining the frequency 
of the consequences; 
3. Spatial and temporal attributes related to the consequences, defining the nature 
of the consequences and subsequent loss. 
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Figure 6-2: “Hazard Universe” 
Interactions of these three sets of attributes define the attributes of the hazard itself. 
The collective effect of interactions between different hazards (in fact these are 
interactions between attributes of individual hazards) could be seen as emerging 
properties of the “hazard universe”, where the “hazard universe” is treated as a system: 
1. Potential detriment, risk, which the hazard can initiate (as an emerging property 
defined by combined spatial and temporal effects of attributes related to the 
origin of the hazard, attributes related to the evolution of the hazard into a 
consequence or set of consequences, consequences themselves and of any 
containments of consequences); 
2. The spatial and temporal nature of the hazard itself (as an emerging property 
defined by the combined spatial and temporal effects of attributes related to the 
origin of the hazard). 
Attributes related to the origin of the hazard could be treated as constituents of the 
“hazard universe” system, which interacting together define the causal properties of 
each of the hazards, and of the “hazard universe”, with their own properties: 
1. The cause or causes (predecessor(s)) of the hazard; 
a. Spatial properties, location of the predecessor(s) to the hazard; 
b. Temporal nature of the predecessor(s) to the hazard; 
c. Nature of relationship between different causes; 
Hazard H1 Hazard Hn Hazard Hn-1 
Consequence Cn-1Consequence C1 Consequence Cn 
Predecessor 
P1 
Predecessor 
Pn-1
Predecessor 
Pn 
Barrier Barrier 
Barrier Barrier 
Barrier Barrier 
Barrier Barrier Barrier 
Mitigation Mitigation  
MitigationMitigation
Mitigation Mitigation
MitigationMitigation Mitigation
Containment Measure Containment Measure Containment Measure 
Safety Performance
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d. Potential relationship between causes and protection/defence measures 
(causes instigating failures of protection/defence measures); 
e. In case that there is more than one predecessor, a measure of contribution of 
the predecessor to the hazard; 
2. The mitigations of causes. The attributes of mitigations are: 
a. Nature of relationship between the cause and the mitigation; 
b. Nature of relationship between  different mitigations; 
c. A measure of reduction of the detrimental effect of the cause or contribution 
to the hazard. 
Attributes related to the evolution of the hazard into a consequence, “post hazard 
horizon”, could be treated as constituents of the “hazard universe” system, which 
interacting together define the consequences of each of the hazards, and of the “hazard 
universe”, with their own properties: 
1. The barriers to the hazard, reducing the effect of the hazard; 
a. Spatial properties, location of the barrier(s) to the hazard; 
b. Temporal nature of the barrier(s) to the hazard; 
c. Nature of relationship between different barriers;  
d. In case that there is more than one barrier, a measure of reduction of the 
detrimental effect of hazard; 
e. Nature of relationship between the causal domain of the hazard and the 
barriers; 
f. Nature of relationship between different barriers. 
2. Attributes related to the progression of consequences and effect of the 
containment measures, “post consequence horizon”, could be treated as 
constituents of the “hazard universe” system, which interacting together 
characterize the safety performance of the system under observation and its 
“hazard” universe: 
a. Frequency or probability of consequence occurrence; 
b. Temporal nature of the consequence; 
c. Spatial properties, location of the consequence; 
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d. Nature of subsequent loss; 
e. Exposed party (who will suffer the loss); 
f. Potential for direct consequences causing further subsequent consequences;  
g. Nature of relationship between different consequences; 
3. And finally, containment measures: 
a. Spatial properties, location of the containment measure(s); 
b. Temporal nature of the containment measure(s); 
c. Nature of relationship between different containment measures;  
d. A measure of reduction of the loss; 
e. Nature of relationship between different containment measures. 
In support of safety management process it is usual to create a log of all hazards on the 
project and track implementation of any defence/protection measures using this log.  
The author will talk about the use of the Hazard Log and its place in the management 
processes later. However for purpose of this analysis the author identified that 
additional information is required. A distinction should be made between the attributes 
of the “hazard universe” from a systems safety point of view, and information needed 
in support of safety management process. 
It is possible to classify these information items into two categories: 
1. Support to a comprehensive audit trial; 
a. Source of identification of each object of the “hazard universe”; 
b. Any documents that are relevant/related to the object; 
c. In case of actions, information supporting closure, confirmation that the 
defence/protection measure is in place and working; 
d. Journal, a record of all changes to the hazard log; 
e. Configuration control information; 
2. Management of actions to implement or confirm implementation of identified 
defence/protection measures 
a. Hazard: 
i. Status of the hazard:  
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 Hazard is OPEN if risk emerging from the hazard is unacceptable and 
defence/protection measures introduced or identified are not sufficient to 
mitigate the risk to an acceptable level; 
 Hazard is CONDITIONALLY CLOSED if  existing and new identified 
(but not yet implemented) defence/protection measures are sufficient to 
mitigate the risk to an acceptable level; 
 Hazard is CLOSED-Mitigated if existing defence/protection measures 
are sufficient to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level. However it does 
not mean that this hazard is forgotten, as discussed earlier. We will 
discuss the Safety Management process later in more detail;  
 Hazard is CLOSED-Eliminated if hazard is completely eliminated, for 
example by design. Again it does not mean that this hazard is forgotten 
and we will discuss the Safety Management process later in more detail;  
 Other statuses are possible (for example TRANSFERRED when 
responsibility for safety management of the hazard is transferred to some 
other project or party or CANCELLED if after initial analysis it is 
confirmed that what was initially hazard actually does not exist) but first 
four are the most important; 
ii. Disposition statement is clarification of the hazard status and record of any 
changes to the hazard.   
b. Defence/Protection measures: 
i. Action Description provides detail about the action to implement the 
defence/protection measures; 
ii. Action Status 
 Action is OPEN if it is not implemented; 
 Action is CONDITIONALLY CLOSED if it is certain that the action 
will be implemented; 
 Action is CLOSED if related defence/protection measure is 
implemented; 
  Similar to hazard, other statuses are possible (for example 
TRANSFERRED or CANCELLED) but unlike hazard, once the action 
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is transferred or cancelled it is usually kept only as a record of earlier 
activities;   
iii. Actionee is responsible to implement the defence/protection measure; 
iv. Actionee response is the status report regarding the implementation of the 
action and Action implementation deadline date is providing a timescale 
for implementation of the action; 
v. References to relevant safety requirements provides link to the system 
requirements set. A subset of defence/protection measures will refer to 
“things” that exist already and some to those that are needed to make the 
system acceptably safe. These defence/protection measures should be 
transformed into requirements.  
Following diagram (Figure 6-3) depicts the above described attributes (coloured 
yellow), information items (blue for audit trial related items and white for 
management of actions related items) and their relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Hazard attributes (coloured yellow), information items (blue for audit trial related items 
and white for management of actions related items) and their relationships 
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Based on this structure it is possible to define different “views” on our knowledge base 
about the “hazard universe” under scrutiny.  
The “views” will depend on the need of the viewer or interested party. As already 
discussed, an analyst will be interested in slightly different information than for 
example a project manager or a person responsible for implementation of identified 
action or a requirement. 
This structure is used for further analysis and development of a process for 
information gathering, conceptualisation and representation in support of systems 
safety analysis and management.  
6.3 The Safety Case 
The purpose of the safety case is to present the arguments that the system, which is the 
subject of the safety case, is acceptably safe to operate in a precise operational 
environment (Kelly and Weaver, 2004).  
Each safety case consists of four elements: 
1. Objectives or Requirements: The safety case must identify and present the 
requirements that need to be fulfilled to ensure satisfactory safety performance 
of the system; 
2. Evidence: The Safety case needs to present the evidence that requirements are 
fulfilled; 
3. Arguments: The safety case need to present two types of arguments. Firstly it 
needs to argue that the set of identified requirements is sufficient to secure, 
assuming that all requirements are implemented, that the system is acceptably 
safe. Secondly, arguments that the evidence provided that the requirements are 
fulfilled, is sufficient proof of requirements implementation; 
4. Context: The safety case must be defined within the operational context of the 
system. Therefore the safety case must identify and outline the operational 
environment of the system being analysed. This needs to include the technical 
“operational envelope” of the system operating within the given environment 
under given operating conditions.  
As result of the research the author proposes that, from a reasoning point of view a 
process supporting derivation of the safety case is of a form of the Singerian inquiry. It 
is possible to present the Singerian inquiry system with the following model: 
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Figure 6-4: Singerian inquiry system model 
In the Singerian inquiry model, choice of objectives determines the choice of data to 
be used and the structure of the holistic inquiry model.  
Following the same approach as to the development of the system, system 
representation and identification of boundaries between subsystems/constituents of the 
system, to support the above listed constraints, and according to the Singerian inquiry 
model, the safety case should be structured around main safety goals, objectives, of the 
system and then decomposed into lower level goals and requirements.  
It is possible to treat a safety case derivation process as a system on its own right. If 
the generalised description of a system, as mentioned earlier, is used, a special case of 
that system would be a “safety case derivation process system”.  
The “safety case derivation process system” is a conceptual, hierarchical system, made 
up of information packets linked together into a fact net model, with a function to infer 
and present the reasoning why the undertaking which is an object of the safety case is 
sufficiently safe.  
In the generalised system description information, energy and action as three general 
categories of inputs and outputs of the system were defined. Also, a special class of 
inputs and outputs of the system related to environment was identified. In case of the 
“safety case derivation process system” elements of a generalised system definition 
can be characterised as follows: 
1. The system corresponds to the “safety case derivation process system”; 
2. The environment corresponds to the analysed system, context within which the 
safety case is being developed, legal constraints and societal perceptions; 
3. The system constituents correspond to a number of different “objects” as 
follows:  
a. The safety goal, or on a lower level of a hierarchy, the safety objective or 
safety requirement. The safety goal is influenced by external inputs such as 
legal requirements or constraints and societal perceptions and expectations 
to mention some; 
Objectives 
Data Inquiry Information 
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b. The data, which in case of safety case process relates to raw information 
being analysed, or to evidence. The data is taking as an input information 
from outside the “safety case derivation process system”, from across the 
system boundary; 
c. Inquirer, which in safety case process terminology relates data to the 
information to produce arguments;  
d. The arguments, which in safety case terminology relates to arguments 
supporting the claim that the safety goal has been achieved; 
4. With regards to the interfaces of the system, three categories were identified 
earlier, “information”, “action” and “energy”. In a case of a “safety case 
derivation process system”, since it is a conceptual system, interfaces of 
“energy” and “action” category do not exist as such.  All of the interfaces are in 
fact “information” interfaces, relating arguments and evidence to safety goals, 
safety objectives or requirements. In case of external interfaces these are 
providing data to support the enquiry process and information to mould the 
safety   objectives; 
5. The topology of the system corresponds to the structure of internal and external 
interfaces of the “safety case derivation process system”. 
Extending the same principle the “safety case derivation process system” within its 
environment, can now be presented by Figure 6-5, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-5: “Safety case derivation process system” within its environment 
Since the “safety case derivation process system” is in fact the Singerian inquiry 
model, the choice of objectives will influence the choice of the inquirer and the sought 
after data. It is consistent with current practice that, when analysing software related 
systems or subsystems, different methods will be used, than if the subsystem is 
hardware based. Therefore different inquirers of the “safety case derivation process 
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system” make up a hierarchy of inquirers related by higher level inquirers into a final 
argument supporting the objective. Figure 6-6 depicts the extended knowledge net that 
“safety case derivation process” is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Generic safety case derivation process system 
The conventional safety case development method is focused on a static system 
definition, where for any change to the system configuration, a new bespoke safety 
case needs to be developed (Kelly, 2001).  
However modern systems and recent large scale projects introduce additional 
complexity of a changing system configuration and the environment within which the 
system is operating (the system here is understood to be the wider system including 
the operators and users). If a conventional approach to the development of the safety 
case is to be followed, it would mean that for each system configuration, or stage of 
the project, a new bespoke safety case would have to be produced.  
A more appropriate approach would be to develop a safety case structured in modular 
elements, which should enable an easy way to adopt or change the safety case to 
represent each new reality.  
In the interest of efficiency, economy and the effectiveness of the safety assurance 
process, the safety case for each system configuration or project stage, should be 
structured in such a way as to enable: 
Constraint 1. Reuse of material and the structure of safety case supporting the 
previous system configuration or the preceding project stages to the 
maximum extent which is appropriate and feasible; 
Constraint 2. For each following issue of the safety case, the underlying safety 
  
Page 150 
 
argument should build upon the safety arguments, safety processes and 
safety management activities as developed during the previous stages of 
the project or in support of earlier system configurations. 
In support of this approach the author identified two potential methods to structure the 
safety case “net model”. Firstly, one could partition the system into parts following 
some predefined methodology, and structure the safety case around these parts (Kelly, 
2001).  This way, the final safety case would in fact, consist of a number of lower 
level safety cases, one for each part of the system, brought together by an overarching 
argument that the overall system is safe.  
This approach appears as the most logical way to define a structure of the safety case 
“net model”, primarily because it is a direct extension of the conventional systems 
engineering approach.  
However, this approach brings about a number of complex requirements that have to 
be fulfilled: 
1. To support the two constraints above clear boundaries between the parts of the 
system to be supported by the safety case need to be identified. There cannot be 
any overlaps between the parts, as for each part a safety case will need to be 
built
2
;  
2. Since the partition of the system requires clear split between different parts of 
the system, it is necessary to identify all parts of the safety case that depend on 
the input from other parts of the safety case (mentioned above) and decision has 
to be made in which part these will be treated; 
3. Decomposition of the analysed system also needs to consider the real system 
boundaries which may be changing throughout the life of the project or the 
product;  
4. Since the first assumption about the analysed system is that it is a changing 
system and as we need to analyse the impact of the change to overall system 
safety performance, it is likely that this approach would necessitate complete 
review of the safety case each time and detailed identification of changed parts 
in need of a new safety case.  
                                                 
2
 In practise this are often not referred to as safety cases, but as parts of the overall 
system safety case. However each one of these possesses all the attributes of a 
standalone safety case.  
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An alternative approach is to identify a common “theme” across all different phases of 
an emerging project or all different manifestations of an evolving system. From early 
stages of the project onwards, for any system it is possible to identify the Core 
Hazards emerging from that system. For example, on railways one of Core Hazards 
would be “Inappropriate separation of trains”.  Furthermore, it is very rare that the 
system to be implemented is so novel that it is not possible to research the history or to 
use previous experience to identify a comprehensive list of potential Core Hazards.  
However this is an iterative process and completeness of analysis should be assured 
through a systematic analysis and review process as is explained in following sections 
of this thesis. 
An overall Safety Goal is that for all Core Hazards emerging safety risks are managed 
to an acceptable level. Therefore, for each Core Hazard, a safety case like argument 
should be made to prove that the risk brought about by a particular Core Hazard is 
managed to an acceptable level.  
This approach has several significant advantages. The “safety case derivation process 
system” is about proving that the emerging safety performance of the analysed system 
is satisfactory, and its output, the safety case is about presenting the results of the 
analysis in a logical manner. Therefore, it is logical that the “safety case derivation 
process system” is structured around the Safety Goals and analysis of the related Core 
Hazards, as it is successful management of the Core Hazards that define the level of 
safety risk.  
This approach should also make it possible to identify the parts of the subsystem 
relevant to a Core Hazard and analyse them in the context of that particular Core 
Hazard. For each new manifestation of the system, a review of the system elements 
that contribute to the Core Hazard should be undertaken to identify those that are 
changing. The analysis then can focus on the analysis of changes of the system 
elements
3
 and the impact of these changes on the overall safety performance. In order 
to satisfy the two constraints described above, the structure of the “safety case 
derivation process system” net model and consequently the safety case arguments 
needs to allow easy identification of the parts that are changing from one system 
manifestation to the next one and impact of these changes on the overall system safety 
performance.  
                                                 
3
 Term system element is here used in a wider possible sense, to include the system 
constituents, interfaces and environment.  
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Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) as a presentation of the net model lends itself very 
well to this task. Each of the main elements of the safety case, Objective, Argument 
and Evidence, as noted above, is represented by a symbol. Notably, Context as a part 
of the safety case is not presented uniquely by a GSN symbol ( Figure 6-7 ). The 
Constraint as a symbol of the GSN is reserved for any type of constraint on the system 
and therefore includes the Context of the system operation. Other symbols of the GSN 
will be discussed later in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Example of reusable GSN pattern 
In terms of a structure and specific areas of interest to be covered by any safety case, a 
structure recommended in EN50129 and the Yellow book (RSSB, 2007) standard is 
widely recognised as representing a good practice in the production of safety cases and 
is used well beyond the Standard’s nominal scope of electronic systems for railway 
signalling.  
The following are generic sections which correspond to the four elements of the safety 
case listed above: 
1. Introduction: High level safety objectives or requirements should be presented in 
this section; 
2. System Definition: A safety case can only “exist” within a context of the system 
for which the safety case is being written. This part relates to a bullet point “4. 
Context” above; 
3. Quality and Safety Management Reports: In support of the safe system operation 
it is important to develop and implement an adequate Quality and Safety 
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Management Systems. This part of the safety case should present the Quality 
and Safety Management System adhered to during the life cycle phases of the 
system to be supported by the safety case. This part of the safety case tallies with 
a bullet point “2. Evidence” above ; 
4. Technical Safety Reports: This section of the safety case contains all safety 
reports related to the system. This section corresponds to main safety case parts, 
Objectives or Requirements, Evidence and Arguments. The context of this 
section should not be a simple repetition of the previous two sections but should 
go into much more detail; 
5. Related Safety Documents: This section should contain references to all other 
related safety documents used in support of the development of the safety case.  
Later in this thesis it will be show how the structure of the safety case recommended 
by EN50129 can be fused with the approach suggested above. 
6.4 Holistic Change Safety Analysis, Risk Assessment and 
Management Process 
  6.4.1 Engineering Safety and Assurance Process – Big Picture 
Change Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Process is the part of the overall 
Engineering Safety and Assurance Process (ESAP). The author developed ESAP as a 
generic System Integration process. For clarity, firstly the ESAP will be depicted and, 
following from there, detail of the Change Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment 
Process will be provided.  
It is difficult if not impossible, to know what the outcome of complex change to a 
complex system is. The system emergent properties can lead to novel, atypical, 
dangerous failures. Furthermore, the exhaustive testing of complex systems is most 
often an impossible task. Hence, the only pragmatic technique to ascertain entirety of 
the “hazard universe” must be centred around a systematic analysis process. 
A process flow diagram on Figure 6-8 describes the information flow, for each major 
system configuration (related to different project implementation stages), and, at a 
high level, the inputs, key activities and outputs of the overall systems integration 
process. 
At the centre of the process is the System Definition which describes how the elements 
of the     system relate to one another to provide an integrated system, metamorphosing 
from one system configuration to the next.  
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Initial requirements capture brings together all of the known sources of safety, 
functional and performance system requirements that were documented at the 
beginning of the project, including the original concept specifications.  
Based on these requirements, the system definition is developed to capture the 
baseline system configuration, before any changes brought about by the project, and 
subsequently for each of the project stages.   
The high level system definition is in the form of a physical architecture diagram 
depicting the high level architecture of existing systems. Underlining the system 
architecture, based on the understanding of existing interfaces, the System Context and 
Interface Diagrams (SCID) were developed.   
As the performance of the interfaces defines the performance of the system for each of 
emerging properties/categories a system is delivering against: safety, RAM and 
performance, the detailed information about the interfaces, including the stage of the 
project (system configuration) the interface is active for, is captured in the Objects 
(assets, procedures and people) and Interfaces Database (OIDB).  
The system definition is utilised to analyse the implications of the change on the 
system and identify detailed requirements against the deliverables, including, Systems 
Safety, RAM, Human Factors, Operational Readiness, EMI/EMC and Performance. 
The first step towards obtaining acceptance of the new system is demonstration that 
what has been designed meets the requirements as specified during the course of 
development.   
This is done through verification and validation. The aim of the verification is to show 
that a specification at one stage in the delivery life cycle is consistent and compliant 
with the specification of the previous stage, taking account of any agreed changes or 
variations.   
Maintaining formal control over the traceability between the requirements repository 
(DOORS software package) and the project remit and standards enables the project to 
prevent requirements creep, substantiate its argument for acceptance of the 
deliverables and identify any changes to the system performance.   
Subsequent stages of verification should be between requirements sets and system 
definitions produced at each stage of the programme/project life cycle (architectural 
design, system design, sub-system design and detailed design). Validation is 
undertaken to demonstrate that what has been built against the design meets the stated 
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requirements.   
During the course of systems development all parties involved in delivery of the 
changes under the project will be compiling evidence that the processes have been 
followed, safety and performance issues are well understood, and the system to be 
delivered meets all requirements and specifications. 
Consent to move to each new system configuration is sought by an “application to 
consent to operate” or “consent to trial operations”, supported by an Engineering 
Safety and Assurance Case (ESAC), which sets out the justification for the assurance 
of the system, as it is at that stage.  
The ESAC presents the arguments for the assurance of the overall system in a given 
major configuration as affected and delivered by the project works. 
The ESAC outlines the system assurance argument by bringing together four distinct 
areas of assurance: 
1. System Safety; 
2. Operational Readiness; 
3. System Reliability, Maintainability and Availability (RAM); 
4. Performance. 
Structure of the system safety case is discussed later.  
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Figure 6-8: Engineering Safety and Assurance Process
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  6.4.2 The Change Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment and Management Process 
The complexity of modern undertakings necessitates an integrated approach to system 
safety hazard management, quantification of system safety requirements and system 
safety assurance. The process described in this thesis aims to integrate these three 
aspects of System Safety Management. To demonstrably discharge the duty of care, it 
must be ensured that all changes are subject to safety analysis, that a robust process 
has been followed for the management of system safety hazards and that all hazards 
have been satisfactorily resolved.  However these changes vary enormously in 
significance and, unless the safety analysis processes are scaleable, they will either 
impose an unacceptable overhead on the less significant changes or fail to cope 
properly with the more significant ones. A scaleable change analysis process, the 
Change Safety Analysis and Management process (provides the framework for 
achievement of these goals) as defined earlier, is extended to include quantified risk 
assessment modelling and systems safety requirements derivation, quantification and 
management. The Change Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment and Management 
Process encapsulates the following: 
1. System conceptualisation and core hazards grouping; 
2. Scoping of the impact of the change on safety performance of the system; 
3. Safety risk analysis and assessment: 
a. Hazard Identification; 
b. Cause Analysis; 
c. Consequence Analysis;  
d. Loss Analysis; 
e. Safety requirements derivation; 
4. Qualitative and Quantitative derivation of safety targets and valuation of safety 
requirements; 
a. Options and Impact analysis: 
b. Apportionment and risk profiling; 
c. Impact assessment and optimisation; 
5. Management of safety requirements; 
6. Configuration control; 
7. Necessary outputs/reports; 
8. Input into construction of safety arguments network; 
9. System Safety Hazard Log management. 
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Figure 6-9, below, depicts the CSA, Risk Assessment and Management Process, 
including the hazard management process and the identified dependencies and the 
deliverables. The process is heterogeneous and adaptive to any system and 
encapsulates following activities, dependences/inputs and deliverables: 
1. The main input to the process is the System Definition. The system definition 
is used to scope and baseline the system and initiate the analysis process; 
2. As the undertaking is progressing, the initial requirements are subject to 
changes and these changes must be assessed for impact on the system 
definition and the system definition should be updated accordingly. Typically 
on a project these should be done through the Engineering Change Request 
(ECR); 
3. Usually one of the main reasons for change of the initial requirements set is 
the feedback from initial testing of the system recorded in the Defect 
Recording and Corrective Action System (DRACAS); 
4. Using the system definition information the system is conceptualised, 
resulting in the set of process models of the system, to enable further 
quantified and qualitative analysis; 
5 and 
19. 
The system model is then used to support the Initial Change Safety Analysis 
and development of the QRA. Output of this activity is the Initial Change 
Safety Analysis record.  This record is configuration controlled and represents 
one of the building blocks of the completeness of the analysis assurance; 
6, 18 
and 
23. 
Those changes that are categorised as category one  or two are subjected to 
Change Safety Analysis (CSA), all novel changes to the system are subjected 
to safety analysis Therefore, like for like replacement of existing equipment is 
not subjected to safety analysis. Output of the CSA process is in the form of 
briefings, in preparation and support of the analysis and the reports detailing 
findings of the CSA; 
7, 21, 
22, 
23, 24 
and 
25. 
Outputs of the CSA provide input into the System Hazard Log. The scale and 
complexity of the project necessitates a central system hazard data store, 
referred to as the System Hazard Log (SHL), in support of the derivation of 
the safety case. The System Hazard Log is the central repository of all the data 
related to the CSA process and the tool for management of the actions related 
to implementation of identified mitigation measures. All hazards are entered 
into the SHL and hazard closure requires review and endorsement at the 
Hazard Forum. Actions to implement requirements and 
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mitigations/containment measures are managed and tracked through  the SHL 
as well. From the SHL, System Hazard reports are produced in support of the 
System Safety Case submission, depicting the status of the SCA activities and 
the SHL. System Hazard Log Reports are produced quarterly and provide 
detailed overview of the content and status of the SHL. A significant part of 
the safety arguments and evidence enabling closure of the SHL records and 
completion of the Systems Safety Case will come from the safety 
documentation produced by the supply chain. Finally, results of the System 
Hazard Log Implementation audits are fed to the SHL and into the System 
Hazard Log Implementation audits; 
8, 16 
and 
17. 
System conceptualisation and the outputs of the SCA are used to support 
quantified or qualitative risk assessment, for each identified Core Hazard.  
It should be noted here that a choice of the risk assessment methodology 
(quantitative versus qualitative) depends on the nature of the risk being 
analysed and the needs of the safety analysis; 
9. Both, the risk assessment models (quantitative or qualitative) and the System 
Hazard Log are “synchronised” in terms of information and coverage of the 
hazards; 
10.  Safety requirements should be derived from the defence/protection measures 
stored in the SHL and some of these requirements will be quantified using the 
Quantified Risk Assessment model.  A Safety Requirements Forum sh643d be 
formed, to assemble sufficient expertise necessary to elicit safety 
requirements; 
11 
and 
12. 
Risk assessment is done at two levels, firstly overall system safety 
performance targets are established, and then the requirements quantified. It is 
also necessary to check that results from testing and monitoring systems 
comply with the quantified safety targets;  
13, 14 
and 
15. 
A team of experts in required disciplines, independent from the project, 
oversee critical CSA activities, endorse the output (reports) of the process and 
approve the change of status of SHL actions and consequently the Core 
Hazards.  In support of the Hazard Forum’s decision making, for any change 
of the SHL action status a proof of implementation is sought  in form of an 
actionee response, V&V report, test log, etc.  
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Figure 6-9: CSA and Risk Assessment Process 
Detailed description of each step of the process is provided in the following sections.  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QRA:  
 Derivation of  
Safety Targets and  
Quantified 
Requirements 
 Process 
 
 
Deliverables
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSA: Hazard Identification, Analysis and Management  
Initial Change 
Safety Analysis 
Records 
Initial 
Change 
Safety 
Analysis 
Change Safety 
Analysis 
Briefings 
 
Categorise
Category 4 
 no safety 
impact
System Hazard 
 Log Reports 
Change Safety 
Analysis 
Reports 
System Hazard 
Reports 
Actions 
Closeout 
review 
Category 1 and 2, novel 
change - Change Safety  
Analysis required (including 
options analysis) 
System Hazard 
Log 
Implementation 
Audit Report 
Causes &  Mitigations;
Consequences & 
Containment Measures;
Qualitative risk 
assessment, etc 
Crosscheck 
for 
completeness
Actions to 
implement 
requirements 
Safety Targets 
Compliance 
Check  
Actions to 
implement 
Mitigations and 
Containment 
Measures
System Hazard Log 
 
Overall 
System 
Safety 
targets 
Risk assessment 
models 
Category 3, not a 
novel change-
managed by 
existing 
standards and 
good practice 
Safety 
Requirements 
Forum  
(Derivation, 
Quantification & 
Closeout of 
Safety 
Requirements) 
Hazard Forum 
 (Actions closure, 
endorsement of: • CSA and ICSA 
activities; • System Hazard 
Log report. 
Individual 
Subsystems  
Safety 
targets 
DEPENDENCY/INPUT 
Safety Requirements 
implementation proof 
 (with quantified target 
compliance statement) 
DEPENDENCY/INPUT 
Actions implementation 
proof (with compliance 
with closure criteria 
statement) 
START 
5
6
79 
8 
10
11
12
13
14
15
System 
Conceptualisation 
DEPENDENCY/INPUT
Changes to 
Requirements  
(ECRS, etc)
DEPENDENCY/INPUT • DRACAS reports • Other 
DEPENDENCY/INPUT 
System Definition  
1 2
3
4 
16 17
18
19
20
21
22
23
2425
  
Page 161 
 
6.4.3 Conceptualisation and Core Hazards Grouping 
To enable the systematic analysis of any system it is necessary to understand the 
whole of the system, to conceptualise the system. Earlier, several different methods of 
conceptual modelling were discussed and also some of the applications for conceptual 
modelling were presented.  
For a complex system it is usually necessary to produce a hierarchy of conceptual 
models, very detailed representations of the system to capture all of the system 
constituents and their behaviour (these models will be referred to as System Concept 
Interface Diagrams (SCID)) and higher level system representations capturing the 
subsystems and their interactions. Still some of the system architecture models contain 
hundreds of interfaces and objects and are very difficult to analyse and configuration 
control. For example a System Definition for the Victoria Line Upgrade Programme 
(VLUP) 
4
, consists of three major elements: 
1. Physical Architecture Diagrams, which represent the physical assets and their 
relationship for all stages of the project as it transforms through  different system 
configurations; 
2. System Context and Interface diagrams which model all system constituents 
including human interactions and the environment; 
3.  Objects and interface database which contains detailed description of all objects 
and interfaces within SCID and descriptions of changes to these for different 
system configurations.  
In support of the conceptualisation process a new type of modelling was suggested. If 
one defines the “core” hazards for the analysed system, then it is possible to extract 
from the detailed system description (SCID), only those parts of the system that are 
contributing to the core hazard and produce a conceptual model describing 
relationships between all of the system constituents (including environmental inputs). 
Through analysis of historical data and a high level system analysis it is possible to 
identify the “core” hazards, and use them for grouping of hazards and process models. 
The concept of the process model methodology was developed by Short of Atkins 
Global (Short, 2007), in support of the development of safety cases for complex 
railway systems. 
 
                                                 
4
 Victoria Line Upgrade Programme was used to test the processes described in this 
section of the thesis. This work is depicted later, in chapter “Application” of the thesis  
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Figure 6-10: An example of System Definition 
In line with earlier definition of the system constituents’ interfaces being categorised 
into Information, Energy and Action type interfaces, the system constituent symbol 
consists of a rectangle depicting the system constituent and three separate partitions of 
the rectangle, one for each interface type, as shown below on the Figure 6-11.  
The agreed convention is that the interface type is defined on the source side of the 
interface, as it is the source system constituent that defines the type of the interface. 
Environment is treated as a special type of the constituent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-11: An example of the basic Process Model  
Further formalisation of this methodology is introduced as part of the research, as 
follows: 
Interfaces can be grouped into intentional and unintentional.  
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Intentional interfaces are planned, designed interfaces, for example communication 
link between two subsystems. This is why an intentional action or information type 
interface can only potentially be an indirect cause of the hazard or the consequence, 
and hence can only lead to the unintended or uncontrolled release of energy, in case of 
its failure to perform desirably.  
Unintentional interfaces are not planned and appear either by mistake in design, 
project implementation or as a result of a system failure. An interface that is not 
intentional is potentially a direct or indirect cause of a hazard or a direct or indirect 
cause of a consequence. It is only an unintentional interface of energy type that can be 
a direct cause of a safety consequence (in a sense of uncontrolled or unintended 
release of energy). An action or information type unintended interface can only be an 
indirect cause of the hazard or the consequence, and can only lead to the unintended or 
uncontrolled release of energy.   
Therefore, on the process models it is possible to distinguish between: 
1. Intended interfaces (annotated by black full line, for example comms link 
between the signalling system and on board computer); 
2. Unintended interfaces that are indirect cause of the hazard or the consequence 
(annotated by black dashed line, for example Electromagnetic Interference) and  
3. Unintended interface that is a direct cause of the consequence (annotated by a 
red lightning bolt).  
All of the Process Model interfaces are described at the level of approximation 
adopted for development of process models. This description needs to include all 
changes to the interfaces to be implemented by the undertaking. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that the process model interfaces should be further “tagged” using a four 
dimensional classification system: 
1. Primary classification: what is the function provided by the interface, or what is 
the purpose of the interface, reason for its existence; 
2. Secondary classification: ”being” of the interface, or a method of its execution; 
3. Tertiary classification: temporal and operational nature of the interface, or when 
is the interface active, including all of the operational modes of the system; 
4. Quaternary classification: physical environment of the interface, or what is the 
surrounding of the interface. 
A set of generic classifications for a railway system have been developed and is 
detailed later in the thesis.  
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Since at the level of approximation of Process Models, some or all of the interfaces are 
conceptual or composite (for example communication between the train driver and a 
signaller on the process model would typically be presented with a single line, 
interface, whilst in reality there are several different methods for this interface to 
occur, train radio, signal post telephone) further cross-referenced to SCID interfaces, 
for detail and traceability is required.  
It is of utmost importance to develop these models at the appropriate level to ensure 
that all relevant interfaces are included in the analysis, but also to make sure that the 
level of analysis is not too detailed in order to avoid the loss of focus on the system 
analysis as opposed to detailed constituents analysis. 
To ensure completeness of the Process Models it is proposed to develop a SCID as a 
detailed system description model, as already discussed above and then identify clear 
boundaries between main system constituents, taking into account the engineering and 
operational aspects of the system as well as commercial/contractual boundaries related 
to the supply chain and the system constituents being supplied by different provider 
SCID and Process models are used in support of the information gathering process and 
are inseparable as a system presentation tool.  
Later in this thesis the experience of use of the process models technique will be 
discussed and further formalisation will be proposed.  
  6.4.4 Initial Change Safety Analysis  
Initial change safety analysis is done at two levels. Firstly when system definition is 
established, each of the boundary interfaces identified within the process models 
should be subjected to Initial Change Safety Analysis (ICSA) as already discussed 
earlier. This is essentially a structured review process, interfaces are systematically 
reviewed by a group of experts against predefined criteria as explained earlier. 
As part of the ICSA, in support of the future Change Safety Analysis, following 
information should be collected:  
1. Description of the change to interface; 
2. What is the rationale behind the way in which the changes are applied; 
3. What is the intended purpose of the new function; 
4. What is the environment in which the new equipment will be installed; 
5. What does the new equipment interface to; 
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6. What non-equipment changes, if any are being made at the same time (for 
instance, changes to the maintenance regime or operational rules); 
7. Which aspects of the equipment and its application are novel and which have 
been proven in service; 
8. Safety benefits of the change, if any; 
9. ICSA category. 
As a project is progressing it is inevitable that the intended system definition will 
change, different subsystem constituents may not be fully compatible or new 
requirements may be identified, resulting in a different system configuration being 
brought into existence than the one that was planned. The SCID and process models 
must be updated to reflect these changes and each of these changes must be subjected 
to ICSA. 
  6.4.5 Change Safety Analysis 
The Change Safety Analysis aims to integrate an integrated approach to system safety 
hazard management, quantification of system safety requirements and system safety 
assurance.  
The Change Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Process encapsulate the following: 
1. Change Safety Analysis: 
a. Identification of Hazard, Causes, Consequences and Defence/Protection 
measures; 
b. Analysis of Causes; 
c. Analysis of Consequences including Loss Analysis; 
d. Analysis of Defence/Protection measures; 
2. Risk Assessment; 
3. Derivation of Safety Targets and Quantified Safety Requirements; 
4. Change Safety Management. 
Identification of Hazards, Causes, Consequences and Defence/Protection measures 
As argued earlier in the thesis, the hazard identification is the key phase of the safety 
analysis of any system. The knowledge gathered during this phase is a base for further 
analysis. The most important facet of the safety analysis is completeness. It is 
necessary to assure that the whole system has been analysed and that all aspects of the 
systems behaviour have been scrutinised. To demonstrate completeness of the 
analysis, it is necessary to approach CSA systematically.  
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As previously discussed, a result of standard hazard identification is usually a linear 
collection of records that fit into different parts of the hazard space: hazards, causes, 
mitigations, consequences or just project/product issues not directly related to safety 
performance of the analysed system. Usually, regardless of the method used to support 
it, the quality of the outcome of the HAZID/HAZOP study, depends only on the skills 
and experience of the person in charge of the study and his/her ability to control and 
guide the participating experts. Most of the time, material gathered during these 
studies requires a significant amount of post processing and structuring. 
With the aim to provide the structure to the HAZID/HAZOP studies and enable 
comprehensive understanding, the following approach is suggested: 
1. Since the process models are already produced for each core hazard, 
identification of hazards themselves is already being done as part of 
conceptualisation. The first step of the CSA is to subject those interfaces that are 
classified as ICSA 1 or two to Change Safety Analysis (CSA) to identify related 
Consequences, Causes and Defence/Protection measures and, for those 
Defence/Protection measures that are not implemented yet, identify the Actions 
to implement them.  
 During the CSA it is useful to follow the guide words [Table 4-7] as it provides 
additional structure to the analysis. Also, it is necessary to consider all 
operational modes the system may operate within (normal operation, emergency, 
degraded mode, failed mode, et.) and different phases of a lifecycle (design, 
operation, maintenance commissioning/implementation, decommissioning, 
disposal). 
 Obviously if, as part of the CSA, a new core hazard is identified, the process 
needs to be reassessed, new process models produced for these core hazards and 
the process should recommence; 
2. It is essential to keep the traceability from interfaces defined within the SCID to 
the interfaces of the Process Models and to the identified Hazards, 
Consequences, Causes and Defence/Protection measures. This will enable 
rigorous change control and assessment of: 
a. Impact of any changes to the original scope on safety analysis done thus 
far; and 
b. Impact of changes on the safety performance of the system. 
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Causes  
Attributes of Causes are already defined earlier in the thesis, therefore here we will 
focus on methodologies for analysis and assessment, identification of the relationships 
and possible combinations between the causes.  
It is proposed to make distinction between three areas of analysis: 
1. Characterising the Causes. 
The aim of this activity is to define the Cause in terms of its description, origin, 
location and period/time when it is active.  
 This is done as part of CSA. Description of the cause must be clear and 
sufficiently detailed to allow further analysis. Since the CSA is carried out by 
systematic analysis of process models’ interfaces, identification of the origin and 
spatial and temporal characteristics of the cause is in fact mapping of these 
characteristics from the originating interfaces to related causes; 
2. Assessing the measure of contribution of Causes to a Hazard and subsequently 
to consequences arising from the hazard.  
 Detailed discussion about this analysis is provided later in section on Risk 
Assessment;  
3. Correlating/Associating the Cause with other Causes, Hazards and 
Defence/Protection measures. 
 It is often the case, that failure of a same interface (failure of a function provided 
by the interface) may lead to more than one hazard or it is necessary for some 
other interface to fail in order for this, now combined failure to lead to a hazard. 
Also some of the causes will actually lead to failures of Defence/Protection 
measures.  
 It is necessary to identify all of these relationships in order to comprehensively 
understand the effect of the interface failures or in other words, Causes, on the 
overall system.  
Analysis of causes could be supported in line with several different methods for 
example: 
1. FMEA/FMECA (see earlier discussion) is usually performed at the detailed 
design level, whereby an analysis of the design is undertaken to identify 
potential failure modes. This approach can be utilised for analysis at the system 
level; 
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2. Reliability Block Diagrams and Network Models (see earlier discussion), again 
are methodologies usually utilised for detailed analysis at design level to identify 
common mode failure modes and enhance system redundancy. 
Consequences and Loss  
Understanding of the potential consequences of a hazard is a prerequisite to 
appreciation of the risk and therefore management of it. 
 Attributes of consequences have already been discussed, as well as different 
approaches to estimation or calculation of probability or frequency of consequence 
occurrence and loss analysis. 
Therefore, here the author will only discuss several aspects of the analysis of 
consequences and losses as follows: 
1. It is necessity to define the location of consequences and their temporal nature as 
part of the initial identification. For example if a consequence happens only 
during out of normal service hours, the loss associated with that consequence 
could be much less than if it happens during peak hours when exposure to the 
consequence is much higher; 
2. As part of the initial analysis relationships between the consequences should be 
identified. It is possible that a consequence is actually a secondary effect of 
some other consequence, or that a consequence always materialise 
simultaneously with some other consequence.   
It is also important to identify the nature of subsequent loss in terms of safety, 
commercial and environmental loss and the exposed party (service users, service 
operators, neighbours).  
Defence/Protection Measures 
Mitigations, Barriers and Containment Measures and their attributes are already 
defined earlier so here we will focus on only on aspects of identification and analysis 
not already discussed earlier.  
Assessing the measure of effectiveness of Defence/Protection Measures is a vital 
enabler of conclusive ALARP argument. Assessment of effectiveness of 
Defence/Protection Measures depends on comprehensive understanding of: 
1.  “Being” of these, in terms of their origin (are these measures a physical thing, 
an alarm for example, a planned human intervention such as scheduled 
maintenance or circumstantial event);   
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2. The temporal and spatial nature of the Defence/Protection Measures, or when 
and where these measures are active and effective; 
3. The potential relationship between different Defence/Protection Measures, for 
example it is possible that a Defence/Protection Measures is effectively working 
“against” one hazard but may actually contribute to another (increase number of 
maintenance checks for example may reduce a number of equipment failures but 
may increase exposure of staff to occupational hazards); 
4. Reasons for, or causes of, failures of the Defence/Protection Measures as these 
may be related to causes of a Hazard as well.  
Risk Assessment 
Quantitative versus Qualitative 
Both of these approaches have been discussed in detail earlier and it is not the 
intention to detail the techniques and different methodologies for risk assessment here.   
Both approaches are equally legitimate and informative and each suffers from some 
common and specific limitations.  
The main shortcomings of quantified risk assessment (QRA) are cost (often the cost of 
this activity cannot be easily justified, particularly for simple undertakings) and lack of 
reliable data (particularly if the undertaking is about a novel and/or complex change). 
On the other hand, qualitative risk assessment often results in unsubstantiable 
argument based around informal estimates of consequence occurrence and associated 
loss. In addition to that, some problems are very difficult if not impossible to model, 
for example system failures related to human action and software performance, 
without experiential data being available.  
As already discussed earlier, it is often possible to develop a substantiated quantified 
risk assessment model of an existing system, and in this circumstances, most of the 
time it is possible to obtain valid data to support modelling of this existing system. It is 
valuable, as it is rarely the case that the whole system is introduced as a completely 
new novel system. Most often, the undertakings are about the existing systems (for 
example railway system) being upgraded or improved through  either a number of 
small changes in time or a substantial large scale upgrade programme. In these cases it 
is possible to develop the QRA model representing the safety performance of the 
system before any changes to the system are made. This approach permits an initial 
model to be populated with valid data and gauged against the validated historical data. 
This model can then be used as a base for development of a model representing the 
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effect of the changes to the system and impact of these changes to the safety 
performance of the system. This approach minimises the amount of new data to be 
identified/derived and makes it possible to validate the model predictions against a 
reliable reference point.   
However, regardless of how much validation and verification of data is done, in 
practice use of the absolute value predictions of common QRA models (the most often 
technique used within the railway industry is the fault tree) in safety reasoning is very 
arduous to assure and justify.  
Most often, in practice, use of the QRA predictions is limited to: 
1. Comparison of safety performance of a future system against the safety 
performance of an existing system. This is always done in relative terms, the 
outcomes of the two models, are compared and the difference between two 
outputs is taken as the result of the analysis. This is then used in support of an 
argument that the safety performance of a future system is in relative terms 
better or at least the same as the safety performance of an existing system. In 
case that the analysis shows that the safety performance of a future system is 
worse than that of an existing system, further analysis and changes to the future 
system are to be done until the results are favourable. For more detail on this 
please see the next section of the thesis; 
2. QRA models are often used to set/derive initial targets for a developing system. 
Later on, once the constituents of the system have been developed and tested, 
real data can be fed back into a model to confirm that the overall safety target 
has been achieved.  
Where a qualitative approach is applied, it is suggested that instead of an absolute 
estimate of the risk a comparative approach is taken, as described earlier in section 
“Complex Railway Project Safety Management – Manchester South Capacity 
Improvement Project”.  It is along the same line of reasoning, adopted for the QRA 
modelling; if a reference point is defined and used for measurement of risk the claim 
for assurance of the assessment should be built around the comparison with the a 
known risk profile. Using this methodology greatly enhances the quality of expert 
estimates; qualitative assessment is almost always based on knowledge of domain 
experts and inference. 
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In its nature the Inquiry System suggested here is a Lockean Inquiry System, the 
problem domain is an empirical one, building arguments into a fact net, based on a set 
of empirical judgments elicited from domain experts. 
Apportionment, Optimisation, Options and Impact analysis, Amalgamation of Quantitative 
and Qualitative Analysis and argumentation for selection of options for implementation 
Systematic study, of each hazard, regarding the causal and consequential effects of 
failures shall be carried out.  In order to identify all the applicable defence/protection 
options, the best available expertise shall be employed. Results of apportionment and 
importance analysis are used as guidance for concentration of effort and prioritisation 
of options analysis.   
To enable rigorous option suitability assessment, for each identified option following 
information must be provided: 
1. Cost of implementation; 
2. Timescale for implementation; 
3. Need for additional training; 
4. Impact of implemented option on a selected consequence; 
5. Impact of the selected option on the overall safety performance forecast by the 
model.  
This information will provide a basis for the decision making process and support the 
ALARP argument. 
As explained, both approaches to risk assessment, Quantitative and Qualitative, have 
some limitations, mainly caused by difficulty in obtaining reliable data to feed into the 
reasoning model. To overcome this problem it is proposed to use both approaches, to 
complement each other, in support of the safety risk assessment and justification.  
In general, construction of the safety argument should be carried out around two lines 
of reasoning (Health and Safety Executive, 2009): 
1. Demonstrating that the safety performance of a new or changed system is at least 
as good as the safety performance of a similar or previous system (before any 
changes being done to it).  
Ethically and legally, we expect the new or enhanced system to deliver at least 
as good safety performance as the previous one. With the rapid advance of 
technology and science it would be impossible to justify increasing the societal 
exposure to risk, the expectation is to improve safety performance with time.  
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Using the QRA methodology in support of this line of reasoning is beneficial 
and is compatible with the approach detailed above.  
2. Demonstrating that the owner and/or the beneficiary of the undertaking has 
reduced the safety risk emerging from the system to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) level.   
Ethically and legally, it is expected that the risk of any undertaking is 
mitigated/controlled to an acceptable level. In the UK in particular the 
acceptable level of risk is defined as ALARP. This requirement calls for 
identification of the controls of hazards on an individual basis (for each hazard) 
including consideration of all possible controls. It is only when there is nothing 
else, practicable, that can be done to reduce the risk level further, that the safety 
risk emerging from the system can be considered as ALARP.   
To support the argument that the safety risk emerging from the system is 
ALARP it is necessary to demonstrate the practicability argument by carrying 
out a cost-benefit analysis to assess and compare the costs of any proposed 
changes to the system against the reduction in risk levels inclusive of the 
acceptance/rejection criteria. 
It is proposed here that the analysis should be done at two levels: 
a. For specific highly critical hazards (ones that have major contribution to 
safety risk) the QRA approach is recommended, but only if it is possible to 
develop QRA models representing the system before changes or a similar 
already existing system so that data and the model predictions can be 
validated and verified.  
The QRA should then be used in support of the options identification and 
analysis and the ALARP argumentation.  
b. At the system level, for each hazard, a qualitative/comparative 
methodology suggested earlier (please see section “Complex Railway 
Project Safety Management – Manchester South Capacity Improvement 
Project”) should be applied.  
This methodology allows for a systematic and transparent assessment of 
all hazards and related causes and defence/protection measures. However, 
in order to enable the process it is necessary to structure the hazard log in 
such a way as to make it possible to comprehend relationships between 
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different elements of the “hazard universe”   and to ascertain sufficient 
information to support domain experts in their review and estimation of 
risk. 
Derivation and Management of Safety Requirements 
In recent times with advance of systems engineering, management of interfaces 
between system constituents, suppliers, contracts, internal divisions delivering parts of 
the system, etc. is executed through management of system requirements.  The system 
requirements should say what the system must do, not how it must be done, and 
should be set at the level of interfaces across boundaries within the system, where the 
boundaries are defined as boundaries between major system constituents and system 
and environment. The boundaries may be dictated by contractual arrangements for 
delivery of the system constituents, internal divisions into delivery groups on the 
project, etc. Regardless of the reasons behind the structure of the project delivery 
organisation, these influences must be taken into account when system boundaries are 
defined within the system architecture and/or process models as described earlier.  
Following from the change safety analysis process, Safety Requirements should be 
derived from identified defence/protection measures. However, not all of the 
defence/protection measures are capable of being translated into requirements. Some 
defence/protection measures are simply statements of fact, and although valid, these 
are not worthy of being transformed into requirements. For example, the Victoria line 
of London underground is wholly underground in a deep tunnel. It never rains on 
Victoria line and this is a good mitigation against corrosion, but it is not a requirement. 
Furthermore, in line with the approach taken regarding the change safety analysis 
process, if the change is conventional (like for like replacement or introduction of 
already proven and used technology, there is no need to define detailed requirements 
as such, a reference to existing standards and good practice should suffice. On the 
other hand, introduction of a new signalling system demands systematic identification 
of all related requirements, including safety requirements, and methodical 
management to validated and verified implementation.  
Some of the safety requirements are not quantifiable as such. For example a safety 
requirement “all train drivers must be trained to drive the train in all operational 
conditions” is a binary statement, it is either done or not.  
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If we define a set Mh of all defence/protection measures (mitigations “m”, barriers “b” 
and containment measures “c”) of a hazard h to be Mh = {m, b, c}, then set of all 
safety requirements Rh, associated with the hazard h, is a subset of set M; Mh ⊆ Rh.  
Furthermore, a set of quantified safety requirements Qh, associated with the hazard h, 
is a subset of set Rh; Mh ⊆ Rh ⊆ Qh.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-12: Defence/Protection measures, Requirements & Quantified Requirements 
Selected defence/protection measure should be stated in the form of safety 
requirements on performance, function, procedure, environment, competence and 
other reduction methods. The safety requirements must then be apportioned to those 
projects and suppliers that are responsible for delivery of the equipment, people and 
procedures that embody the causal factors identified in the analysis.  
The projects and suppliers to which these safety requirements have been apportioned 
are responsible for supplying the evidence that safety requirements have been met. 
The System Safety Case is populated with the system safety requirements as 
apportioned to the projects and suppliers and evidence coming from the projects and 
suppliers. 
The safety requirements are associated with defence/protection measures they have 
been derived from and should be managed through the hazard log, because 
implementation of a requirement enables closure of a hazard log entry.  
  6.4.6 Assertion of Completeness of System Analysis 
An essential part of any safety argument is an argument about the completeness of the 
safety analysis done. In making any logical claim, the most difficult part of the 
argument is proof of completeness of analysis and understanding of uncertainties 
involved in decision making. The following are the areas of interest: 
Causes
Hazards
Consequences 
Defence/Protection 
Measures 
Requirements 
Quantified  
Requirements 
Acting on
Acting on
Acting on
  
Page 175 
 
1. Completeness of the system understanding: 
a. understanding of the existing system (system to be changed); 
b. understanding of the changes to the system to be introduced; 
2. Completeness and correctness of change safety analysis: 
a. completeness of hazard identification and identification of protection 
measures and safety requirements; 
b. correctness of risk analysis and assessment and certainty of data used in 
support of risk assessment; 
3. Completeness of the safety arguments/facts net: 
a. completeness of totality of lines of reasoning explored; 
b. completeness and certainty of evidence provided in support of arguments. 
Completeness of the system understanding 
Completeness of the system understanding consists of understanding of the existing 
system, system before changes and the changes to be introduced to the system and the 
effect of these changes on the system properties.   
The process models have been used on both projects to support this understanding as 
already explained earlier. Confidence in completeness of the system understanding is 
achieved through a rigorous process of process models’ production, review and 
configuration control.  
Completeness of change safety analysis 
There are two slightly different types of completeness and certainty in relation to 
change safety analysis.  
The first type is about the comprehensiveness of analysis of the conceptualised system 
(process models) aimed at identification of hazards, protection measures and 
requirements.  
The second type is about the correctness of the risk assessment and analysis of the 
identified hazards, protection measures and requirements and the correctness of 
information used in the analysis. It is particularly relevant to QRA and options and 
impact analysis. 
The assertion of comprehensiveness is achieved through adherence to a structured and 
rigorous process of hazard identification; preliminary analysis (Initial Change Safety 
Analysis and Change Safety Analysis) is done on the process models of a system as 
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base-lined and agreed by the project. The analysis must include all of the boundary 
interfaces identified within the system architecture and mapped to the process models.    
Once the system architecture and process models are base-lined, any changes to the 
system should be controlled. The change control mechanism is usually known as the 
Engineering Change Request, and is in a form of an official request for change of 
base-line design. Usually this process is not formalised in a sense of changes being 
referenced against interfaces, the change is described and the impact of change 
assessed by competent experts. 
However, to comprehensively support ICSA and CSA processes it is necessary to 
integrate configuration control of the system architectures with the ECR process. It is 
suggested that each change request is referenced to the interface impacted by the 
change and submitted to the custodian of the system architecture for impact 
assessment. Any change to the system should be approved by the custodian of the 
system architecture and the system architecture/process models updated. 
In order to complete the impact assessment, regarding the impact of the change on 
safety performance of the system and/or effect of changes on safety analysis already 
done; for each change, affected interfaces should be identified, and then subjected to 
ICSA and if necessary CSA. Output of this analysis feeds into a hazard providing the 
base for further analysis and supporting construction of safety arguments. 
The assertion of correctness is achieved through adherence to the rigorous and 
transparent process for development of QRA logic and data collection and review.  
However, in this case it is also possible to gain further confidence with regards to the 
data used for QRA. Use of sensitivity analyses to identify the most critical data items, 
and focus data search and checking in these areas, use of multiple, independent data 
sources, comparison of model prediction with real life data (base-lining) are all 
techniques that should be used in support of building confidence in the modelling 
results.  
6.4.7 Hazard Log, tool for Change Safety Management, Configuration Control 
and Reporting 
The hazard log is a central repository of the knowledge gathered during the analysis 
and the tool supporting management of activities related to safety analysis and control. 
All the information gathered through the analysis should be captured in the hazard log. 
The basic information to be contained in the hazard log is defined in the railway 
industry guidance, the Yellow book (RSSB, 2007): 
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1. Journal should describe all amendments to the Hazard Log, in order to provide 
a historical record of its compilation and provide traceability. 
2. Directory, sometimes known as the Safety Records Log, should give an up-to-
date reference to every safety document produced and used by the Project.  
It may be convenient to keep the Directory separate from the rest of the Hazard 
Log, or even to integrate it with a project document management system. 
3. Hazard Data should record every identified hazard. For each hazard, the 
information listed later in this section should be recorded as soon as it becomes 
available. Data collected during Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment should be 
transcribed to the Hazard Log when the reports have been endorsed. 
If the hazard is not closed or cancelled, then the name of a person or company 
who is responsible for progressing it towards closure should be captured as well; 
4. Incident Data should be used to record all incidents that have occurred during 
the life of the system or equipment. It should identify the sequence of events 
linking each accident and the hazards that caused it. 
5. Accident Data should be used to record every identified possible accident. It 
should identify possible sequences of events linking an identified accident with 
the hazards that may cause it.  
It is easy to see that all of the information listed above has been already identified as 
part of the overview of the hazard attributes earlier in the thesis. The only outstanding 
part is reference to Directory and Documents and this is not directly related to 
identification, analysis and management of individual hazards. The author would 
recommend that generic documentation related to plans and processes for safety 
management on the project should not only be included in the hazard log directory, but 
should be integrated with the project document management system.  
Since all of the information gathered during Change Safety Analysis is contained in 
the hazard log it seems logical to utilise the hazard log to actively support further 
analysis, not to be only a repository of results of the analysis. If the hazard log is 
structured in such a way as to present the data in a form of a Meta-model of the 
“hazard universe”, it then could be used in support of further analysis, for example in 
support of qualitative risk assessment, review for completeness, or construction of 
safety arguments. 
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Consequences 
 Containment measures 
  Actions 
 Barriers   
  Actions 
Hazard   
 Causes  
  Mitigations 
   Actions  
Figure 6-13:  Hazard Log Hierarchy 
With this in mind a Hazard Log database has been developed. The complexity of the 
Hazard Log database is due to many – to – many relationships that occur between the 
different elements of the hazard log, for example, one consequence may apply to many 
hazards, and one hazard may have many consequences.  This cross-fertilisation 
between the elements lends itself to the capability of cross referencing to other 
elements by selection. The figure below shows the relationship between the data items 
(tables) in the Hazard Log: 
 
 
Figure 6-14: Hazard Log relationships 
Note: all tables are in one-to-many relationship in direction shown on figure 3 above 
(for example, one cause can relate to many hazards) except for relationships between: 
1. Table: Consequences and Table: Hazards, where each consequence can belong 
to only one hazard and  
2. Table: Configuration control and Table: Journal, where each journal entry can be 
related to only one configuration control entry. 
Table: Lifecycle Phases
Table: System States
Table: System Elements 
Table: System Interfaces
Table: Project 
phases 
Table: Relevant Documents
Table: Source of 
identification 
Table: Configuration control 
Table: Owner
Table: Action 
Table: Safety Requirements
Table: Journal 
Table: Actions
Table: Causes 
Table: Mitigation Measures
Table: Containment 
Measures
Table: Barriers
Table: Hazards
Table: Location
Table: Related QRA Elements 
or Risk Assessment Data 
Table: Consequences
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The following table describes the various elements that make up the Hazard Log and 
its relationship to other elements: 
Element 
Name 
Attributes Attributes-Relationship to other elements 
Hazards 1. Unique Identifier; 
2. Hazard Name; 
3. Hazard Description; 
4. Comments; 
5. Disposition Statement. 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Related Causes; 
2. Related Barriers; 
3. Related QRA Model Elements (if QRA is 
used); 
4. Pertinent Lifecycle Phases;  
5. Pertinent Project Phases; 
6. Source of Identification; 
7. Relevant Documents;  
One to one relationship with: 
1. Related Consequences; 
2. Hazard status (Open; Conditionally Closed; 
Cancelled; Closed; Transferred); 
3. Pertinent Location. 
Causes 1. Unique identifier; 
2. Cause Name; 
3. Cause Description; 
4. Measure of a 
contribution of the 
cause to the Hazard 
and related 
Consequences; 
5. Comments. 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Related Hazards; 
2. Related Mitigations;  
3. Related QRA Model Elements (if QRA is 
used) or Risk Assessment Data; 
4. Related System States; 
5. Related System Elements; 
6. Related System Interfaces; 
7. Pertinent Lifecycle Phases;  
8. Pertinent Project Phases; 
9. Source of Identification; 
10. Relevant documents;  
One to one relationship with: 
1. Status (Open; Conditionally Closed; 
Cancelled; Closed; Transferred) 
2. Pertinent Location. 
Consequences 1. Unique identifier; 
2. Consequence Name; 
3. Consequence 
Description; 
4. Loss associated with 
the consequence; 
5. Frequency or 
probability of 
consequence 
occurrence 
6. Comments; 
7. Initial Risk; 
8. Residual Risk. 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Related Containment Measures; 
2. Related QRA Model Elements (if QRA is 
used); 
3. Related System States; 
4. Related System Elements; 
5. Related System Interfaces; 
6. Pertinent Lifecycle Phases;  
7. Pertinent Project Phases; 
8. Source of Identification; 
9. Relevant documents; 
One to one relationship with: 
1. Related Hazards; 
2. Exposed party; 
3. Pertinent Location. 
Mitigation 
Measure 
1. Unique identifier; 
2. Mitigation Name; 
3. Mitigation 
Description; 
4. A measure of 
reduction of the 
detrimental effect of 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Related Causes; 
2. Related Safety Requirements; 
3. Actions for implementation of mitigation; 
4. Related QRA Model Elements (if QRA is 
used); 
5. Related System States; 
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Element 
Name 
Attributes Attributes-Relationship to other elements 
the cause; 
5. Comments. 
6. Related System Elements; 
7. Related System Interfaces; 
8. Pertinent Lifecycle Phases;  
9. Pertinent Project Phases; 
10. Source of Identification; 
11. Relevant documents;  
One to one relationship with: 
1. Pertinent Location; 
2. Status (Implemented; Not Implemented) 
Barrier 1. Unique identifier; 
2. Barrier Name; 
3. Barrier Description; 
4. A measure of 
reduction of the 
detrimental effect of 
hazard 
5. Comments. 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Hazards; 
2. Safety Requirements; 
3. Actions; 
4. Related QRA Model Elements (if QRA is 
used); 
5. Related System States; 
6. Related System Elements; 
7. Related System Interfaces; 
8. Pertinent Lifecycle Phases;  
9. Pertinent Project Phases; 
10. Source of Identification; 
11. Relevant documents;  
One to one relationship with: 
1. Status (Implemented; Not Implemented); 
2. Pertinent Location 
Containment 
Measure 
1. Unique identifier; 
2. Mitigation Name; 
3. Mitigation 
Description; 
4. A measure of 
reduction of the loss; 
5. Comments. 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Consequences; 
2. Actions; 
3. Related QRA Model Elements (if QRA is 
used); 
4. Related System States; 
5. Related System Elements; 
6. Related System Interfaces; 
7. Pertinent Lifecycle Phases;  
8. Pertinent Project Phases; 
9. Source of Identification; 
10. Relevant documents;  
One to one relationship with: 
1. Status (Implemented; Not Implemented);  
2. Pertinent Location. 
Actions 1. Unique identifier; 
2. Action Name; 
3. Action Description; 
4. Comments; 
5. Action Response 
6. Information 
Supporting Closure; 
7. Implementation 
Deadline; 
8. Date Action 
Allocated; 
9. Date Action 
Completed. 
Many – to – many relationships with: 
1. Related Mitigation; 
2. Related Barrier; 
3. Related Containment Measure; 
4. Source of Identification; 
5. Relevant documents. 
One to one relationship with: 
1. Action Implementation Managers; 
2. Status. 
Table 6-1:  Hazard Log Elements and Relationships 
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Element 
Name 
Attributes Attributes-Relationship to other elements 
Configuration 
Control 
1. System hazard log 
version number; 
2. Version details; 
3. Comments; 
4. Issued by 
One to Many relationship with: 
1. Related journal entries 
Journal 1. Journal Entry 
Reference; 
2. Entry created by;  
3. Date of journal entry; 
4. Comments. 
 
Table 6-2: Configuration control and Journal data 
If the Hazard Log is structure in such a way and contains all of the information 
discussed above it could be used in support of the following safety analysis and 
management activities: 
1. Structuring and grouping of the identified causes, mitigations, hazards, barriers, 
consequences and containment measures into Core Hazards’ meta models 
supporting analysis; 
2. Management of safety activities through  management of actions; 
3. Configuration management of safety information and audit trial; 
4. Reporting against the status of the hazards analysis, management of safety 
activities and achieved levels of safety.  
  6.4.8 Continual Appraisal and Knowledge Update 
Through the time of undertaking/project it is necessary to keep the information 
required to secure safe delivery of the undertaking up to date. This should be 
implemented through  a regular review of changes to the original system design, for 
example review of ECRs and impact of these changes on the analyses done so far, and 
the review of data collected by the system performance monitoring processes such as 
Failure Reporting And Corrective Action System (FRACAS).  
During the lifecycle of the project or any undertaking for that matter, in particular in 
early stages of the lifecycle, in order to initiate analysis it is necessary to make some 
assumptions, for example about the future performance of the system, or about 
particular interface behaviour. Furthermore, during the analyses often it is necessary to 
identify dependences that need to be acted upon prior to operation of the system, and 
caveats or restrictions setting the limits, defining the boundaries of the operational 
envelope of the system.   These need to be regularly reviewed and updated. A change 
of assumption may initiate additional analysis or review of analysis already done to 
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ensure the results are still valid. A change of dependency may cause a change of a 
schedule, new chain of actions to be implemented and finally, a change in restrictions 
to be implemented, need to be captured as it is the restrictions that have a significant 
contribution in defining the safe operational envelope of the system being 
implemented or changed.  For the purpose of management and control of these it is 
suggested that establishing databases to collate and control Change Requests and 
Assumptions, Dependences and Caveats (Restrictions) would be beneficial.   
6.3 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter the author presented and discussed the new systems based framework 
for analysis and management of safety risks that the author developed against the 
requirements identified earlier in Chapter 5.   
In support of the framework, the author analysed the hazard as a system concept and 
developed existing notions further, identified and defined the attributes, and their 
hierarchical structure, of a Hazard as a system. The author also analysed the concept of 
the safety case as the inquiry model identifying a number of constraints and 
requirements that a safety case must satisfy.  Subsequent to analysis of these, the 
author proposed the general high level approach to structure of the safety case as a fact 
net, reasoning model.  
In previous chapters, the author presented the results of the analysis of the existing 
system safety and system engineering processes and guidance, and some of the early 
development results and identified requirements for a new framework. The author 
outlined the vision of the safety engineering as an integrated part of the system 
engineering process and the assurance of delivering the needed functioning of the four 
key emerging properties of any system: safety, RAM, Operability and Performance.   
Following from that the author developed and outlined the integrated process for 
analysis and management of engineering safety. The process consist of 7 steps, most 
of which are not newly identified as needed but have not been formalised nor used 
together within an integrated framework.  
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CHAPTER 7:  APPLICATION 
7.1 Chapter introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of a real life application of the 
developed process. The scope includes two major London Underground upgrade 
projects; the Victoria Line Upgrade Programme and the Subsurface Lines Upgrade 
Programme, on both of which, the author with his team, is successfully applying the 
process depicted in this thesis.  
As part of the application of the process and methodologies, developed earlier, where 
need for further enhancements was identified it was completed and is discussed in this 
section as well. 
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Figure 7-1: Structure of Chapter 7 and argument in support of claim that the newly developed process has been successfully trialled and any shortcomings in the initially developed process developed further 
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7.2  Background 
The Victoria Line Upgrade Programme (VLUP) is a multi-discipline project. The 
principal works included within the programme are the upgrading of rolling stock, 
signalling and signalling control. The solution involves: 
1. Delivery of a fleet of 47 new trains, to be driven automatically, but with the 
capability to be driven manually at full speed under Automatic Train Protection 
(ATP); 
2. Delivery of a new signalling system, including: 
a. Train borne equipment, 
b. Signal equipment room equipment,  
c. Control Centre equipment, and 
d. Trackside equipment. 
3. Delivery of a new signalling and communications control systems, located 
within a new Service Control Centre (SCC); 
4. Removal and disposal of existing Victoria Line trains and signalling; 
5. Provision of train cab and signalling simulators; and 
6. Training in system operation and maintenance and provision of maintenance 
manuals and full technical documentation. 
These works are supported by a number of infrastructure enabling works and support 
activities. These include: 
1. Provision of new Signalling Equipment Rooms (SERs) and cable routes; 
2. Provision of new signalling power supplies with battery backup (Uninterruptible 
Power Supplies); 
3. Track upgrade works (through the Metronet Rail Bakerloo, Central and Victoria 
Line (MRBCV) Track Renewals Programme); 
4. Substation enhancements (through the Power Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
with EDF); 
5. DC power distribution enhancements by the VLUP; 
6. Transmission links and train radio enhancement (managed through the Connect 
PFI); 
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7. Depot upgrade works; 
8. Station upgrade and enhancement - including Customer Information Systems 
(CIS) (through the MRBCV Stations & Civils Programme); 
9. EMC and gauging surveys. 
The VLUP is being delivered by a number of projects (around 25) and in a number of 
major configurations. 
To deliver the VLUP, the VLU Project Team within the Victoria Line Programme has 
been established. The VLU Project Team is responsible for managing all contracts 
entered into, to deliver the VLUP, for integration of the various subsystems that make 
up the upgrade and for various other cross-discipline functions. 
It is the responsibility of the VLU Project Team to deliver the overall Engineering 
Safety and Assurance Case (ESAC), comprising of the System Safety Case, Railway 
Operational Readiness Report, System RAM Status Report and System Performance 
Status Report.   
Bombardier Transportation supply trains, signalling and signalling control. 
Bombardier Transportation has a contract with Westinghouse Rail Systems Limited 
(WRSL) for delivery of the signalling and signalling control, while delivery of trains is 
the responsibility of Bombardier Mainline and Metros. Bombardier Transportation is 
responsible for the delivery of these systems and their integration for the VLU. 
Subprojects of the VLU Project will carry out the delivery of the Victoria Line Service 
Control Centre (SCC) building and systems integration, and other enabling works such 
as track upgrades and SER construction. 
Two Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), being managed through separate contractual 
arrangements by LU, also enable the VLUP: 
1. The Power PFI contract with EDF Energy Powerlink Limited - responsible for 
power supply upgrades by way of substation enhancement; 
2. The Connect PFI contract with CityLink Telecommunications Limited - 
responsible for radio and transmission upgrades. 
There is no direct contractual relationship between VLUP and the two PFI suppliers.  
Requirements from the LU have been placed on VLUP through the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) contract. Any changes to these requirements will need to be 
negotiated with the client organisation within LU. LU is responsible for providing 
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safety analyses and assurance evidence from the PFI suppliers to the VLUP to support 
the VLUP System Safety Case, as required by the VLUP System – wide Work 
Package Plan. 
The VLUP also interfaces with other LU/Metronet Rail/Tube Lines supply chain 
partners responsible for other London Underground Upgrade programmes: 
1. Balfour Beatty - responsible for ongoing track renewals; 
2. Stations Alliance - responsible for refurbishment and modernisation of Metronet 
stations and civil infrastructure. 
3. Station upgrades, carried out by Tube Lines. 
All of the subsystem suppliers to the VLUP are responsible for safety management 
within their individual scope of responsibility. 
Operation of the line is the responsibility of LU (apart from engineering hours when it 
is responsibility of VLUP). 
Maintenance of the line is the responsibility of LU Maintenance Organisation. 
However, initially WRSL will maintain signalling part of the system with planned 
hand over to LU Maintenance Organisation at later stage. 
The Subsurface Lines Upgrade Programme (SUP) consists of many projects that 
together deliver the capability improvement requirements and PPP contractual 
obligations to achieve improved Subsurface Lines (SSL) railway performance.   
The following major programme of works is to be undertaken for the upgrade of the 
SSL railway: 
1. Replacing the ageing rolling stock offering improved capacity and performance; 
2. Replacing the obsolete signalling control system with one offering greater 
operational management capability and improved headways; 
3. Providing a new Service Control Centre (SCC) for LU controllers, 
ergonomically integrating a number of systems and their human factor 
requirements including signalling control, train communications, Public 
Address, tunnel telephone and auto telephones; 
4. Providing the necessary power upgrades including the upgrade of low voltage 
AC power required for SUP and station upgrades, and support LU with the DC 
traction power upgrade; 
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5. Necessary infrastructure enabling works such as track, station and depot 
upgrades including the provision of new signal track equipment; 
6. Providing rolling stock (cab) and signalling control system simulators; 
7. Training in the operation and maintenance of the new or altered assets and 
systems provided, as well as maintenance manuals and full technical 
documentation. 
Each SUP Upgrade Steps is delivered through a staged process of translating the 
system requirements and contractual obligations into infrastructure changes.  The final 
stage, and hence the upgrade of the complete SSL railway, is due to be delivered by 
March 2018.   
The principal objective of the staged process of commissioning the SSL railway is 
such that: 
1. Safety risk is kept As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP); 
2. That the risks of the SSL upgrade programme are understood and managed to 
acceptable levels as the new systems are rolled out; 
3. Revenue service is maintained at existing levels, with service improvements as 
the new systems are rolled out; 
4. The operational, technical and functional maturity of the railway is progressively 
implemented; 
5. System rollouts are achieved within the constraints imposed by the access 
requirements; 
6. Roll-out costs are contained within acceptable levels. 
The SUP will also interface with three network-wide PFI schemes modernising the 
SSL infrastructure:  
1. Communications - Connect PFI contracted with the consortium known as 
CityLink. It is responsible for supporting the radio system and providing 
reliable, high-capacity data links which can be flexibly deployed, a robust fibre-
optic transmission network will also be installed.  This will provide the SSL 
Railway with transmission links to support signalling control and 
communications systems; 
2. Power - PFI contracted with EDF Energy Powerlink Limited (EEPL). The new 
trains and signalling to be delivered by the Metronet programme will require 
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more power than at present; therefore to accommodate the new trains the high 
voltage distribution network has to provide more power than is currently 
available.  The PPP contract provides for LU to improve the existing power to 
meet these needs.  With the integrated approach to implementation of both 
programmes (SSL and Power PFI), this power upgrade will be in place prior to 
the full-scale introduction of new trains to the SSL Railway; 
3. Ticketing - Prestige PFI contracted with the consortium known as Transys. 
There are few links between the Prestige PFI and the SUP, although there is a 
need for these to be identified and managed.  An example is that many ticket 
gates in the central area use compressed air from the signalling air main for their 
motive power; this supply must be maintained despite the decommissioning of 
pneumatic signalling equipment (e.g. points) on the SSL Railway. 
The SSL Programme is required to roll out an extensive upgrade of the 284km sub-
surface network over the next 10 years. The upgrade will impact virtually all the assets 
on the current SSL network and will have a significant impact on the operation and 
maintenance of the railway during the intermediate and final state of the SSL Upgrade 
Programme. During the upgrade of the SSL railway, a number of interim railway 
system configurations is defined, as the new assets are delivered into service across the 
SSL railway network.  In addition to the work needed to manage procurement of the 
new rolling stock and signalling, additional enabling works are required to allow the 
new trains to operate on the line.  The resulting work has been divided into four 
principal project portfolios as follows: 
1. Train Systems portfolio – All work required for preparation, passenger service, 
availability, and maintenance of the first S8 trains.  This includes S8 trains, 
necessary depot upgrades, DC traction upgrades including low loss conductor 
rail; 
2. Track portfolio – All work required along the route to enable the S8 trains to 
interoperate with existing rolling stock at line speed, includes train arrestors, 
gauging, maximum safe speed; 
3. Immunisation portfolio – All work required in some areas of the SSL network to 
overcome safety concerns over the compatibility of the new trains with the 
existing train detection equipment.  This includes signalling immunisation track 
circuit replacement, low voltage signalling power, cable route management and 
communications; 
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4. Station Enabling portfolio – All work required at stations along the route of the 
S8 trains to interoperate with existing rolling stock in passenger service.  This 
includes correct side door enable (CSDE), selective door operation (SDO), OPO 
TT CCTV and platform extensions and modifications. 
7.3  Challenge 
Organisationally, both major upgrade programmes, SSL and VLU, are split into a 
number of layers; at programme layer, final integration into a railway system is 
undertaken whilst constituents are delivered by projects and supply chain, the 
immediate integration into subsystems is realised by project portfolios which are 
groupings of related projects.  
For example, on the Victoria Line, the train is being delivered by Bombardier 
Passenger Group; the signalling control is being delivered by Westinghouse. Initial 
integration of the signalling onto train is carried out by Bombardier London 
Underground Projects.  
Once the train-signalling subsystem integration is completed, the final integration of 
the subsystem is completed by the VL Upgrade Programme.   
This is illustrated by Figure 7-2 below, where blue colour indicates integration at 
project portfolio level and red colour indicates the programme level integration.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Organisational structure of the Upgrade Programmes and two integration layers   
 
Integrating safety arguments from a large number of parts and subsystems integrated 
into a railway system and all delivered by different projects and long and complex 
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supply chain, into a series of holistic and coherent system safety cases (one for each of 
the main system architectures) is a challenge.   
The complexity of the Upgrade Programmes necessitates an integrated approach to 
system safety management.  
the author achieved this by ensuring that the various projects, suppliers and project 
portfolio’s, and their specific engineering safety management processes are guided by 
the common principles and practices (set out in the programme level Engineering 
safety Management Plan) and interact in such a way that the overall safety 
requirements and quantitative safety targets are met for each defined railway system 
configuration state.  
As illustrated by Figure 38, there are three areas of focus when implementing the 
integrated safety analysis management on any complex project, alignment of 
processes, alignment and coordination of analysis and management activities and 
harmonization and coordination of deliverables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Integrated safety management process 
When mapped onto the organisational structure of the upgrade programmes, this 
arrangement can be represented by Figure 7-4 below. 
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Figure 7-4: Integrated safety management process mapped onto organisational breakdown structure 
Following common engineering safety analysis and management fundamentals, based 
around the safety fundamentals defined at the programme level, are implemented, 
across the project portfolios and key supplier, to enable an integrated approach to 
managing and demonstrating system safety for each of the configuration states:   
1. Identification of a set of common core hazards. To ensure a common 
approach to hazard identification and analysis it was essential that the same set 
of core hazards is used as a template structure for hazard log groupings across 
the programme, at system hazard log level across to the project portfolio-project 
level.  
2. Use of a hierarchy of Process Models starting from the system level down to 
the delivered subsystem/constituent level in order to: 
a. Define the scope of analysis at system and project/supplier level; 
b. Facilitate common understanding of the scope of change to be introduced 
to the railway system; 
c. Facilitate common understanding of interface boundaries between 
different projects/suppliers scopes of work; 
d. Enable the traceability between different elements of the process, namely, 
QRA, Hazard Log and CSA in support of completeness argument. 
3. Use of the principles of change safety analysis at programme and project level 
to identify hazards, mitigations and safety requirements. These have been 
explained in detail earlier. 
Railway 
Upgrade 
Programme scope 
boundary
Portfolio
Portfolio
Project 
Project 
Project 
Project 
Project
Project
ESAC
SHL 
SSC
System Architecture QRA ICSA/CSA 
HL 
Portfolio and Subsystem SC 
Subsystem 
Architecture 
Input into 
QRA  
ICSA/CSA 
Portfolio and Subsystem SC 
HL Subsystem 
Architecture
Input into 
QRA  
ICSA/CSA
  
Page 193 
 
4. Apportionment of Safety targets and quantification of requirements. To 
demonstrate that the risks resulting from the changes to the railway are 
Tolerable, ALARP and no greater than the level of risk in the current Railway 
System, quantitative risk assessments are carried out, and a set of requirements 
related to the new hardware system constituents have been quantified.   
For purpose of reporting against the risk performance, London Underground 
developed QRA models of the 20 most critical hazardous events, some time ago. 
The current London Underground Subsurface Lines and Victoria Line QRA (LU 
SSL and VL QRA) models are based upon an assessment of the risk of 
passenger fatalities from the hazardous events. These models have been 
reviewed aiming to limit the scope of the programmes QRA to only those 
interfaces and related hazards that are affected by the scope of the programmes’ 
works as defined by reference to the Railway System Architecture. 
The subset of LU QRA models has been developed further to establish a 
baseline set of models representing the Current Safety Performance (CSP) of the 
SSL and VL prior to any changes introduced by the programmes’ works. 
Predictions from these models have been used to set Tolerable Hazard Rates 
(high level safety targets) for both programmes. 
The set of CSP models has been further developed to reflect changes to the SSL 
and VL to be introduced by the programmes, for each stage system configuration 
and geographical area. As result a series of Interim Safety Performance (ISP) 
and Final Safety Performance (FSP) models of the SSL and VL have been 
developed. The models are used to quantify safety requirements for novel parts 
of the system and to confirm that the Tolerable Hazard Rates (high level safety 
targets) have been met by each of the programmes for each system configuration 
during migration. 
5. The use of a consistent hazard management process and hazard log 
structure across programme, project portfolio’s and key suppliers including 
implementation of Hazard Forum at programme and Interdisciplinary Hazard 
Review Group at the project portfolio level. 
To demonstrate that risks associated with the hazards introduced to the SSL and 
VL railways have been reduced to ALARP, a robust hazard management process 
has been implemented.  In addition a clear relationship between the Hazard Logs 
at the System (Programme), Subsystem (Project or Project Portfolio) and the 
Constituent (Supplier) level has been established and documented aiming to 
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adequately manage hazards introduced to the operational railway as a result of 
the upgrade programmes. 
The identified hazards are structured into two different classes for easy 
allocation and monitoring between system, subsystems and third party 
organisations where identified: 
a. System boundary or interface hazards.  These hazards reside at the 
interfaces between two subsystems (e.g. between rolling stock and 
signalling).  Management of these types of hazards is the responsibility of 
the Systems Integration Team on  each of the two programmes;  
b. Subsystem level hazards.  These type of hazards reside at the project and 
supplier level and are the responsibility of either the particular project 
portfolio, project or their key suppliers. 
A Hazard Forum has been implemented at the programme level to oversee and 
address the transfer of hazards between the programme, projects and suppliers 
and also consider hazards that require effort from multiple projects to facilitate 
closure.  The Hazard Forum is independent from the programme. 
An Interdisciplinary Hazard Review Group [IHRG] is formed to address and 
close-out hazards at project portfolio, project and supplier level. The IHRG 
oversees and addresses the transfer of hazards between the programme, projects 
and suppliers and also considers hazards that require effort from multiple 
projects to facilitate closure.  The IHRG is independent from the programme 
delivery. 
The same hazard log management procedure and the hazard log database 
structure are used across programme and project level. This ensures consistency 
between the system (programme) hazard log and projects hazard logs. 
6. Use of a common requirements management process, to support traceability 
of safety requirements from programme to project and finally to supplier level. 
Safety Requirements (qualitative and quantitative) are built around the Core 
Hazards.  This is because the only continuous “theme” relevant to the safety 
argument during the life of the programme of works is a set of the Core Hazards. 
Derivation of safety requirements was supported by the following sources: 
a. Railway Legislation and Regulations; 
b. LU Standards; 
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c. European and International Standards; 
d. The PPP Service Contract; 
e. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Railway Safety Principles and 
Guidance; 
f. Safety Reports from past accidents in the UK railway industry; 
g. Preliminary Hazard Analysis – Safety requirements have been derived 
from the review of the mitigation measures identified during the PHA; 
h. Change Safety Analysis - Safety requirements have been derived from the 
review of the mitigation measures identified during the CSA. 
Using the above sources a set of core safety requirements to be met by all project 
portfolios and suppliers has been established.  The safety requirements are 
generic and include technical and process types. The requirements are applicable 
at all levels of the programme and for all systems and sub-systems put in to 
operational use in the SSL and VL railway.   
7. Linkage and consistency between engineering safety cases (safety arguments 
and evidences) produced at programme, project and supplier level in order to 
support the application for Consent to Operate, at key stages of the Upgrade 
Programmes. The underlying system safety argument is build around a set of 
safety goals derived from the Core Hazards identified in the System Hazard Log. 
 The programmes make use of the process models to identify boundary 
interfaces, define and establish the linkages between the safety cases produced at 
programme, project and supply chain level. Identifying the responsibilities for 
each identified boundary interface, enables the scope of each safety case to be 
fixed at programme, project and supply chain level.   
 Adopting this approach ensures that there is a full coverage of all safety issues 
arising from the SUP programme works, that there are no gaps in the analysis, 
but as well, that there is no duplication of effort.  
 The technical safety report parts of the safety cases are based around the Core 
Hazards, at project and programme level. Central to demonstrating safety is the 
use of GSN to outline the safety argument and set out the evidence supporting 
the case for safety.  
 In constructing a GSN based safety argument for an overall system safety case, 
the safety cases of individual sub-systems within the system are used, to supply 
the evidence. The core hazards are a constant for all parts of the system and for 
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all configurations of the project, and using them to form the goals of safety 
justification for each railway system configuration as the project is progressing 
facilitates the development of consistent and reusable safety arguments. This 
includes the use of Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), to:  
a. Facilitate identification and management of hierarchy of safety arguments 
and evidence throughout the programme; 
b. Facilitate the development of railway system safety arguments based on 
the safety arguments for individual subsystems (developed by projects or 
suppliers); 
c. Enable the reuse of safety arguments from one stage to another. 
7.4  Identification of a set of common core hazards 
The Top Events of the LU QRA were used as the starting point for identification of the 
Core Hazards. Only those QRA Top Events which were believed affected by the 
changes to the railway within the scope of the upgrade programmes were included in 
the review.  
As already stated the LU QRA are of very narrow scope and in order to confirm the 
completeness of the core hazards set and its scope it was necessary to identify and fill 
any gaps (for example workforce related risk and causes which do not result in 
fatality).  
A review was carried out using the following complementary sources of railway risks 
to complete the list of LU QRA top events: 
1. Railway Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) Safety Risk Model;  
2. Victoria Line Upgrade (VLU) System Safety Case Core Hazards; 
3. Existing SSR System Hazard Log hazard groupings; 
4. West Coast Route Modernisation Current Safety Performance of the Railway 
QRA model. 
Each of the QRA Top Events was reviewed for possible omissions highlighted by the 
other sources.  Where appropriate the scope of the Core Hazard mapped to the QRA 
Top Event, was broadened.  
 Where there was no suitable existing LU QRA Top Event a new Core Hazard was 
defined. The Core Hazards were named to maintain an obvious link to any relevant 
QRA Top Events.  The names of Top Events defined in terms of accidents were 
modified to better reflect the definition of a Hazard e.g. “the potential to cause harm”. 
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Impacts on  Core Hazards  Definitions 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Potential for 
collision between 
trains 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which effect the safe separation between trains. 
 
This Core Hazard is primarily expected to affect Passengers and 
Workforce.  There is potentially a secondary effect on MOP, were a 
collision to result in "something hazardous" going beyond the railway 
boundary. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Potential for 
collision with 
object 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which affect the likelihood of objects or animals "find their 
way" on or near the running railway such that they could make contact 
with a passing train. 
 
This Core Hazard includes those occurrences where the train: • Is incompatible with the structure gauge; • May collide with buffers.  
 
This Core Hazard excludes: • Instances of objects on the track causing fires; • Collision with objects which cause derailment. 
 
This Core Hazard is primarily expected to affect Passengers and 
Workforce.  There is potentially a secondary effect on MOP, were a 
collision to result in "something hazardous" going beyond the railway 
boundary. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Potential for 
derailment 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, where the relationship between the track and the train is 
compromised such that the train may be derailed.  Examples of possible 
causes include: over-speeding of the train, track degradation outside safe 
limits, faults at switches and crossings, signalling failures and objects on 
the line.   
 
This Core Hazard is primarily expected to affect Passengers and 
Workforce.  There is potentially a secondary effect on MOP, were a 
derailment to result in "something hazardous" going beyond the railway 
boundary. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
People-train 
incident at the 
platform 
interface 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the  scope 
of works, which affect people at the platform train interface including, 
but not restricted too: • Entering or alighting from trains; • Falling off platforms; • Being struck or run over by train (station areas only); • Crossing the lines at station (Where authorised only); • Opening and closing of carriage doors. 
 
This Core Hazard excludes Passengers and Workers who deliberately 
access restricted track areas.  These events are within the scope of 
Unauthorised access to track.  
This Core Hazard has been extended to also include slip trip and fall 
Causes arising from or impacted by the changes in platform areas 
undertaken within the scope of works. 
This Core Hazard is expected to affect Passengers and Workforce only. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
People-train 
incident on the 
train 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the  scope 
of works, which affect people on-train due to train movement:  This 
includes, but is not restricted too:  • People protruding beyond train gauge during movement; • Loss of train compartment integrity (e.g. Carriage separation, 
broken windows); • Falls due to train lurching, jerking or rapid deceleration. 
 
This Core Hazard excludes a collision with another train, derailment, 
collision with an object.  (All of these are covered by other Core 
  
Page 198 
 
Impacts on  Core Hazards  Definitions 
Hazards). 
 
This Core Hazard is expected to affect Passengers and Workforce only. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Potential 
Electrocution 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the  scope 
of works, which affect the safe separation of people from live electrical 
power supplies.  
 
This Core Hazard is closely linked to Arcing but is kept separate because 
the nature of any resulting accident will be different.  However the two 
Core Hazards may be combined together for analysis where it is 
pragmatic to do so. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Arcing This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which affect arching of electrical power supplies (particular 
traction power).  
 
This Core Hazard is closely linked to Potential Electrocution but is kept 
separate because the nature of any resulting accident will be different.  
However the two Core Hazards may be combined together for analysis 
where it is pragmatic to do so. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
Potential for 
Train Fire 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which affect the potential for on-train fires. 
 
This Core Hazard is expected to impact on-train Passengers and 
Workforce. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Potential for 
Station Fire 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which affect the potential for station fires. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
Potential for 
Trackside Fire 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which affect the potential for trackside fires.  For the purposes 
of this Core Hazard trackside shall include both open line-side and sub-
surface. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
Inadequate 
ventilation (On 
train) 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, which affect the on-train air quality.  
This Core Hazard excludes fires. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers and Workforce. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Unauthorised 
access to track 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, related to unauthorised access to track. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Workforce Failure to protect 
workforce on 
track from train 
movements 
This Core Hazard groups Causes, arising from or impacted by the scope 
of works, related to workforce when on or about the track.  This includes 
but is not limited to: • When acting as lookout or hand signaller; • When working on or about the track; • When authorised to walk on the track; • Flying objects or out-of-gauge parts of a train. 
 
This Core Hazard will impact on the Workforce only. 
Workforce Workforce This Core Hazard is intended to encompass all Causes, arising from or 
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Impacts on  Core Hazards  Definitions 
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety 
impacted by the  scope of works, related to Workforce occupational 
health and safety which fall outside the scope of all other Core Hazards. 
 
This Core Hazard will impact on the Workforce only. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
Potential for 
flood 
This Core Hazard is intended to encompass all Causes, arising from or 
impacted by the  scope of works, relating to the potential for flooding. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Passenger, 
Workforce, 
Member of 
Public 
Potential for 
Structural failure 
This Core Hazard is intended to encompass all Causes, arising from or 
impacted by the  scope of works, relating to the failure of structures. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers, Workforce and Members of the 
Public. 
Passenger, 
Workforce 
Evacuation from 
trains 
This Core Hazard is intended to encompass all Causes, arising from or 
impacted by the  scope of works, relating to the evacuation of trains. 
 
This Core Hazard may affect Passengers and Workforce. 
Table 7-1: SSL Core Hazards definition 
7.5 Information gathering, conceptualisation and representation 
(System Analysis) 
To assist the understanding of the interaction between the various systems and 
elements which comprise the overall system, for each Core Hazard (or a group of Core 
Hazards), process models have been developed based on the Railway System Physical 
Architecture and for a relevant Railway Configuration with the aim to: 
1. Identify the system boundaries; 
2. Identify boundary interfaces and their associated change through  migration 
stages; 
3. Identify owners of changes to each boundary interface (i.e. supplier, project or 
programme); 
4. Identify safety functions of the system; 
5. Identify the subset of the system relevant to each safety function; 
6. Focus attention on the functional interactions between the elements relevant to 
each safety function; 
7. Focus Change Safety Analysis on the elements of the railway that are subject to 
change; 
8. Establish a common reference environment for Safety Analysis and Derivation 
of Safety Arguments across the programmes; 
9. Ensure that there is no duplication of effort in the safety analysis carried out at 
programme, project and supply chain level. 
Process models have been developed with particular focus on the identification and 
establishment of boundary interfaces and their associated physical, functional or 
  
Page 200 
 
operational change.  Responsibilities for each change to any of the interfaces have been 
identified and assigned. The scope of the safety analysis is clearly determined by the 
use of process models, ensuring that there is no duplication of effort in the safety 
analysis carried out at programme, project and supply chain level.   
More importantly, use of the process models provides focus of the analysis on the 
elements of the railway that are subject to change by the upgrade programme scope of 
work.  A common approach to conceptualisation of the system was adopted in support 
of the two upgrade programmes, VLU and SSL.  
For the purpose of this thesis an example of the process model depicting the same 
family of “Train accidents” from both programmes has been used.  The “Train 
accidents” comprise collision between trains, collision of trains with buffer stops or 
movement arresters, derailments, and collision of trains with objects. 
The model shown here represents the situation of the first new trains running 
interspersed with existing trains and the line still being controlled from the existing 
control room. For simplicity the existing trains and their relation to the track and 
existing system have not been shown. The safe behaviour of these elements of the 
system is taken as already proven.  
The existing signalling system acts on the track in the sense that it drives the points. It 
receives information from the track in the form of track circuit inputs and point 
detection. It also provides energy to lineside signals and receives information in the 
form of lamp proving. 
Specifically for VLU, the new signalling system receives information from the 
existing signalling system and provides information to control the train via its traction 
control and braking systems. It should be noted that the element labelled “Signalling 
System (new)” includes the on-train parts of the signalling system as well as the 
lineside parts.  
The controller controls and monitors the movement of trains via the Service Control 
Centre system and its links with the signal system, and the line controller and driver 
can speak via voice communications links.  In support of the Victoria Line safety 
analysis the process models have been developed at the programme/railway system 
level only. An example from VLU on Figure 7-5 is the process model covering the 
following core hazards; “Potential for collision between trains”, “Potential for 
collision with object” and “Potential for derailment” in one process model. An 
example of interface descriptions for this process model is in Table 7-2 below.  
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 This is because by the time the CSA and ESAP as a process have been implemented 
the supply chain and project activities have advanced significantly further than the 
railway system level activities and therefore it was not practicable to develop the 
hierarchy of process models.  Instead, allocation of responsibilities for development of 
safety arguments has been done through mapping of the VLUP System Architecture 
interfaces (SCID and O&Idb interfaces) to the supplier’s interfaces matrix.  
Table 7-2: VLU Train Movement Accident interfaces description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5: VLUP Train Movement Accidents process model 
On SSL, the process models have been developed at the programme level initially and 
subsequently at the project level, resulting in a hierarchy of the process models 
providing two levels of detail commensurate to the level of detail required to support 
the engineering safety analysis and management activities.   
As depicted by Figure 7-6   the System Level Process model has been further 
decomposed for each project portfolio scope of works to provide the relevant detail in 
support of safety analysis at each of the two levels.  
 
Process Model Ref IF Ref Interface (from SCID) Description 
TA07 IF0409 09TS Train provides discrete status indications to the Train Operator via the 
Drivers HMI in the cab. 
TA25 IF1352 Track Lubricator provides Lubrication using Mechanical Device (method) via 
Mechanical (medium) to Trackwork 
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Figure 7-6: Decomposition of process models 
An example below, Figure 7-7, represents the system level SSL “Train Movement 
Accidents” process model.  
This process model has been decomposed further into a number of process models for 
“Immunisation Portfolio”; “Rolling Stock Portfolio”, etc.  
In this example, system components indicated by coloured boxes have been 
decomposed to reflect the scope of the “Immunisation Portfolio” works, see Figure 
7-8.   
An example of the process models’ interfaces descriptions and hierarchical 
decomposition is presented in Table 7-3 below.  
 
SSL System level Process Model (Figure 7-7) 
Process 
Model 
Interface Id 
Upstream Object Downstream Object Interface Description Change 
TM07 Current Signalling 
System 
Train Stop I/L command to actuate 
train stop movement 
Train Stop moved.  
 
Project Portfolio level Process Model (Immunisation Portfolio) (Figure 7-8) with mapping to decomposed 
interfaces 
TMA29/
TMA65 
Current Signalling 
System object 
controller 
Train Stop via 
Auxiliary Signal 
I/L command to actuate 
train stop movement 
Train Stop moved.  
 
TMA30/
TMA64 
Train Stop via Main 
Signal 
Table 7-3: SSL Train Movement Accident interfaces description 
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Figure 7-7: SSL System Level “Train Movement Accidents” process model 
 “Immunisation Portfolio” Level of the “Train Movement Accidents” process model provides more detail relevant to the scope of change to be 
introduced by this portfolio. On the Figure 7-8, the decomposition of relevant system components is indicated by highlighted boxes.  
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Figure 7-8: SSL “Immunisation Portfolio” Level “Train Movement Accidents” process model 
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7.6  Information processing 
7.6.1 Change safety Analysis: hazard identification, analysis of causalities and 
consequences options and impact analysis and risk assessment 
As already mentioned in support of further hazard identification, for each Core Hazard 
a Process Model has been developed and was used to structure the change safety 
analysis as described earlier.  For each interface the ICSA class is identified and 
recorded, a reference to the relevant core hazard is kept as well as the description of 
the identified cause. All of the identified causes have been mapped to QRA model 
elements as well. This activity supported later quantification of some of the safety 
requirements as detailed later in this thesis.  
The comparable risk assessment process was also applied (pre and post 
implementation of the mitigation) successfully and the results of it used in the safety 
case arguments as detailed later.  
In order to assess the correctness and sufficiency of the identified mitigation measures, 
the ALARP review process followed the process depicted in Figure 7-9. 
It should be noted that the depicted process relies upon the collective expert 
knowledge and judgement of the assembled workshop participants to determine 
whether all relevant mitigations have been recorded and make a first-pass judgement 
on whether any additional mitigations could be reasonably practicable to implement. 
To aid the process of assessing the risk of the hazard as a whole as well as adding 
transparency to the classification process, the author added an additional step to the 
process depicted in Figure 7-9, the process was applied (by using the same 
classifications, as in Table 7-4) at the Causal level.  It was not always possible to 
assign a classification at the Causal level and it was recorded where this was the case.  
The risk acceptability criteria shown in Table 7-5 are not directly applicable when 
applied at the causal level.  For example, it may be acceptable to have a worsening of 
a minor cause as this might be counter balanced by an improvement in another cause 
to give no effect on the hazard as a whole.  This is particularly relevant at the overlay 
stages (when new and old trains are to be running at the same time, old trains relying 
on the old signalling system and new trains on the new DTG-R signalling) as there 
may be an increase in risk for some causes associated resulting from operational 
arrangements for trialing (e.g. driver distraction due to additional personnel in cab).  
Qualitative ranking has been undertaken on a per-hazard basis in accordance with the 
classification scheme provided in Table 7-4. This ranking was used to confirm 
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whether the residual risk presented by the hazard, as mitigated by the mitigation 
measures, is acceptable in accordance with the acceptability matrix presented in Table 
7-5 .  
 
Figure 7-9: ALARP Review Process 
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Qualitative 
Ranking 
Definition 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n
 1
 BETTER 
The risk is assessed as significantly better (lower) than would be 
achieved with standards or other established authoritative good practice 
being used 
WORSE 
The risk is assessed as significantly worse (higher) than would be 
achieved with standards or other established authoritative good practice 
COMPARABLE 
The risk is assessed as neither Better nor Worse than would be achieved 
with standards or other established authoritative good practice 
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n
 2
 
MINOR 
There are other hazards associated with the VLU Programme that have a 
risk at least an order of magnitude greater for the group which is exposed 
to them in the relevant part of the VLU 
MAJOR 
There is no other hazard associated with the VLU Programme that has a 
risk at least an order of magnitude greater 
Table 7-4: Qualitative Ranking 
 
 
 BETTER COMPARABLE WORSE 
MINOR Acceptable Acceptable Not Acceptable 
MAJOR Acceptable Further Review Not Acceptable 
Table 7-5: Risk Acceptability 
the author used the results of the review, in fact the options and impact analysis, in 
support of system safety case arguments.  
On VLU, process models at the system level were subjected to ICSA and CSA. The 
analysis was conducted to identify the system level causes, defence/protection 
measures and consequences related to changing interfaces identified to be between the 
scopes of work of different suppliers and/or projects. An example of the outcome of 
the process is presented in Table 7-6 below.  
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Train Operator error -
09TS train operator 
will be presented with 
a higher target speed 
in PM mode in 
comparison to 67TS.  
The train operator 
may over speed when 
returning to a 67TS 
and the signalling 
system will not trip 
the train at 22mph in 
Coded Manual. 
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(if necessary, 
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briefing).  C
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Poor or 
inadequate 
lubrication 
Table 7-6: VLU Train Movement Accident-CSA Output Result 
On SSL, process models at the system level were subjected to ICSA and CSA first. 
The system level analysis was conducted to identify system level causes, 
defence/protection measures and consequences related to changing interfaces 
identified to be between the scopes of work of project portfolios or where the change 
is introduced by mode than one project portfolio.  
Following from that a project portfolio/ subsystem level CSA was conducted, aiming 
to identify the sub-system or a constituent level causes, defence/protection measures 
and consequences related to interfaces being changed at this level.  
An example of the ICSA/CSA record related to the SSL System Level Analysis is 
presented in Table 7-7  below.  
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speed, such that the tripcock is 
then not able to protect the 
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Table 7-7: SSL Train Movement Accident-System Level CSA Output Results 
As illustration of the hierarchy of the Change Safety Analysis a change to interface 
TM07 is taken as an example.  
This change, displacement of Train Stops, is being delivered by the Immunisation 
Portfolio Project. Part of a railway signalling system, a train stop or trip stop 
(sometimes called a tripper) is a train protection device that automatically stops a train 
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if it attempts to pass a signal when the signal aspect and operating rules prohibit such 
movement, or if it attempts to pass at an excessive speed.   
As part of the changes implemented by the portfolio, power supply to the signalling 
system is being upgraded and the train stops are being relocated.  
Results of the related CSA are presented in the Table 7-8 below.  
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process. 
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Table 7-8: SSL Train Movement Accident-Project Portfolio Level CSA Output Results 
  7.6.2 Restrictions management 
It is important to distinguish between the Restrictions, Dependencies and 
Assumptions.  A dependency is an agreement between involved parties that something 
will be in place before the operation of the change.  An assumption is a statement 
about the system or the rest of the world, including people and organisations with 
which it will interact, as well as the physical system and the environment. If the above 
definitions are accepted, both assumptions and dependencies need to be managed and 
controlled by the project or undertaking but do not necessitate safety analysis. The 
restrictions however need to be treated in same way as defence/protection measures.   
A Restriction or a Caveat is a condition or limitation imposed on the system that must 
be respected, after the change is put into operation, for the system to remain safe and 
operable. These can be categorised as: 
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1. Permanent restrictions – imposed on the system by limits of the operational 
envelope of the system within its environment; 
2. Temporary restrictions – imposed on the system due to interim shortcomings of 
the system design or implementation. 
With increased complexity of the system, in the early stages of a new or a changed 
system introduction, the number of restrictions is likely to rise; in particular the 
number of temporary restrictions is likely to be relatively high.  On VLUP, as part of 
the safety analysis in support of the first stage of the project implementation (trial 
running of one new train in normal operational hours, controlled by the new signalling 
system) the author invented the following process (Figure 7-10) to identify and 
analyse all the restrictions. The process is structured as follows: 
 A.   Review and Categorisation: The aim of this is to clearly scope out the boundary 
of review. This activity is carried out in two steps: 
Step 1: Characterisation of inputs into Assumptions, Dependences and 
Restrictions/Caveats. 
Step 2: Identification of causes of identified restrictions and confirmation of 
completeness and correct mapping to related hazards.   
[Example:  Causes of Restrictions on the VLU at the stage of the project are typically 
a fault in the implementation of the software product, a fault in the geographic data or 
a fault in the product design. For example, Manned Auto Operation, Unimpeded, into 
platform two is caused by geographic data errors in the map or APRs incorrectly 
located / programmed at the ramp to the depot. The following hazards have been 
identified as relevant:  
1. Inappropriate separation between trains   leading to a collision; 
2. Possible derailment due to wrong movement of train over unsecured or out of 
correspondence points, or movement of points under the train; 
3. Possible derailment due to over speed; 
4. Unwanted Stopping; 
5. Electrocution; 
6. Collision with object; 
7. Possible collision with buffer-stops. 
The top event hazard affected by this issue is ‘Possible collision with another train’ 
due to excessive RM driving]. 
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Figure 7-10: Restrictions identification and analysis process 
B. Preliminary assessment of impact of causes of restrictions/caveats and 
identification of Mitigation options: 
The aim of this part of the review is to prioritise and carry out identification of options 
to mitigate identified issues and concerns.  
This is carried out in two steps: 
Step 1: Review the restrictions applying the criteria P1: Is a cause/issue leading to the 
restriction: 
1. A direct cause to an accident? 
2. A secondary cause to an accident? 
3. Not safety related? 
If a cause/issue does not lead to a safety accident it is recorded and no further action 
taken. 
If a cause/issue is potentially a direct cause of a safety accident it is flagged and 
subject to further review focussing on these first. If a cause/issue is potentially a 
secondary cause of a safety accident it is subjected to further review after completing 
the review of direct causes. 
B 
 
D 
C 
A Categorisation of the input into restrictions, 
assumptions and dependences 
Review for completeness and mapping to hazards. 
?
Identify/review possible options to mitigate 
the issue. 
No further 
analysis 
required
3 2 
Assess the risk of issues and related options 
for effectiveness using criteria P2. 
Review identified mitigations for 
completeness and remove any duplications 
Criteria P1: is issue 
leading to the restriction: 
1. a direct cause to an 
accident; 
2. a secondary  cause to 
an accident; 
3. not a safety hazard. 
Agreed set of restrictions and an 
ALARP statement 
Identification/confirmation of causes of identified 
Criteria P2: 
Level of the risk arising from the issue contrasted against existing 
train/signalling system:” Better”; “Worse”; “Comparable”; 
Hazard is considered mitigated ALARP:  
1. If the event is judged to be no more likely to occur without 
restriction or mitigation than equivalent events in the existing 
railway system then no restriction is needed. 
OR 
If the proposed restriction or mitigation makes it no more 
likely that the hazard will lead to an accident than equivalent 
events in the existing railway system then the restriction or 
mitigation is satisfactory,  
AND 
2. If not alternative or further restrictions or mitigations are 
needed so as to make the likelihood of an accident no greater 
than that from equivalent events in the existing railway system. 
1 
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Step 2: Review of existing restrictions and identification of any new mitigation options 
against safety causes/issues; direct causes first and secondary causes after. 
C.  Risk assessment and selection of available options: 
The aim of this part of the review is to assess the risk of identified causes/issues, 
effectiveness and practicability of identified mitigations/restrictions and based on that 
assessment select the mitigations/restrictions to be implemented. This is carried out in 
three steps: 
Step 1: Review the causes/hazards before the restriction is implemented, applying the 
criteria P2: Is level of the risk arising from the hazard contrasted against 
existing train/signalling system ”Better”; “Worse” or “Comparable”? 
Step 2: Review a need for mitigation and where needed the effectiveness of identified 
restrictions applying the criteria P2. 
Hazard is considered mitigated to ALARP:  
1. If the event is judged to be no more likely to occur without restriction or 
mitigation than equivalent events in the existing railway system then no 
restriction is needed 
OR 
 If the proposed restriction or mitigation makes it no more likely that the hazard 
will lead to an accident than equivalent events in the existing railway system, 
then the restriction or mitigation is satisfactory,  
AND 
2. If no alternative or further restrictions or mitigations are needed to make the 
likelihood of an accident no greater than that from equivalent events in the 
existing railway system. 
Step 3: Review the causes/hazards assuming that the restrictions are implemented, 
applying the criteria P2: Is the level of the risk arising from the hazard 
contrasted against the existing train/signalling system ”Better”; “Worse” or 
“Comparable”? 
D. Review of identified mitigations and ALARP argument: 
The aim of this, final, stage of the process is to rationalise the output of the 
workshop and agree conclusion.   
An example of the output from the workshop is presented in a Table 7-9 below. 
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ID Details of the existing restriction Source Related 
Hazards 
Cause Mitigation 
Method 
Action Actionee Risk Assessment 
Description Category Initial Residual 
1 Temporary/Permanent Speed 
Restrictions (TSR/PSR) imposed by 
existing means (either maintaining 270 
code or recommisioning coasting spots) 
will not be obeyed by 09TS 
Maintenance briefing to reinforce 
existing rules to be published 
System 
design in 
overlay 
Possible 
derailment 
due to over 
speed 
Inappropriat
e 
maintenance 
action 
Primary Maintenance and 
operations 
briefing to 
reinforce existing 
rules on the 
application of 
TSRs  to be 
published. 
Publish 
maintenance 
and operations 
briefing to 
reinforce 
existing rules on 
the application 
of TSRs. 
Name 
Surname 
W
o
rs
e 
C
o
m
p
ar
ab
le
 
3 The testing shall be controlled under an 
appropriate method statement and test 
briefing notices.  These briefing notices 
shall include the following: 
1.   Consideration of how unsafe 
conditions can arise due to the 
operation of fault handling devices 
such as bypass and isolating switches 
and isolating cocks; 
2.  How the operator can change the 
mode of operation of the train borne 
control system and the pre- and post- 
change conditions; 
3.  Details of the driver actions when a 
train in MA mode stops at a station it 
should skip; 
4.  Actions for when the train in MA 
Mode does not stop accurately at a 
platform; 
5. Actions for when a train in MA 
mode fails to stop at a station at which 
it was expected to stop; 
6. If, during auto-driving, erratic train 
movement is experienced, the driver 
should leave MA Mode change at their 
earliest opportunity. 
Westingh
ouse 
testing 
arrangem
ents 
restrictio
n 
Inappropriate 
separation 
between trains 
leading to a 
collision 
Possible 
derailment 
due to over 
speed 
ATP fails to 
intervene 
when 
stressed by 
ATO 
Secondary WRSL train 
method statement 
and test briefing 
notices for T1/T2 
Non-Traffic 
Hours Testing 
with full reliance 
on DTG-R 
Agreed between 
all parties that 
LU rule book / 
driving manuals 
and training is 
sufficient and 
covers these 
driver actions - 
although 
obviously some 
of these are not 
acceptable for 
traffic / 
passenger 
operation and 
will need to be 
closed for 2.1 or 
2.2. To be 
agreed with 
WRSL. 
Name 
Surname 
C
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C
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le
 
Table 7-9: Sample of the restrictions analysis outcome
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7.6.3 Modelling  
The Victoria Line Upgrade and Subsurface Lines Upgrade projects are introducing many 
changes to the Victoria Line, including new trains and signalling. It is a legal requirement to 
demonstrate that these changes will not cause the risk of passenger fatality to increase beyond 
the current levels and is ALARP.  
Both projects are being delivered through a series of migrations between defined Configuration 
States that map to key milestones in the programme thereby changing the risk profile of the 
railway at each migration stage. To reflect this, the QRA model has been developed for each 
Configuration State, resulting in a set of risk predictions for passenger fatalities at each stage 
(defined and analysed in the Interim Safety Performance models).  
To ensure that the total risk is kept to an acceptable level, as a minimum a level which is no 
worse than at present, the QRA models are used to set safety targets for aspects and functions 
of the systems.    
As already mentioned, a set of QRA models developed within the LU was handed over to 
upgrade projects to support derivation of safety targets and quantification of core safety 
requirements.  
After detailed examination of the LU model it was decided that it was not suitable for defining 
the current level of risk because: 
1. A significant number of logical as well as data errors were identified; 
2. The model logic was not fully representative of the current function and 
operation of the railway; 
3. The base data was no longer traceable to a verifiable data source. 
The models have been reviewed and updated to provide a Current Safety Performance 
of the Victoria Line and of the Subsurface Lines (CSPVL and CSPSSL) QRAs.   
This revised CSPVL QRAs formed a baseline model of the current railway and are 
being used to: 
1. Confirm the current levels of risk, to set a baseline safety target;  
2. Provide a baseline risk model that can be modified to reflect the changes to the 
railway, for each major migration stage. 
Using the CSP models as a starting point, the Interim Safety Performance and the 
Final Safety Performance models have been developed to define the impact of changes 
to the railway on the system safety performance.  
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Figure 7-11: Development of QRA models in support of staged project implementation 
To achieve this, following activities were carried out:  
1. Logic and data of models have been updated to include potential causes of minor 
and major injuries to all exposed parties (Passengers, Workers and Neighbours); 
2. A new loss analysis to predict the injuries and subsequently equivalent fatalities 
was carried out in some cases; 
3. Additionally, in future if the scope changes is altered, it may be necessary to 
develop further models to include all novel changes.  
ISP and FSP series of the QRA models are capable of: 
1. Bringing together all the risks from the trains, signalling, track, stations and 
operators (for modelled hazards only); 
2. Integrating with other QRA models (produced by suppliers e.g. Bombardier and 
Westinghouse) so as to allow for reuse of the data already produced and 
validated by suppliers; 
3. Producing a risk profile given the expected passenger fatality rates resulting 
from each hazard;  
4. Producing a single figure prediction of risk of a fatality to a passenger or worker 
or neighbour expressed as the risk to the most exposed individual; 
5. Calculating the relative contribution (apportionment) of individual causes 
(interface/subsystem/procedural failures) to the overall risk, originating from 
each individual hazard.  
Railway before any changes  
being introduced.  
 
 
Migrating Railway, as changes  
are introduced in stages,  
the railway system migrates  
from one configuration to  
another, trough predefined 
implementation stages. 
Final Railway after all  
of the changes have been  
completed 
Current safety performance 
model
Interim safety 
Performance
 model
Interim safety 
Performance
 model 
Interim safety 
Performance
 model
Final safety 
performance 
model
System Safety 
Performance Targets 
Quantified Safety 
Requirements for interim 
railway configuration 
Quantified Safety 
Requirements for interim 
railway configuration 
Quantified Safety 
Requirements for final 
commissioning 
Quantified Safety 
Requirements for interim 
railway configuration 
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A regular cross check between the content of the hazard log and the QRA is essential, 
for each system configuration, to ensure completeness of both sets of analysis during 
the programmes’ lifecycle. In order to track the changes between the different 
incarnations of the QRA models a change control process has been followed to ensure 
that each change is transparent and traceable.  This process generates a spreadsheet 
which lists the changes between the two model versions for each model element.  This 
change control register is maintained as a separate spreadsheet for each model and will 
be updated as new models are produced for each of the project stages.   
Scope of the QRA work 
The LU 2003 QRA consists of 20 models of the top contributors to safety risk. These 
are: 
 
1.  Arcing; 
2.  Collision Between trains; 
3.  Collision Hazard (with Object); 
4.  Derailment; 
5.  Platform Train Interface- platform; 
6.  Platform Train Interface- train; 
7.  Station Area Accident (SAA)- 
escalator; 
8.  SAA- lift; 
9.  SAA- other; 
10.  Train fire; 
11.  Station fire; 
12.  Tunnel fire; 
13.  Lift fire; 
14.  Escalator fire; 
15.  Unauthorised access; 
16.  Explosion; 
17.  Flood; 
18.  Structural failure; 
19.  Power; 
20  Ventilation. 
The changes to the railway as a result of the VLU and SSL do not affect all of the 
models. The models can be split into two groups, models affected by changes and 
those that are not. 
Model 
Affected by scope of changes 
VLU SSL 
Arcing 9 9 
Collision between trains 9 9 
Collision with object 9 9 
Derailment 9 9 
Passenger Train Interface on train 9 9 
Passenger Train Interface on platform 9 9 
Train fire 9 9 
Tunnel fire 9 9 
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Model 
Affected by scope of changes 
VLU SSL 
Station fire 9 9 
Unauthorised access 9 9 
Ventilation 9 9 
Power  9 
Explosion   
Station Area Accidents - escalator   
Station Area Accidents - lift   
Station Area Accidents - other   
Flood   
Escalator fire   
Structural failure  9 
Lift fire   
Table 7-10: LU 2003 QRAs affected by changes to the railway introduced by VLU and SSL 
Only the models affected by scope of change have been subjected to a thorough 
review and update. 
In order to track the changes between the LU 2003 QRA model and the CSP models a 
change control process has been followed to ensure that each change is transparent and 
traceable.  This process generates a spreadsheet which lists the changes between the 
two model versions for each model element.   
These changes are of the following types: 
1. Deleted – The model element has been deleted.  This is generally due to a 
structural change and the change rationale will briefly describe the justification 
for this change.  Full details of the justification for the change are provided; 
2. Added - The model element has been added.  This is generally due to a structural 
change and the change rationale will briefly describe the justification for this 
change.  Full details of the justification for the change are provided; 
3. Data model or data change – This indicates a change to either the type of data 
model used and/or the data value used in the model.  The rationale for this is 
described in the appropriate  field of the modelling tool; 
4. Loss data – This shows where loss data has been revised. 
The Data Sources and References in the LU 2003 QRA model were generally not 
provided whereas in the CSP model a Data Source and Reference has been provided 
for each event. 
This change control register is maintained as a separate spreadsheet for each model 
and is being updated as new models are produced for each of the stages.   
The QRA works in support of the Victoria Line Upgrade have been used in this report 
as an illustration of works done for both projects.  
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One of the main reasons for changes is that the Victoria line has some unique features 
that were not correctly reflected in the LU model: 
1. It is all subsurface, consequently there are no embankments, bridges or external 
environmental effects; 
2. It is all twin tunnels, consequently a train cannot collide with a train on the 
adjacent track except at crossovers; 
3. It is all deep tunnel that is mainly straight; 
4. There are no curved platforms; 
5. There are no speed restrictions due to track curvature, even the points are 
arranged to be capable of full line speed; 
6. The trains are driven automatically by the ATO; 
7. The trains are protected by the Safety System, this is a protection system that is 
completely independent from the ATO train control system;  
8. Due to the safety system there is no trip cock protection on the railway. A train 
driven in SM can pass a signal at danger without being tripped. On an automatic 
signal a driver can proceed under rule without authority of the signaller, 
although he should be informed. 
9. The train can be driven in three modes: 
a. Automatic using the ATO called Auto; 
b. Manually with safety system still providing protection called Coded 
Manual (CM) (in the event of ATO   failure). Speed should be limited to 
22mph, but is not enforced; 
c. Manually at slow speed with no safety system protection called Slow 
Manual (SM) (in the event of safety system failure). Speed is limited to 
10mph and is enforced by the train speed governor. 
In addition to above: 
1. On all models large numbers of logic gates with no connection to a top gate or an 
event tree were identified; 
2. A number of logical inconsistencies were identified and corrected; 
3. None of the data used in the original models was substantiated. 
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The process of review and acceptance of the revised model logic was as follows: 
1.    The starting point was LU VL 2003 QRA; 
2. The next stage was to identify the known specific characteristics of the VL; 
3. The model was then modified to reflect these characteristics. As the model is VL 
specific if a base even was not applicable it was deleted rather than the data 
changed to make it have no affect; 
4. In order to complete the review process the project organised a final series of 
workshops and where appropriate experts reviewed and accepted the logic as 
representative of the current VL; 
5. A workshop report was issued to substantiate the changes proposed to the 
models; 
6. Subsequent to the workshop report during the data analysis the need for 
additional changes to the logic were identified; 
7. The additional changes were ratified at a review meeting with the VL Design 
Authority and Systems Engineering and LU Operations. 
Identical process was followed on SSL for review of relevant QRA models. The 
principle change made was to merge the three QRA models for the SSR lines (the 
Metropolitan, District, Circle, and Hammersmith & City lines) into one model.  This 
was done recognising that the lines share the same infrastructure for a portion of their 
length and to simplify the representation of the upgrade.   
Summary of Data Update - Methodology 
The principle steps for validation of the CSPVL models, representing current 
configuration of Victoria Line are listed below: 
1. Set review scope; 
2. Compile list of potential data sources, including scope and coverage; 
3. Assess current data set:  
a. Compile set of new data items (“Obtain”) and identify possible data 
source; 
b. Group data items into common sources; 
4. Get data for each new data event; 
a. Define appropriate data model type; 
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b. Review source; 
c. Assess uncertainty issues; 
d. Obtain data item(s); 
e. Write rationale, reference and assumptions. 
Summary of Data Update - Scope of the Review 
The aspects of the model event data which were reviewed are: 
1. Local or Generic Data Model; 
2. Data Model Type; 
3. Rationale; 
4. Reference. 
Summary of Data Update - Data Sources 
The data types used in the model were identified in the course of the model data 
review and are as follows: 
1. INCA: INCA is the Incident Capture and Analysis database used by LU to 
capture incidents which occur on the Underground infrastructure.  Data has been 
entered into this database since 1992.  Incident data is entered under a particular 
classification, of which there are 105 different categories.  For the data items 
used in the model the 14 year period between 1992 and 1996 has been used.  The 
am has been to use incident data from the Victoria Line only.  However, in the 
case that there were few or no incidents of a particular type on the Victoria Line 
then the search has been extended to then the Bakerloo-Central-Victoria system 
and, failing that, then the whole Underground system was searched for data.  
Where this has been done the results have been reviewed to ensure applicability. 
2. RAM: A number of the event data items in the model are due to equipment 
failure rates.  The data for these items is common with that used for system 
availability modelling in the VLU project.  Data on these failures in use in 
captured in the CuPID database and it is from this database that the data has 
been derived. 
3. Asset Data: There are a small number of asset data items which are needed in the 
model.  However it should be realised that all of the incident data contained in 
both the INCA and CuPID database is from a system which has a particular set 
of physical and operational conditions.  It is an assumption in the use of these 
databases that the conditions over the time period that the data are obtained are 
sufficiently similar to the current system to allow the use of the data. 
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4. Passenger Occupancy Data: There are two types of passenger occupancy data 
which are used in the model.  The main aspect of passenger occupancy which is 
required in the event trees is the division between high, medium and low 
passenger loading. 
5. Human Factors: There are a large number of events in the model which are 
human errors.  The probability data for human errors regarding skill and rule-
based tasks is general in the range 0.01 to 0.001.  While the data provided for 
human errors is largely presented without justification, it is within this range. 
6. Timetable/Number of trains: One of the operational characteristics which affect 
the risk is the number of trains running on the system.  This number has been 
taken from the signalling availability model and it is one of the operational 
parameters which describe the system. 
7. Judgement: A large number of the failure events in the model are estimates 
based upon judgement.  Where this is the case, operational or engineering 
expertise has been sought from Metronet or LU competent personnel. 
The QRA data set has been assessed against the aspects listed above.  As part of this 
the most appropriate data source for each data item has been identified.  The data 
sources for the different models are shown in Table 7-11 below.   
This table lists the number of events for each of the data sources listed above.  It can 
be seen from this table that in addition to the set of data sources listed above there are 
two additional categories “Model” and “Delete”. 
The designation “Model” is used for those elements which are identical to an element 
in another part of the model or in another model.  In this case, the rationale is 
duplicated and reference is made to the other model element.  
The designation “Delete” is made for model elements which are to be deleted.  This 
can be for a number of reasons, as follows: 
1. The model element is not used and has no dependencies; 
2. The model element is the complement of another model element; 
3. The model element is the duplicate of another model element. 
Where a model element has been designated “Delete”, the rational for this has been 
given. 
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Arcing 20 12 0 5 3 0 0 3 45 0 
Collision between trains 0 28 0 22 18 2 3 4 48 169 
Collision with object 7 0 3 7 10 0 0 2 50 7 
Derailment 4 67 0 12 8 1 1 1 107 165 
PTI on train 7 13 0 7 6 0 0 0 1 185 
PTI  Platform 17 37 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 2 
Train fire 10 19 8 0 0 0 0 0 5 20 
Tunnel fire 10 13 3 24 13 0 0 0 0 9 
Station fire 25 20 4 20 14 0 0 2 0 24 
Unauthorised access 3 9 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
Table 7-11: Model Element Data Sources Overview 
Principles for Data Validation in the QRA Model 
The development of a model structure is intrinsically linked to the data available to 
support the model.  In general, the level at which the data is available is the level of 
detail to which the model should be developed.   
Sometimes this is in conflict with other model requirements.  For example if there is a 
need to use the model to assess the effect of changes which are at a higher level of 
detail than the data supports, then there may be a justification for applying subjective 
judgement techniques to estimate parameters. 
In the QRA model, if the model structure is not supported by the data, then an 
assessment needs to be made as to whether the elements of the structure are required 
for analysis of system changes.  If they are not then the structure should be simplified 
to the level that the data supports. 
Loss data 
The loss data for each consequence was checked for validity both in the context of the 
specific model and in the context of the model as a whole.  The basis for this checking 
was other industry models such as the Railway Standards and Safety Board Safety 
Risk Model and the West Coast Main Line Current Safety Performance Model.    
However it should be noted that as these models are for heavy rail only, the loss data 
could not be directly compared in many cases and historical data was used as a 
reference point, including a set of incident data for train accidents in tunnels. 
The overall approach was to leave the loss data unchanged from the LU 2003 QRA 
model unless a specific discrepancy was noted.   
The loss data will be further reviewed if affected by changes in the VLU or SSL. 
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Summary of the Initial Findings 
The first finding of the data review was that information regarding the data (the 
rationale) was not available in a single source.  
Instead, descriptions to different levels of detail were contained in both the FT+ model 
and in a number of other reports.  Hence the first task was to gather all of the 
information in a single source so that it could be reviewed.  This was done by 
exporting all of the FT+ models events as Excel spreadsheets and importing into these 
all of the descriptions from the other reports.   
These spreadsheets formed the basis for the model review with reference to the model 
structures in FT+ where required. It is desirable that all information regarding the 
event data (excluding the change history) should be held in the FT+ model.  However 
there are restrictions in terms of the number of notes fields available (8) and the size of 
those fields (255 characters).  Also some of these fields may be required for 
description and assumptions regarding the logic.   
Hence the available fields have been used as follows: 
1. Reference: Data source reference including any spatial or temporal aspects; 
2. Data source: A description of how the data items were derived from the data 
source; 
3. Planned Maintenance; 
4. Assumptions 
Where addition information was required which did not fit in these 4 fields, then 
reference has been made as to where it can be found either in the Data Gathering and 
Validation report or the data change register/database which exists outside of the 
model. 
 Results 
Having validated the CSPVL model data set, the next task was then to import all of the 
data into the FT+ models so that the models could be run and the overall results 
checked against the existing LU models. An example of the results for Collision with 
Trains model is presented and discussed below. The LU model divides collision 
between trains into Fast, Medium or Slow and Head on Fast or Slow.  The causes are 
mainly attributed to signalling wrong side failures or the driver passing a signal at 
danger in SM or reversing.  
The major changes of the QRA logic, in the CSPVL model, were: 
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1. Failures in Coded Manual mode are added. This is specific feature of the 
Victoria line signalling ; 
2. The interlocking setting conflicting routes is added. This base event was missing 
from the original QRA model; 
3. The train driven in SM following safety system failure is added. This is specific 
feature of the Victoria line signalling; 
4. The modelling of Automatic Train Operation related failure is improved. 
In terms of data, the main changes made are as follows: 
1. The LU 2003 QRA passenger train loadings have been reviewed and revised.  In 
the LU 2003 QRA model, High loading was estimated to occur 0.1% of the time 
(i.e. one  minute of each operational day), medium loading 2% of the time and 
low loading 97.9% of the time. These have been revised to: high loading 10%, 
medium loading 16%, low loading 74%; 
2. The LU 2003 QRA model assumed complete segregation of tracks, whereas the 
CSPVL model has taken into account the two crossovers on the VL. 
Following are Risk Results from the updated CSPVL Collision with Trains model. 
CSPVL LU 2003 QRA 
0.067 0.062
Table 7-12: Total Risk (fatalities/yr) 
 
Original Model LU 2003 QRA Model Updated CSPVL Model 
Event Description Frequency Event Description Frequency
Fast collision between trains 1.39E-02 Fast collision between 
trains 
1.23E-04
Head on collision between trains 0.00E+00
Head on collision between 
trains 
3.52E-02Slow speed head on collision 
between trains 
4.18E-04
Medium speed collision between 
trains 
1.83E-03 Medium Speed collision 4.43E-03
Slow speed collision between 
trains 
3.08E-03 Slow speed collision of two 
trains 
4.32E-08
Total 1.92E-02 Total 3.98E-02
 
Table 7-13: Comparison of Initiating event frequencies 
At the level of initiating event, the CSPVL model calculates the frequency to be 
approximately 50% less than that calculated by the LU 2003 QRA model.  Given the 
rarity of this type of event this is degree of variation is not significant.   
In the event tree the risk calculated by the CSPVL model is slightly greater that that 
calculated by the LU 2003 QRA model.   
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While there is a small effect from the inclusion of head on and subsequent collisions in 
the CSPVL model, this difference is almost entirely due to the different apportionment 
to passenger loading levels which has been explained and justified above. 
Conclusions from the review of the baseline QRA and definition of Tolerable Hazards’ 
Rates  
A summary of the risk results for all of the 10 models updated for the Victoria Line is 
presented below. 
Model Name 
CSPVL 
Risk 
% of VL 
Total 
LU VL 2003 
QRA Risk 
% of LU 
VL 2003 
QRA Total 
% change 
between 
CSPVL and 
LU VL 2003 
QRA 
1.   Arcing 1.86E-03 0.30% 2.09E-03 0.22% -11%
2.   Collision between 
trains 0.068 10.86% 6.19E-02 6.46% 10%
3.   Collision with object 3.25E-03 0.52% 1.90E-03 0.20% 71%
4.   Derailment 0.0388 6.20% 5.95E-02 6.21% -35%
5.   PTI on train 0.138 22.04% 4.78E-01 49.91% -71%
6.    PTI  platform 0.331 52.86% 2.25E-01 23.49% 47%
7.   Train fire 0.0138 2.20% 8.48E-02 8.85% -84%
8.   Tunnel fire 2.10E-05 0.00% 1.12E-03 0.12% -98%
9.   Station fire 4.58E-03 0.73% 9.54E-05 0.01% 4701%
10. Unauthorised access 0.0269 4.30% 0.0433 4.52% -38%
Total 6.26E-01 9.58E-01  -35%
Table 7-14: Summary of Risk results 
It can be seen that there is a decrease in risk of 35% over the LU 2003 QRA total for 
these 10 models.  There have been many changes between the two sets of models, both 
structurally and in terms of data.  The principle reasons for the differences are as 
follows: 
1. A number of changes in model structure, data and loss apportionment have 
contributed to differences in the risk in the CSPVL Derailment, Train Collision 
and Collision models as compared to the LU 2003 QRA models; 
2. The risk due to PTI on Train has reduced by 71% in the CSPVL model as a 
result of a better alignment with INCA data. As this model constituted 50% of 
the LU 2003 QRA total risk for these 10 models, this reduction is the main 
contributor to the decrease in the total. 
3. All of the fire models have changed significantly, though they are not major 
contributors to the overall risk.  This is due to changes in model structure to 
enable the models to be closely based upon incident data. 
  
Page 226 
 
All of the above comparisons have been made against the LU 2003 QRA, as due to the 
low incidence of fatality on the LU network as a whole (averaging 4 per annum, 
excluding suicide), it is not possible to conduct comparisons at any level of detail.   
This is consistent with the low frequencies of the initiating events which are in general 
of the order of one in one hundred or less.  It should be remembered that the aim of 
this validation exercise is to give a baseline set of models which is representative of 
the current Victoria Line on which the operational and infrastructure changes of the 
different stages of the VLU can be imposed and effects on safety assessed. 
On this basis the conclusion was reached that this updated set of the CSP QRA models 
is a suitable representation of the hazards on the VL.  As such it provides a suitable 
baseline which was used to set a baseline safety target, Tolerable Hazard Rates 
(THRs).  From that, the total contribution to overall risk, for each Core Hazard, from 
failures of the new signalling equipment was calculated. Only apportionment to the 
new signalling system and to rolling stock was calculated, since other changes to the 
Victoria Line are conventional changes and no new or novel equipment is being used.  
Top Event 
Risk 
(fat./yr) 
THR 
Apportionment 
to Signalling 
(contribution) 
Notes 
1. Arcing 1.86E-03 0.00%  
2. Collision between 
trains 
6.81E-02 1.28% A safety factor of 2x has been 
applied to account for signalling 
sub-system failures which may 
not have been modelled in 
detail in the Current Safety 
Performance-Victoria Line 
(Baseline) mode. 
3. Collision with object 3.25E-03 0.00% Signalling contribution is non-
zero but negligible. 
4. Derailment 3.88E-02 4.45%  
5. PTI on train 1.38E-01 0.00%  
6. PTI  platform 3.31E-01 0.00%  
7. Train fire 1.38E-02 0.00%  
8. Tunnel fire 2.10E-05 0.00%  
9. Station fire 4.58E-03 0.00%  
10. Unauthorised access 2.69E-02 0.00%  
Table 7-15: Victoria line THRs 
The above data (apportionment) were calculated by identifying all of the events in the 
models relevant to signalling and conducting an analysis of the cut set to calculate the 
contribution to the overall individual risk for that Core Hazard. 
The aim of this analysis was to allow the supplier of the signalling system to consider 
the cost, for each top event, of an “effort” to reduce the risk for an individual hazard 
from (say) 1E-9/hr to 1E-10/hr, and if the predicted costs are comparatively small, to 
  
Page 227 
 
justify a general statement, that further cost benefit analysis is not necessary for each 
top event. 
The ALARP argument was produced (in line with LU Standard 2-05101-101) using a 
value of £1.4 million as the value of avoiding a fatality (VAF) to calculate the safety 
benefit associated with a measure. A factor of 3 was applied to the safety benefit to 
assess whether the cost of a measure is grossly disproportionate to the achieved safety 
benefit. 
However, this did not preclude analysis (quantitative or qualitative) of specific issues 
where it was required. 
Development of Interim Safety Performance Models 
The overall railway level safety requirements are that: 
1. The levels of risk after the change shall be ALARP, and  
2. No greater than the current level of risk.   
For the VLU project, the update of the QRA reflecting the system changes 
implemented as part of the first system configuration (referred to as V2.1), has been 
used in support of the safety argument presented in the System Safety Case 
(elaborated later in this thesis). This QRA model is referred to as ISP V2.1 (Interim 
Safety Performance for migration stage/system configuration V2.1). This update 
included a review of the VL QRA model against the models developed by the rolling 
stock and signalling system suppliers to ensure that the models are sufficiently 
consistent to test if the tolerable hazard rates and other targets used by the suppliers 
are suitable to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The ISP V2.1 QRA model has been 
used to assess the anticipated level of risk at the railway system configuration 
compared to the baseline level as estimated by the CSPVL Baseline model. 
As part of the system configuration V2.1 an extra pathway in off-peak hours (after 
20:30) on which to test the new system, was created (the new train did not carry any 
passengers).  Hence the modelling approach was to change the baseline model to 
represent the risk posed by the new train on this single train path, the total risk is the 
risk from the baseline model (which is unchanged as V2.1 does not alter the existing 
system nor the existing service) together with the risk from the new ISP V2.1 model 
(representing the risk from a new, overlaid system and the additional train path).  It 
should be noted that as the QRA models risks to passengers only the effect on risk to 
the drivers, testers or maintainers has not been addressed in these models. These risks 
have been assessed separately using the comparative methodology described earlier. 
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As a result of this approach, for each configuration of the system architecture for 
which a System Safety Case is being prepared, a representative QRA model will 
consist of a Baseline model with altered data to reflect the changes, and the model 
reflecting the logic and data changes provided by improvements or new system 
components such as new trains.  This approach results in there being two risk models 
to model the overall risk of V2.1 operation: one which models the existing system and 
one which models the new system.  This allows each model to represent the different 
functionality of the old and new system and any interfaces between the two to be 
explicitly represented.   
As more new trains are introduced to replace the existing rolling stock, the initiator 
data in each model is changed accordingly so that the risk from each system can be 
calculated at each migration stage.  When all of the old rolling stock is replaced by the 
new train, then the existing system risk will be zero (as the initiator data will be zero) 
and all of the risk will reside with the new system. This can be represented by the 
following formula:  ISP
newVx
CSP
Vx
ISP
totalVx RRR +=  
Where 
ISP
totalVxR  Total risk for migration stage Vx (fatalities/yr); 
CSP
VxR  Risk from operating with existing signalling and rolling stock for 
migration stage Vx (fatalities/yr); 
ISP
newVxR  Risk from operating with new signalling and rolling stock for migration 
stage Vx (fatalities/yr). 
The first task in the upgrade of the CSPVL models to represent ISP V2.1 was to 
review each of the ten hazard models relevant to the VLU to assess if and how these 
are affected by the changes implemented in phase V2.1.  The following Table 1 
presents the results of this assessment.   
Top event Effect on passenger risk for 
V2.1 new train service 
Changes to risk model 
(potential 
for) 
Collision 
with trains 
As it is assumed that the risk 
from collision between 67TS 
remains unchanged, the new 
risk is that a failure of the T2 
train control and protection 
causes a collision with a 67TS 
resulting in passenger fatalities 
on the 67TS train. 
It is assumed that the new 
signalling system will not 
negatively affect the wrong side 
failure rate of the existing 
signalling system. 
The baseline train collision model has been 
altered to represent the risk of collision due 
to failure of the new signalling and/or train.  
All initiator data has been changed to 
represent the operation of a single train path 
for 4 hours per day. 
Exposure data in terms of train loading (of 
the second as the T2 is not carrying any 
passengers) has been modified to represent 
operation in off-peak hours only. 
These changes result in a new ISPV2.1 model. 
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Top event Effect on passenger risk for 
V2.1 new train service 
Changes to risk model 
(potential 
for) 
Collision 
with 
Object 
The risk from the Collision 
Hazard for the 67TS remains 
unchanged. 
The only new risk is that the 
object derails the train and  
subsequent to derailment the T2 
train is hit by a train carrying 
passengers 
For T2 the consequence analysis has been 
changed to remove fatalities resulting from 
derailment with no subsequent collision and 
where subsequent collisions occur to only 
include the effects of loading of the 67TS ( 
rather than combined loading) 
The causes for objects on the track remain 
unchanged.  
All initiator data has been changed to 
represent the operation of a single train path 
for 4 hours per day. 
Exposure data in terms of train loading (for a 
subsequent collision, as the T2 is not 
carrying any passengers) has been modified 
to represent operation in off-peak hours only. 
These changes result in a new ISPV2.1 model. 
(potential 
for) 
Derailment 
The only new risk is that T2 
derails and is subsequently hit 
by a 67TS. 
The 67TS risks remain unchanged. 
The baseling model has been developed to 
exclude fatalities from derailment without 
subsequent collision and in the event of 
subsequent collision only includes the 67TS 
loading. 
The causes of derailment (the fault trees) 
have been changed to take account of the 
new signalling and trains. 
These changes result in a new ISPV2.1 model. 
Table 7-16: Sample of QRA changes relevant to ISP 
Having identified where changes to the risk models were required, a more detailed 
review of each model was conducted to identify specific gates and base events 
concerning aspects of rolling stock and signalling for which a mapping to the rolling 
stock and signalling fault trees was sought.  The V2.1 risk assessment has modified the 
Victoria Line baseline QRA models to take account of the following: 
1. The train brake and traction and control failure rates as defined in the supplier’s 
model (BT VLU Vehicle level Fault Trees), have been used in the ISPV2.1 model; 
2. The DTG-R signalling system failure rates as defined in supplier’s model 
(WRSL Signalling and Train Control System Preliminary Fault Tree Hazard 
Analysis), have been used in the ISPV2.1 model; 
3. The supplier’s model (BT VLU Vehicle level Fault Trees) did not include failure 
rates for the mechanical or structural elements, e.g. bogies, wheels, suspension 
etc. Where rates were included in the model the figures from the baseline were 
used on the grounds that the design was based upon standards and best practice 
so the rates should be similar to those achieved on the 67TS; 
4. The use of Connect digital radio to replace the cab radio and allow the train 
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operator to communicate directly with other operators as required is included in 
the ISPV2.1 models; 
5. The V2.1 risk analysis assumes that the T2 train is used for a year (all rates are 
per year and all Initiators are events per year). The total risk has been scaled for 
the relative proportion of usage of T2 and 67TS trains in each of the different 
phases. In V2.1 only one train path in off peak hours (after 20:30) is being 
created for the T2 train; 
6. The V2.1 loss analysis has been adjusted for the fact that one of the trains has no 
passengers. Also T2 collisions can only occur at off peak low loading all losses 
associated with high or medium loading have been set to zero; 
7. The V2.1 models, model the risk from the T2 train operating without passengers 
on the extra path which has been created in off-peak hours.  The risk from this 
operation has been added to that from the Baseline model to obtain the total risk 
from the V2.1 operation.  Hence the data changes have been of two types: the 
changed failure data for the new rolling stock and signalling systems and the 
changed exposure data in terms of number of train movements; 
8. The changed data for the new rolling stock and signalling systems has been 
obtained from the suppliers fault tree models.  In some cases these values have 
been set as requirements which the systems must be shown to meet.  It is 
assumed that the supplier’s assurances cases will demonstrate how these targets 
or requirements will be met and testing in engineering hours will highlight any 
potential issues.  Any requirements or targets not achieved will have to be 
resolved before the new train goes into service in passenger hours.  
The assessment of the impact of system changes on its’ safety performance using ISP 
QRA  
A summary of the changes made to the models to represent V2.1 and a comparison of 
the ISPtotalVR 1.2  risk against the CSPVL baseline risk is presented below. 
Model Name 
CSP
VxR  
ISP
totalVR 1.2  
% change from 
CSPVL Baseline 
1.   Arcing 1.860E-03 1.860E-03 0.000%
2.   Collision between trains 6.800E-02 6.800E-02 0.001%
3.   Collision with object 3.250E-03 3.266E-03 0.490%
4.   Derailment 3.880E-02 3.882E-02 0.054%
5.   PTI on train 1.380E-01 1.380E-01 0.000%
6.    PTI  platform 3.310E-01 3.310E-01 0.000%
7.   Train fire 1.380E-02 1.380E-02 0.000%
8.   Tunnel fire 2.100E-05 2.100E-05 0.000%
9.   Station fire 3.860E-03 3.870E-03 0.258%
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Model Name 
CSP
VxR  
ISP
totalVR 1.2  
% change from 
CSPVL Baseline 
10. Unauthorised access 2.69E-02 2.693E-02 0.100%
Total 6.255E-01 6.255E-01
Table 7-17: Summary of Risk results 
As the change in V2.1 was to introduce a new train path, an increase in risk over the 
baseline is expected.  However it can be seen that this increase is negligible or zero 
for the 10 hazards affected by the VLU. The results of this analysis have been used in 
support of the safety argument within the safety case, as detailed later.   
Apportionment and confirmation of safety targets 
As already elaborated, the baseline QRA model (CSPVL and CSPSSL) define the 
Tolerable Hazard Rates (THR) for the Victoria Line and Subsurface Lines railway 
systems, for each of the core hazards. In order to apportion the THRs to specific 
constituents of the system, for which a quantified target (or a failure rate) is required in 
support of safety requirements quantification, further analysis has been done as 
follows: 
1. The system elements affected by the changes brought about through  
implementation of VLU and SSL project scopes have been identified and the 
changes classified as per each subsystem (signalling, rolling stock, power, etc); 
2. The impact of these changes on the QRA model has been analysed and scoped; 
3. The QRA elements have been classified to enable apportionment; 
4. Contribution to overall risk for each of the core hazards has been calculated.  
For example, for Victoria Line, the result of this analysis, an analysis of the signalling 
contribution to risk as calculated from the CSPVL QRA model are as in the Table 
7-18 below. 
Top Event 
Risk  
(fat./yr) 
Signalling 
Contribution
Notes 
1. Arcing 1.86E-03 0.00%  
2. Collision 
between trains 6.81E-02 1.28% 
A safety factor of 2x has been applied to account 
for signalling sub-system failures which may not 
have been modelled in detail in the CSPVL  model 
3. Collision with 
object 3.25E-03 0.00% Signalling contribution is non-zero but negligible. 
4. Derailment 3.88E-02 4.45%  
5. PTI on train 1.38E-01 0.00%  
6. PTI  platform 3.31E-01 0.00% Signalling contribution is non-zero but negligible. 
7. Train fire 1.38E-02 0.00%  
8. Tunnel fire 2.10E-05 0.00%  
9. Station fire 4.58E-03 0.00%  
10. Unauthorised 
access 2.69E-02 0.00%  
Table 7-18: An analysis of the signalling contribution to risk as calculated from the CSPVL 
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These data were calculated by identifying all of the events in the models relevant to 
signalling and conducting an analysis of the cut set to calculate the contribution to the 
overall individual risk for that hazard. 
A similar exercise was completed in support of the Subsurface Lines Upgrade 
Programme, in particular in support of the quantification of safety requirements 
intended for tendering for a new signalling system. More detail and examples of this 
work are in the following section. 
On the Victoria Line project, specifically, for signalling and rolling stock subsystems, 
the suppliers have developed their own safety targets early in the life cycle of the 
project, prior to development of the overall London Underground safety targets 
described earlier. Therefore, the only pragmatic solution was to use the developed 
ISPVL and FSPVL models to confirm that the solution being provided by the supply 
chain will deliver, as a minimum, safety performance commensurate with the safety 
performance of the existing subsystems (signalling and rolling stock).    
This was done by substitution of relevant parts of logic or data in the CSPVL model to 
derive ISPVL model and results are presented in Table 7-17.  
As result of this work the supply chain safety targets have been accepted. 
Furthermore, this information was used to support the supply chain’s ALARP review, 
allowing consideration of how much it will cost for each top event to reduce the risk 
for an individual hazard from (say) 1E-9/hr to 1E-10/hr and if the predicted costs are 
disproportionate, to justify a general statement, that detailed cost benefit analysis is not 
necessary for each top event.  
The ALARP argument was produced in line with LU Standard which requires that “a 
value of £1.4 million is used as the value of avoiding a fatality (VAF) to calculate the 
safety benefit associated with a measure”.  
A factor of 3 was applied to the safety benefit to assess whether the cost of a measure 
is grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit achieved. 
7.7 Derivation of safety requirements 
As already mentioned earlier, safety requirements can be grouped into two categories: 
1. Requirements related to compliance with standards and good practice; 
2. Specific system safety performance related requirements. 
Requirements related to compliance with standards and good practice are relatively 
easy to identify and on both SSL and VLUP these were identified by the safety team at 
early stages of the lifecycle.  
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The second category, specific system safety performance requirements were elicited 
through the review of mitigations/protection measures in the hazard log. Those 
mitigations/protection measures that are related to novel equipment or new process or 
novel environment within which the conventional equipment or a process is to operate 
were converted into safety requirements. Those safety requirements that are related to 
novel equipment were further analysed to facilitate the representation of these in the 
QRA either as base events or logical gates.  
Quantified targets were set upon these requirements. Table 7-19 presents an example 
of the VLUP safety requirements, with 4 quantified requirements (R00001, 25, 26 & 
28) in italic font.  
Requirement No. Description 
R00001 The CSPVL QRA shows that to meet the overall goal of achieving risk 
levels proportionate to those in the overall LU risk model the risk due to 
collision between trains on the Victoria Line should be not greater than 
6.81·10-2 fatalities per year.  
R00005 All equipment specified shall be compliant with new EMI/EMC legislation. 
R00006 All trainborne and trackside communications equipment shall not be 
susceptible to trainborne EMI/Regenerative braking. 
R00007 Configuration control of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) map data shall 
be enforced throughout the life cycle of the system (Metronet asset 
performance issue). 
R00008 Configuration control of trackside and train borne ATP data shall be 
implemented. 
R00009 Configuration management of track capability data linked to signalling data 
shall be implemented. 
R00011 Design of the track circuit configuration shall be compatible with 09TS (e.g. 
straddle existing short depot track circuits). 
R00012 Door alarms to be fitted on Signalling Equipment Room (SER). 
R00019 Mobile and portable radio equipment shall be banned from SERs (and other 
areas) if analysis shows this to be necessary 
R00022 Operational procedures for safety critical communication between the train 
operator and the controller shall be reviewed and updated and appropriate 
training provided. 
R00023 Power and signalling cables shall be sufficiently separated 
electromagnetically to comply with Standards. 
R00025 The likelihood that ATP Movement Authority is exceeded in Protected 
Manual mode of operation  shall not be greater than 7.67E-8 to ensure the 
same level of safety performance as today 
R00026 The likelihood that the Automatic Train Operation (ATO) system attempts to 
exceed the stopping point shall not be greater than 2.44E-5 to ensure the 
same level of safety performance as today 
R00028 The likelihood of the Emergency Brake being unavailable on two or more 
cars shall not be greater than 1.49E-7 to ensure the same level of safety 
performance as today 
R00042 The overlay of the new signalling system must not affect the operation of the 
existing signalling system 
R00046 The track lubrication system shall be designed to ensure that relevant 
standards have been adhered to and that the performance of the railway 
targets can be met. 
R00047 Trainborne EMI/Regenerative braking shall not degrade or incapacitate train 
borne or trackside communications equipment. 
R00049 Validation of data shall be carried out for each change. 
Table 7-19: Examples of Victoria Line related Safety Requirements  
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7.8 Construction of the safety arguments logical network – Safety 
Justification & Case 
In support of both projects, VLUP and SSL, the safety justifications and safety cases 
were produced (and are still being produced), as an outcome of the above described 
safety management process. As an illustration of this, one example of a development 
of the safety justification and a safety case from VLUP and an example of the 
hierarchy of safety cases from SSL will be presented in this section.  
As already outlined the process models inform the change safety analysis (CSA). The 
output of the CSA feeds the hazard log and the identification of the safety 
requirements, as illustrated by Figure 7-12 below. 
 This information is used as a base for further safety analysis, identification and 
assessment of effectiveness of the protection measures and safety requirements and 
construction of the safety fact net. 
  
Figure 7-12: Development of Safety Arguments 
  7.8.1 Safety Justification 
Usually, testing is the first life cycle stage that calls for a safety argument to be 
produced in support of carrying the testing or a trial operation. Production of such a 
“Safety Justification” is the first step towards production of the safety case.  Most 
often, the process for derivation of the “Safety Justification” is exactly the same as the 
process for production of the safety case. However, the overall delivered safety 
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performance of the changed system, to enable the testing, is most often less onerous 
than in case of the system being fully commissioned.  This is due to the fact that the 
testing is done in controlled environment and it is possible to rigorously enforce many 
more operational controls that must be in place to compensate the unproven or still 
unsatisfactory safety performance of the system.   
The safety justification is based around the proof of adequate management of hazards, 
restrictions and incident control and management and an argument that these three key 
elements of the safety management system deliver safe system for testing. As an 
example from VLUP, a safety justification that was produced in support of the testing 
of the new train and the new signalling system in non-traffic hours is presented on 
Figure 7-13 below. This particular testing was carried out under operational control of 
London Underground whilst the train-signalling system was delivered by the supply 
chain, including the proof of safety of the technical solution.   the author structured the 
system safety justification around the three lines of reasoning, mentioned above, and 
an additional justification of purely technical safety performance of the subsystem 
delivered by the supply chain, as follows (the structure of the safety justification is self 
explanatory (Figure 7-13): 
1. Management of restrictions is adequate; 
2. Applicable hazards are managed to closure or are conditionally closed and 
managed through  restrictions. The Safety risk is ALARP; 
3. Incident management is appropriate; 
4. Train-signalling system is acceptably safe subject to adequate management of 
residual risk through  restrictions. 
Conclusion of the Safety justification was that a set of restrictions, dependencies and 
other safety measures has been identified which enabled the train operations 
associated with V2.01 testing to be performed at a level of risk which is tolerable and 
ALARP.  Safety justification can be seen a subset of the reasoning model that is the 
System Safety Case for VLUP.  
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Figure 7-13: Example of Safety Justification produced in support of the VLUP Testing of the new Train and Signalling system (DTG-R signalling system in overlay)  
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  7.8.2 Safety Case 
In general, the safety argument about any undertaking should be based around the 
following lines of reasoning, for each of the 4 elements (as discussed earlier): 
1. Objectives/Requirements: 
a. Hazards, emerging from the change of the system, identified, analysed and 
managed; 
b. Suitable safety targets identified, selected and achieved; 
c. Safety performance of the system is commensurate with the ALARP 
principle; 
2 Arguments including: 
a. Completeness of the analysis and implementation of protection and 
prevention measures (mitigations, barriers and containment measures), 
requirements and targets; 
b. Control of hazards on an individual basis including Qualitative Safety 
Arguments and/or Quantitative Safety Arguments; 
c. Options and Impact analysis (is there anything else, practicable, that can 
be done to reduce the risk level further) including the practicability 
argument (qualitative or quantitative cost-benefit analysis), assessment and 
comparison of the costs of any proposed changes to the system against the 
reduction in risk levels with the acceptance/rejection criteria for selection 
of options; 
d. Rationale for adequacy of safety management activities and implemented 
mitigations, requirements and safety targets;    
e. Rationale for adequacy of evidence provided in support of the arguments; 
3. Evidence of: 
a. Comprehensive change safety management process followed;  
b. Comprehensive processes used to identify, manage and close hazards 
including: HAZOP, HAZID, Functional Failure Analysis, FTA, Interface 
Analysis, Single Point Failure Analysis and Diversity Analysis  with 
traceable detailed records of these activities; 
c. The system design approach, including design of system architecture, use 
of a suitable means of checking for errors, including design reviews and 
the ability of the system to self-check;  
d. Applicable standards and practices being identified (such as EN50126, 
EN50128, EN50129), followed and complied with;  
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e. Use of a Problem/Fault/Data Reporting And Corrective Action System; 
f. Work performed by the ISA (or Competent Independent Person) during 
the project;  
g. Evidence of implemented protection and prevention measures (mitigations, 
barriers and containment measures), requirements and targets being 
achieved, including testing and verification and validation results; 
h. Where novel process elements are employed, (e.g. by the introduction of 
new techniques not included in EN50126/8/9), a more extensive 
justification that they are consistent with the achievement of ALARP is 
required; 
4. Context: 
a. Outline of the system to be changed; 
b. Outline of the changes to be introduced to the system with their impact on 
the system performance; 
c. Outline of the operational environment of the system, including the outline 
of the technical “operational envelope” of the system operating within the 
given environment under given operating conditions. 
The System Safety Case Structure  
On both, VLUP and SSL, the same philosophy to construction of the safety case has 
been adopted, in outline the safety argument is broken down into: 
1. Introduction: Safety objectives, targets and requirements are outlined in this 
section (summary of point “1” above); 
2. System Definition: This section provides context for the safety case (point “4” 
above); 
3. Quality and Safety Management Reports: This section presents the Quality and 
Safety Management System adhered to during the life cycle phases of the system 
development/change (point “3” from “a” to “f” above); 
4. Technical Safety Reports: This section of the safety case contains all safety 
reports related to the system. This section corresponds to main safety case parts, 
Objectives or Requirements, Evidence and Arguments. The context of this 
section is not a simple repetition of the previous two sections but goes into much 
more detail; 
5. Related Safety Documents: This section provides references to all other related 
safety documents and documented processes used in support of the development 
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of the safety case.  
For clarity of presentation and ease of appraisal, the SSC is structured as follows: 
VOLUME 1: Presents a statement of safety objectives, confirmation if these have 
been achieved, and high-level summary of safety arguments and any 
outstanding safety issues for the railway system configuration stage. 
It contains the principal record of the safety arguments for the changes 
being implemented, and where they have a safety implication on the 
Project.  
The Vol.1 is subject to endorsement, providing a key document input, 
by the acceptance bodies. 
VOLUME 2:  Contains safety arguments. It is structured around the core hazards and 
related safety goals and contains all the key Technical Safety Reports 
(TSR). 
VOLUME 3:   Contains the ‘evidence of safety’ in terms of compliance statements, 
including references to the key Verification and Validation (V&V) 
records, traceable audit information and close-out reports, Test Results, 
etc which support the Vol.1 and Vol.2 entries. This volume also refers 
to all other safety related documents, supply chain safety cases, Audit 
Reports, Test Logs, etc. 
The sections for Vol. 1 of the SSC are as follows: 
1. List of References 
2. Executive Summary - This section provides a high level SSC status overview: 
a. Purpose and scope of submission for V2.1; 
b. Status of the SSC and related activities including the status of previous 
submission; 
c. Outline claim of the submission; 
d. Status of identified programme risks related to the SSC delivery;  
e. List of sections altered from previous submission; 
3. Introduction - This section consists of following subsections: 
a. Objectives of the System Safety Case; 
b. Aims of this volume; 
c. Scope of the System Safety Case; 
d. Definitions; 
e. Abbreviations; 
4. Proposed Submissions - This section presents the proposed submissions of the 
SSC. 
5. System Definition: 
a. Overview of VLU; 
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b. System Outline; 
6. Structure and Status of the System Safety Case - This section consists of the 
following subsections:  
a. Position of this Document; 
b. Format of the SSC; 
c. Status of the SSC; 
d. Changes from previous submission; 
e. Comparison with EN50129; 
7. Methodology - A summary of the methodology followed during development of 
the SSC is outlined in this section, as follows: 
a. Safety Goals; 
b. Method of Safety Analysis; 
c. Structure of Safety Argument; 
d. Change Safety Analysis process; 
e. Role of ISA; 
8. Safety Justification - This section provides an overview and summarises the 
status of the safety arguments for the V2.1 project stage, to be detailed in 
Volume 2. 
a. Completeness of the coverage of the risk; 
b. Train accidents; 
c. Movement accidents: 
d. Non-movement accidents; 
e. Complete set of sub goals;  
f. Safety Arguments Status Report; 
g. Outstanding Safety Issues – Summary; 
h. Conclusions; 
i. Overall GSN; 
9. Next submission - The scope and objective of the next SSC submission is 
outlined in this section; 
10. Implementation –Delivery: 
a. Responsibilities; 
b. Liaison with LU; 
c. Liaison with Supply chain; 
11. Appendix I: ADCs; 
The following sections comprise Vol. 2 of the SSC: 
1. Overview: 
a. Scope; 
b. Aim; 
c. Outline of overall safety argument; 
d. Structure of SSC Vol 2.; 
2. System Definition: 
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a. System description; 
b. Operational envelope of the system; 
3. Quality Management report: 
a. Roles and Responsibilities; 
b. Lifecycle Issues; 
c. Standards; 
d. Audits and Assessments; 
e. Supplier management; 
f. Controls; 
g. Configuration Management; 
h. Project Quality Management Training; 
i. Outstanding Issues; 
4. Safety Management Report: 
a. Roles and responsibilities; 
b. Safety lifecycle; 
c. Safety analysis; 
d. Safety Standards; 
e. Safety audit and assessment; 
f. Supplier management; 
g. Safety controls; 
h. Configuration management;  
i. Project safety training;  
j. Outstanding issues;  
5. Core Hazard/Safety Goal:(NOTE: This section is repeated for each Safety Goal): 
a. Scope; 
b. Description and Process model; 
c. Change Safety Analysis; 
d. Derivation of Safety Acceptance Criteria; 
e. Safety arguments; 
f. Outstanding Safety Issues; 
g. Related Safety Documentation; 
h. Conclusion; 
6. Appendix I: Assumptions, Dependences, Caveats; 
7. Appendix II: Migration Plan; 
8. Appendix III: Project Assurance Plan. 
The following sections comprise Vol. 3 of the SSC: 
1. Overview; 
2. Subsystems: summary of safety documentation/evidence and its status. 
The safety case structure recommended in EN50129 is widely recognised as 
representing good practice in the production of safety cases and is used well beyond 
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the Standard’s nominal scope of electronic systems for railway signalling. Figure 7-14 
shows how the structure adopted for the SCC encompasses all the material required by 
EN50129 and builds into an equivalent structure. 
 
Figure 7-14: SSC mapped onto EN50129 
This structure is compatible with the safety case format recommended by CENELEC  
EN50129 standard, but supports the focus on the control and management of the 
hazards and consequences.  
Victoria Line Upgrade Programme – System Safety Case 
the author structured the System Safety Case (SSC) as outlined above.  Heart of the 
SSC is the Volume 2 and outline of the VLUP System Safety Case is presented on  
Figure 7-15 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-15: VLUP GSN- Top level 
As the management organisation of the VLUP is relatively simple, there was no need 
for GSN presentation of the sections dealing with Quality management and Safety 
management. The GSN has been developed for each safety goal/core hazard. As an 
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Figure 7-16: Collision between trains GSN (VLUP System Safety Case)
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Existing signalling 
system will not 
give unsafe inputs
 
G1.1.3.3
 
Rails will provide 
sufficient adhesion 
for safe braking
 
G1.1.3.2
  
Design staff quality
Maintainers will 
not put system into 
unsafe state
 
Proven in 
  
use
  EMC design 
and assessment 
of train
 
Maintenance 
strategy
 
G1.1.3.1.1 
  
Existing signalling 
system design is
correct 
  
G1.1.3.1.2
  
Design of old /
new interface is 
correct
  
G1.1.3.1.3
 
Installation of 
interface will not
disturb existing 
signalling
 
G1.1.3.1.4
 
New train will 
not disturb 
existing 
signalling
 
G1.1.3.1.5
 
New train will 
operate track
circuits
 
Adherence to
LU standards
etc
 
Relevant 
features of 
train are not 
novel
 
Transitional 
maintenance 
arrangements
 
S6 – Protect all driving 
modes by technical 
barriers and / or 
operating procedures.
 
G1.1.4.1
 
Adequate protection 
in Manned 
Automatic (MA)
 
G1.1.4.3 
  
Adequate
protection in 
Restricted 
Manual (RM)
  
G1.1.4.2 
  
Adequate protec tion 
in Protected Manual 
(PM) 
  
Protected by 
signalling 
system
 
Speed 
limited by 
new 
signalling 
system 
Signal sighting 
made adequate 
for new train
  
Protected by 
signalling 
system
  
Rules and 
supporting 
systems 
unchanged
 
G1.1.4.4
  
Adequate protection 
against incorrect 
operation of fault 
handling devices
 
Procedures and
driver training
 
  
S2 –
 
Develop criteria & 
justifications for 
probability of unsafe 
train movements in 
each mode.
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The process model is used to set a context for the safety case argument and to focus 
specific justification for each of the main areas of concern, indicated by the GSN. For 
the relevant phase of the project, testing of the new trains in traffic hours, the only 
elements of the overall process for train movements represented by the process model 
Figure 7-5 which are changed from the existing Victoria Line are those associated 
with the introduction of the new train and signalling system. The changes comprise: 
1. Introduction of new train and signalling system; 
2. Modification to existing signalling system to provide interface to new system; 
3. Provision of co-acting lineside signals where needed for sighting from new train; 
4. Changes to driver’s task associated with design of new train and signalling; 
5. Changes to activities of signalling, track and rolling stock maintainers. 
The outline of the safety argument is as follows:  
1. The new train and signalling system will behave correctly providing they are not 
disturbed and providing they do not receive inputs which could cause unsafe 
behaviour;  
2. The potential disturbing factors in the environment of the Victoria Line will not 
cause unsafe behaviour of the new train and signalling system; 
3. The probability of inputs or actions which would cause unsafe behaviour being 
applied to the new train or signalling system is consistent with the safety 
acceptance criteria;  
4. The introduction of the new train and signalling system will not adversely affect 
the behaviour of the existing trains with regard to the risk of collision. 
In addition, special consideration is given to two particular operational activities; 
moves towards buffer stops and rescue of failed trains. The risk of train collision is 
made equal to or lower than the value derived from the LU QRA model by the 
combination of technology developed to appropriate levels of safety integrity, 
established good practice in engineering, and the application of effective safety 
management to operations. 
Detailed arguments for each of the goals relating the safety justifications with 
evidence and providing the logical framework has been developed for each of the 
safety goals from the GSN.  The conclusion of the System Safety Case was that the 
safety risk is not materially impacted by the operation of the pre-series trains in 
passenger Traffic Hours and residual safety risk has been reduced as low as reasonably 
practicable. This was subject to: 
1. The imposition of a number of identified restrictions and 
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2. Confirmation of the conclusions in the system safety case to be gained upon 
acceptance of the supply chain safety cases by the programme. 
Subsurface Lines Upgrade Programme – Hierarchy of Safety Cases 
As already outline the Subsurface Lines Upgrade Programme (SUP) delivery 
organisation is a hierarchically structured with many (40 projects) delivering at 
different timescales to a common objective at a number of migration stages. This 
arrangement dictates a structure and management of a delivery of the safety cases in 
support of the projects and the overall programme as illustrated by Figure 7-2, Figure 
7-3, and Figure 7-4 earlier.  A model of the hierarchy of safety cases, which the author 
established, is illustrated by Figure 7-17 below.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-17: Hierarchy of safety cases and justifications/evidences 
The subsystem level safety cases are delivered and submitted for approval as and 
when required prior to individual projects’ works being delivered and most often in 
advance of the system safety case delivery (some of the project level deliverables are 
completed at the same time as the system commissioning and are therefore delivered 
and submitted at the same time with the system safety case but to different 
approvals/acceptance bodies).  However, in order to secure delivery of the complete 
safety argument, the system safety case structure and fact net must be completed well 
in advance, with all the subsystem level safety arguments relevant to the system level 
argument identified and “completed” as part of the subsystem level safety cases 
delivery and acceptance.  This is illustrated by Figure 7-18 and Figure 7-19 below. 
The system level safety argument for Train Movement Accidents, outlined by the 
GSN (Figure 7-18), covers the complete system. Each of the goals in this particular 
example are influenced by system changes being delivered by more than one project, 
as illustrated by Table 20 below.  
System Level 
Subsystem Level 
 
for each system configuration 
System Safety Case
Portfolio Level 
Safety Case 
Project Level 
Safety Case
• PSC
• GASC
• SASC
• Case for Safety
•  Any other Safety Related Justifications or Evidence 
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Table 7-20: Apportionment of responsibility for engineering safety management activities and delivery 
of evidence across the programme work packages 
The GSN elements coloured blue are the goals related to the scope of change delivered 
by the Immunisation portfolio projects. 
Following from that the Immunisation portfolio GSN and the safety case were 
produced, demonstrating the justification for safety and providing the evidence in 
support of the safety argument. This is illustrated by Figure 7-19 below.  
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Goal Goal Description 
M1 
G902 
The risk that the Earthing & Bonding 
arrangements are incompatible with the existing 
railway is reduced in line with risk principle 
● ● ● ●  ● ●  ● ●   ● ●    
M1 
G903 
The risk of the movement authority not being 
visible to the train operator in all rolling stock is 
reduced in line with risk principle 
 ●  ●  ● ●           
M1 
G904 
The risk that the increased length of S Stock is 
not compatible with signalling layout and 
clearances is reduced in line with risk principle 
 ●  ●  ● ●           
M1 
G910 
The risk that any train is not detected by the 
Signalling System is reduced in line with risk 
principle 
●     ●            
M1 
G916 
The risk that the driver/staff can introduce an 
unsafe state in the system is reduced in line with 
risk principle 
● ●    ● ●           
M1 
G918 
The risk an unsafe state is introduced in 
maintainer equipment is reduced in line with 
risk principle 
● ●    ● ●  ● ●        
M1 
G922 
The risk that any objects (e.g. trackside, 
platform mounted or the platform, structures 
etc) infringes the Kinematic envelope of the 
rolling stock is reduced in line with risk 
principle 
● ●  ● ● ● ●  ● ●   ●     
M1 
G957 
The risk that any products/ subsystems/systems 
cannot be supported over the complete lifecycle 
is reduced in line with risk principle 
●  ●      ●  ●  ●     
M1 
G958 
The risk that any products/ subsystems/systems 
cannot be maintained over the complete 
lifecycle is reduced in line with risk principle - 
(includes equipment to be located in a position 
where it can be maintained in safety is reduced 
in line with risk principle) 
● ● ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ●  ●     
M1 
G959 
The risk that any products/ subsystems/systems 
is not sufficiently reliable so as to effect the 
safety performance over the complete lifecycle 
is reduced in line with risk principle 
● ● ●   ● ●  ●    ●     
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Figure 7-18: SSL system level train movements accidents GSN 
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Figure 7-19: SSL project portfolio (subsystem) level train movements accidents GSN 
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The goals (coloured blue) correspond directly to the system level goals and represent 
the contribution to the risk from the immunisation portfolio implemented changes to 
the system safety performance in these particular areas. For each of the goals, a remit 
has been produced, agreed with and passed to the actionee.  
This process supports assurance of completeness of the safety argument and 
justification.   
In support of the clarity of delivery and structure of documentation, the author 
produced the hierarchical document tree, an example of which for system level and the 
immunisation portfolio level is shown by Figure 7-20 below. All of the arguments and 
evidence at project level is summarised at the project safety cases as presented in listed 
documentation.  
System Safety Case - M1   
        
   M1 System Hazard Log Report  
   M1 CSA Report   
   Baseline QRA Report   
   QRA Update - M1   
   system safety cases remits log  
   Integration testing safety justification  
     
  Immunisation Portfolio   
   Immunisation Portfolio Safety Case  (update including Legacy signalling, Delta's etc) 
     Hazard log report  
      
   Signalling Immunisation  
     WRSL PD Product safety case 
 
     WRSL FS2550 Product safety case  
     FS2550/PD/Frequency conversion Generic Application Eng Safety Case 
     FS2550/PD/Frequency conversion Specific Application Eng Safety Case 
      Demonstration of closure of safety case caveats & open issues 
      Confirmation of concessions status 
   LVAC and alarms   
   Safety justification - Non Section 12  
   Safety justification - Rotary Converter  
   CRMS Generic Safety justification paper  
   Legacy Signalling Generic Safety justification - S8 
   Legacy Signalling Site Specific System Safety Validation Report 
    
    
   Other projects’ safety justifications, evidence and arguments.  
Figure 7-20: SSL System safety argument document tree 
7.9  Assertion of completeness of analysis and assessment of 
uncertainties  
An approach to assurance of completeness of the system understanding and 
completeness and correctness of change safety analysis has been discussed earlier and 
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the same processes and methodologies were (and still are) successfully applied on 
both VLUP and SSL. This will not be further discussed here.  
However, during the work on VLUP and SSL an additional type of completeness 
argument has been identified as required. 
  7.9.1 Completeness of the safety arguments/facts net 
As already mentioned earlier, the completeness of the safety arguments net, can be 
classified in three kinds: 
1. Wholeness of lines of reasoning explored; 
2. Sufficiency and Completeness of evidence provided in support of these 
arguments; 
3. Certainty of evidence provided in support of these arguments. 
Wholeness of the logical fact net, that is the safety case, is being assured by adherence 
to the Change Safety Analysis, Risk Assessment and Management process for its 
development. In addition the fact net must be transparent throughout its own life 
cycle, involving all the necessary competences in its development and review.  
Use of GSN or some other form of graphical presentation of the fact net, certainly 
supports the verification of wholeness of the safety arguments.  Substantiation of 
Sufficiency and Completeness of evidence differs depending on the subject, varying 
from a simple well understood problems, for which the evidence can be a simple 
check or a 100% test of all functionalities provided by the relate subsystem, to 
complex distributed, software based safety critical control systems, where a 100% test 
is practically impossible and the evidence is likely to consist of some practical testing 
(with justification of the tested sample being based on statistical analysis) and the 
evidence of adherence to adequate processes including use of advance development 
and analysis tools. Whichever type of evidence is being provided, the justification for 
sufficiency must be made. 
Certainty of evidence depends on the type of provided evidence. In case of a proof 
based on a physical measurement (in a very general sense), the certainty is relatively 
easy to prove through  use of well known methods for determination of precision of 
measurement.  However, in case of non-measurable, intuitive, evidence, typically 
related to proof of adherence to processes and application of good practice and 
standards, it is much more difficult to determine the level of confidence in available 
information. The usual method to support this kind of evidence is by an audit and 
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monitoring of the initial failure rates through  FRACAS/DRACAS system for more 
frequent than expected failures of the system as an indication of inadequate processes 
in place or existing mitigations although being implemented not being effective.  
7.10  Management and Reporting (Presentation of results) 
  7.10.1 Management 
Planning and management related to safety management activities is not different to 
management of any other engineering undertaking, apart from the following activities 
specific to engineering safety management (common planning and management will 
not be further discussed):  
1. Management of the hazard logs; 
2. Management of the operational restrictions; 
3. Management of the safety case delivery. 
These are related and to great extent overlapping.  
Hazard log, as already mentioned, holds a record of all the hazards and related change 
safety activities. Apart from making sure that all the records are kept up to date and 
configuration controlled, which will be discussed later, the hazard log is a tool for 
control and management of hazard log actions. Each action needs to be allocated to 
owner with a clear and concise description of the action and what action is expected to 
deliver.  
Operational restrictions need to be managed and controlled with the same rigour as the 
hazard log. During identification and analysis of the restrictions it is necessary to 
identify the evidence required and the “authority” to remove or relax the restriction. 
No restriction should be removed without the documented agreement from the 
identified authority.  
Most often delivery of the safety case is dependent on input from people or teams 
other than the safety case author or the engineering safety team. On SSL and VLUP 
programmes, delivery of the safety cases has been managed through  the remits. At 
project level, Project Managers are responsible for delivery of all documentation on 
projects including that required to support delivery of the system safety case.   
It is the Project Manager and delegated Project Engineer responsibility to ensure that 
evidence is collated and controlled that will support all of the arguments for safety 
case, including the maintenance and operations readiness and RAM performance 
acceptability.  
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The system safety team identifies the safety arguments and evidence requirements and 
develops remits for delivery in support of the system safety case by the Project 
Manager or Engineer.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-21: Delivery management of the Safety Case 
Management of safety case via remits, allows for reporting against the remits delivery 
as KPIs and monitoring of the progress.  
In order to de-risk the assurance regime, for each system configuration several 
versions of the system safety case were submitted for review well in advance of the 
commissioning (this strategy is still being followed on both projects). As represented 
by the Figure 7-22, below, following approach was successfully implemented: 
1. As early as possible a template document, indicating structure and main areas of 
discussion is submitted for agreement and approval; 
2. A first draft with 85% to 95% of requirements identified and all evidence items 
intended to support these identified and related arguments completed subjected 
to review and approval by all stakeholders prior to final commission enabling 
submission;  
3. A system safety case with all requirements identified, all evidence items 
intended to support these identified and most available, related arguments 
completed submitted for approval to allow commissioning to happen; 
4. Due to complexity of the changes introduced to the system, a post 
commissioning system safety case update is submitted in order to close out any 
outstanding issues and enable the review of the adequacy of implemented 
mitigations and temporary mitigations.  
 
 
 
Project  
Manager/Engineer 
Assign 
 Structure arguments & justifications supporting the safety case using Goal Structured Notation; 
 For each argument/justification produce a remit; 
 Assign it to a project manager/project engineer to deliver.
 
Remit
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Figure 7-22: Typical programme of submissions.  
   
  7.10.2 Reporting 
The author identified five types of reporting during implementation of the framework: 
1. Analysis reporting. These reports present the analyses carried out and are usually 
submitted for approval and acceptance in preparation for commissioning of the 
system change. These reports should have the same general structure as the 
safety case; objective or requirements, arguments, evidence and context;   
2. Analysis records, are used to create and auditable trial of evidence gathering in 
support of the analysis reports. These are used as evidence, referred to from the 
safety case; 
3. Management-planning. Necessary safety management activities should be 
identified early in the project, planned and agreed within the project as well as 
with the regulatory and acceptance bodies. The plans need to be recorded and 
regularly updated to support auditable trial and continuity throughout the life of 
the project; 
4. Management-implementation. Implementation of actions resulting from the 
change safety analysis and management activities, should be controlled through  
remits agreed between the actionee and the safety team; 
5. Management-progress monitoring. On any project it is necessary to monitor 
progress of delivery. With regards to change safety management process, 
progress monitoring should be done through  monitoring of the remits. 
 
List of reports that have been identified and are being produced is presented in Table 
7-21  below.  
 
 
 3 months earlier 1 week prior to commissioning 
SSC Post-
Commissioing
SSC  
template 
SSC Advanced 
draft
SSC  Enabling 
Commissioning 
Migration stage 
X 
11/2 months post 
commissioning
Post Migration 
stage X 
9 months earlier 
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Directly related reports are indicated by outline numbering.  
Report Report category 
1. Safety Case: Analysis reporting 
1.1 Safety Cases Remits; Management-implementation 
1.2 Remits Progress Reports; Management-progress monitoring 
2. Other safety cases, justifications & documents; Analysis reporting 
3. Hazard Log Report: Analysis reporting 
3.1 Action Remits; Management- implementation 
3.2 Hazard Forum Minutes; Analysis record 
3.3 Safety Requirements Forum Minutes; Analysis record 
3.4 Actions progress report; Management-progress monitoring 
4. Restrictions Register; Management- implementation 
5. Hazard report; Management-progress reporting 
6. CSA Report; Analysis reporting 
6.1 CSA Briefing; Analysis record 
6.2 ICSA Records; Management- implementation 
6.2.1 Change Requests; Analysis record 
6.2.2 ICSA Briefing; Analysis record 
7. QRA Report: Analysis reporting 
7.1 QRA Models; Analysis record 
7.2 QRA Data log; Analysis record 
7.3 QRA Change Register; Analysis record 
8. Process Models Report; Analysis reporting 
9. QRA Development Plan; Management-planning 
10. Safety Audit Plan; Management-planning 
11. Acceptance and Certification Strategy; Management-planning 
12. Engineering Safety Management Plan. Management-planning 
Table 7-21: Reporting - Change Safety Management process  
7.11 Configuration Control, Continual Appraisal and Knowledge 
Management 
Within the change safety management process a number of different configurable data 
items exist: 
1. System change data: 
a. System Change scope and scope changes; 
b. System configuration data; 
c. Assumptions and Dependences; 
2. Safety analysis data: 
a. Hazard log data;  
b. Risk assessment information (qualitative and quantitative); 
c. QRA data; 
d. Incidents and Accidents data;  
e. Safety related documentation;  
f. Operational Restrictions/Caveats; 
3. Safety performance monitoring data: 
a. FRACAS/DRACAS systems; 
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b. Incidents reporting system; 
4. Management data: 
a. Planning; 
b. Implementation and progress monitoring. 
Relationships between these are described in Figure 7-23 below.  
System change data enables and provides input into the system analysis. All of these 
must be strictly configuration controlled, because the change to the system data may 
have impact on the system safety performance. Frequent appraisal of how correct and 
current these information is, is crucial. Safety analysis and safety performance 
monitoring data are critical to development of a suitable, applicable and convincing 
safety case. These must be configuration controlled as well, but in addition to that, 
these data should be subjected to continual appraisal, throughout the life of the project, 
and once the project is completed, it shall be handed over to the infrastructure owner, 
it needs to be apprised until the system is decommissioned or upgraded when the new 
cycle of the safety management will began. The management data is used to record the 
processes and monitor the progress towards a successful delivery for the safety 
argument. Therefore this data does not have to be strictly configuration controlled but 
needs to be sufficiently current to enable appropriate progress monitoring.  
 
Figure 7-23: Configurable data items 
In line with the recommendation from the Yellow book (RSSB, 2007) some of this 
information is contained within the hazard log (as described earlier) and configuration 
System Safety 
Analysis 
System Change 
Information 
Hazard Log 
Restrictions  
Log
QRA
Implementation 
of change 
Safety Performance 
Monitoring
Safety Case 
FRACAS/ 
DRACAS
Incidents 
monitoring
Management  
Data 
(Remits)
Evidence 
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control of it is managed through  the parts of the hazard log itself.  
Journal The Journal describes all amendments to the Hazard Log, in order to provide 
a historical record of its compilation and provide traceability. For each amendment it 
contains: 
1 The date of the amendment (not necessary if a diary format is used); 
2 A unique entry number; 
3 The person making the amendment; 
4 A description of the amendment and the rationale for it; 
5 The sections in the Hazard Log that were changed. 
Directory of safety related documents.  The Directory, provides an up-to-date 
reference to every safety document produced and used by the Project. The documents 
referred to include the following, where they exist: 
1. Safety Plan; 
2. Safety Requirements Specification; 
3. Safety standards; 
4. Safety Documents; 
5. Incident/accident reports; 
6. Analyses, assessment and audit reports; 
7. Safety Case; and 
8. Correspondence with the relevant Safety Approvers. 
For each document the Directory includes the following: 
1. A unique reference; 
2. The document title; 
3. The current version number and issue date; and 
4. The physical location of the master. 
Hazard Data (including safety requirements).  Every identified hazard is recorded. 
For each hazard, the information listed below is recorded as soon as it becomes 
available and strictly configuration controlled. Data collected during Hazard Analysis 
and Risk Assessment is contained within the Hazard Log: 
1. A unique reference; 
2. A brief description of the hazard including the system functions or constituents 
affected and their states that represent the hazard; 
3. The causes identified for the hazard; 
4. A reference to the full description and analysis of the hazard; 
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5. Assumptions on which the analysis is based and limitations of the analysis; 
6. The severity for the related accident, the likelihood of the hazard occurring and 
the likelihood of an accident occurring with the hazard as a contributing factor; 
7. The predicted risk associated with the hazard; 
8. Target likelihood for its occurrence;  
9. A reference to all Safety Requirements associated with this hazard or with 
related causes or protection measures; 
10. A reference (and description) to the system interface or object: 
a. Whose change is the source of cause or hazard; 
b. To which a protection measure is related;  
11. A reference (and description) to related QRA elements (base and top events, 
gates, etc); 
12. The status of the hazard;  
13. If the hazard is not closed or cancelled, then the name of a person who is 
responsible for progressing it towards closure; 
14. A description of, or a reference to, the action to be taken to remove the hazard or 
reduce the risk from the system to an acceptable level.  This includes: 
a. A statement as to whether the hazard has been avoided or requires further 
action (with a justification if no further action is to be taken); 
b. Details of the risk reduction action to be taken; 
c. A discussion of the alternative means of risk reduction and justification for 
actions considered but not taken; 
d. A comment on the need for accident sequence re-evaluation following risk 
reduction actions; 
e. A reference to any design documentation that would change as a result of 
the action;  
Incident Data.  At the time of writing this thesis no incidents occurred. However, in 
future all incidents that have occurred during the life of the system or equipment are to 
be recorded here, identifying the sequence of events linking each accident and the 
hazards that caused it.   
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For each incident the following will be provided: 
1. A unique reference; 
2. A brief description of the incident; 
3. A reference to a report describing an investigation of the incident; and 
4. A description of any action taken to prevent recurrence, or justification of the 
decision not to take any. 
Consequence/Accident Data.  Every identified possible consequence is recorded, 
including the possible sequences of events linking identified consequence with the 
hazards that may cause it. For each consequence the following is provided: 
1. A unique reference; 
2. A brief description of the potential consequence; 
3. A reference to a report giving a full description and analysis of the consequence 
sequence; 
4. A risk assessment information (either comparable, using earlier outlined 
methodology or quantified data); and 
5. A list of the hazards and associated consequence sequences that could cause the 
consequence. 
Operational Restrictions are being managed by a centralised Restrictions register. As 
operational restrictions are in fact temporary mitigations these need to be treated with 
the same rigour as the hazard log. Table 7-22 is an example of the record.  
Ref Description  Group Rationale 
R014(a) The full performance key switch shall only be operated (to 
select full performance) whilst in an Engineer's Current 
Area.  At all other times the key switch shall be OFF. 
Rollin 
stock - 
power 
Full execution 
of test 
Action Actionee Status Criteria for Removal Removal Authority  
Ensure train is Inter-
Running mode when 
outside Engineer's Current 
Area. 
Lead 
Train 
Master. 
Open Confirmation of successful 
conclusion of all tests 
requiring operation at "Full 
Performance" and removal 
of key switch mode. 
Head of Rolling 
Stock Engineering 
SUP (C Holmes), 
Transportation 
Notes Evidence or  Action 
Revised 16th November 2009 following installation of Mod No. SSL1509. #N/A 
Table 7-22: An example of the restriction’s register record 
QRA related information can be split into two categories; data and logic. Model data 
needs to be regularly reviewed and confirmed against the latest incident data. The 
logic of the QRA model, once the models has been completed (including review for 
correctness), needs to be reviewed after each change to the system.  Usually tools used 
for QRA modelling have the data storage facilities. On both VLUP and SUP, Fault 
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Tree +   software has been used for modelling. All of the modelling data is stored 
within the tool’s data repository. The configuration control is implemented through  
the tool following a change control process.  
FRACAS/DRACAS: failure/defect reporting and corrective action system is in place 
on both VLUP and SUP. This is a standard process and will not be further disused 
here, apart from mentioning that it is essential for the information from 
FRACAS/DRACAS system to be reviewed against the records in the hazard log and 
the restriction log to confirm that the mitigation in place are working and are sufficient 
and that there are no missing causes in the hazard log.  
System Change Information: as the system is being changed it is necessary to keep 
the information about the change up to date and ensure that he system description is 
complete and correct. The process already earlier in this thesis, has been successfully 
implemented on both projects and is working.  
Incidents monitoring is implemented across the LU. All the incident reports are 
subjected to analysis by the engineering safety team. Any relevant information is 
assessed and if appropriate used to update the QRA and/or hazard log.  
Remits are used in support of management process to convey the detail of action that 
needs to be taken to the actionee including the timescales for delivery. As already 
explained, the status of remits is used as indication of progress of the safety case 
delivery.  An example of a remit is presented below in Table 7-23. 
Task Id. Context Task Description 
BTLUP1 There are numerous items 
in the BTLUP Hazard Log 
relevant to train signalling 
system, all of which are 
controlled or mitigated by 
the measures on which the 
safety arguments are based. 
Provide regular update on the status of the BTLUP Hazard 
log including: 
 clear and unambiguous statement of arguments in support 
of closure of hazards; 
 an assessment of residual risk (ALARP argument); 
 reference to relate the hazard log entry to the process model 
interface. 
SSC Section 
Collision and Derailment 
SSC reference 
Add New section on 
Project hazard logs  
Delivery  Milestone Owner Status Type of response agreed 
dd/mm/yy Delivery of the hazard 
log report for V2.1 
system configuration 
with all relevant 
hazards closed  
Name  Draft 
response 
received
LUP: Delivery of an update to the hazard log report with all 
hazards closed or conditionally closed.  LUP:  Confirmation 
that all hazards have been transferred from MR to BT.  The 
WRSL hazard log report will be available by the end of May.  
Table 7-23: An example of the remit 
7.11 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter the author outlined and analysed the results of a real life application of 
the proposed framework. As part of this work the author identified some minor gaps in 
the framework, developed missing processes and methodologies. These have been 
tested and analysed as well.  Detailed conclusions drawn from this are presented in the 
next chapter 
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CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
8.1  Conclusions and contribution 
This section summarises the findings of the research and identifies my contribution to 
the knowledge and practice of System Safety. The structure of this section is outlined 
by figure below.  
 
Figure 8-1: Structure of Chapter 8  
  8.1.1 Overall summary 
the author completed a thorough exploration of the existing methodologies for safety 
risk analysis and assessment and processes for management of engineering safety in 
railway industry. The author considered and commented on a substantial number of 
methodologies, tools and modelling techniques. The findings of this initial research 
are outlined in chapters two and three of the thesis. Following from there, the author 
used as vehicles a number of projects for further analyses and development of initial 
ideas as outlined in chapter 4.  
the author identified a number of gaps, in particular in relation to establishment of a 
systems based framework for analysis, assessment and management of engineering 
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safety. These are discussed in chapter 5. As part of this work the author identified and 
discussed further the requirements for a new system based framework. The 
requirements framework has been structured to correspond to the number of stages 
within the safety risk analysis and management process.  
The framework supports a system based approach to safety analysis and management 
and provides a complete step by step guidance for: 
1. Conceptualisation of system supporting safety analysis; 
2. Identification, analysis, assessment and management of safety risks; 
3. Construction and management of safety cases. 
the author successfully implemented and trialled this framework on two real life 
railway projects. Each of these stages is considered in turn and the findings presented 
here, with clear indication of fulfilment of the identified requirement and my 
contribution to wider knowledge and practice.  
Additionally, the author analysed and further developed the theoretical background in 
relation to the concepts of “Hazard” and the “Safety case”. 
  8.1.2 The concepts of “Hazard” and the “Safety case” 
the author analysed the hazard as a system concept and developed existing notions 
further, identified and defined the attributes, and their hierarchical structure, of a 
Hazard as a system.  
the author analysed the concept of the safety case as the inquiry model identifying a 
number of constraints and requirements that a safety case must satisfy.  Subsequent to 
analysis of these, the author proposed a general high level approach to structure of the 
safety case as a fact net, reasoning model.  
This knowledge and understanding informed the later development of the engineering 
safety analysis and management process and methodologies. 
CONTRIBUTION: knowledge and understanding of concepts such as “Hazard” and 
”Safety Case” have been improved as part of this work.  
  8.1.3 Holistic Change Safety Analysis, Risk Assessment and Management Process 
the author analysed the existing system safety and system engineering processes and 
guidance, and proposed a new framework. Firstly the author outlined the vision of the 
safety engineering as an integrated part of the system engineering process and the 
assurance of delivering the needed functioning of the four key emerging properties of 
any system: safety, RAM, Operability and Performance.   
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Following from that the author developed and outlined the integrated process for 
analysis and management of engineering safety. The process consist of 7 steps, most 
of which are not newly identified as needed but have not been formalised nor used 
together within an integrated framework.  
As part of this research the author identified requirements for the integrated process, 
analysed existing methods and processes, identified gaps and outlined the need for a 
framework in chapter 4 of this thesis.   
CONTRIBUTION: the new framework is now an integrated part of the Project 
Management Framework (PMF) for LU Upgrades Directorate and is known as 
Engineering Safety and Assurance Case (ESAC) and a process in supporting its 
delivery, Engineering Safety and Assurance Process (ESAP).  A description of this 
and other engineering safety related deliverables and templates has been produced as 
part of the PMF (Lucic, 2009a), (Lucic, 2009b), (Lucic, 2009c), (Lucic, 2009d), 
(Lucic, 2009e).  
As part of the initiative to implement the framework, training has been arranged 
(ESAC College) (Lucic, 2009f) and up to the date of issue of the thesis more than 150 
engineers and managers from LU and the supply chain have been trained.  
The author is the principle author of the course, with several other experts in the field 
contributing to the material through review and comments on an early version.  
Step 1: System Conceptualisation, Representation and Scoping (System 
Analysis) 
A number of methodologies for system conceptualisation have been analysed and 
some of these tested (chapters 2, 3 and 4). The author adopted the methodology 
initially developed by Short, “Process Models”, formalised it further and integrated it 
with the rest of the framework. 
CONTRIBUTION: the author formalised the process and methodology for system 
conceptualisation within the general system safety framework and wider within the 
system engineering framework.  the author developed further the existing concept of 
“process models” to enable development of the hierarchical conceptualisation models 
on real life projects as detailed in Chapters 6 and 7.   
Step 2: Information processing  
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As indicated earlier the information processing can be structured in a number of 
activities. Following is a summary of the research findings and a contribution 
statement against each one of these activities. 
Core hazard grouping, Hazard identification and Analysis of 
causalities and consequences 
A two stage process, Initial Change Safety analysis and Change Safety Analysis 
has been developed and implemented. As depicted in Chapters 6 and 7.   
CONTRIBUTION: the author performed a research and identified a set of the 
core hazards on real life projects. These have been distinctly defined and are 
being used at the core of the safety analysis and in support of structuring the 
safety cases across the project.  the author defined and successfully applied a 
new holistic framework for safety analysis mainly by means of enhancing and 
formalising already existing processes such as structured hazard identification 
using guide words, FMEA techniques, use of process models, and integrating 
them together into a comprehensive framework.  
the author made extensive use of the theoretical work the author completed in 
relation to the understanding of a concept of “Hazard” and its attributes from a 
system viewpoint. 
Risk assessment 
the author undertaken a review and analysis of existing risk assessment 
techniques. The author developed technique and methodology for integration of 
standalone QRA models into an integrated system risk model as well as the 
specification for software tool in support of the methodology. This work is 
outlined in Chapter 4, sections 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Project. Unfortunately, the results of 
this research (toolset) were not transferable across, onto the LU Upgrade 
projects for financial and IT service reasons.  
the author developed a process that brings together the qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessment methodologies into a framework supporting the 
production of the safety case and the ALARP argument. This has been applied 
on the real life project (LU Upgrades) as depicted in Chapter 7. The quantified 
approach is used to set the safety targets and monitor safety performance of the 
railway throughout the migration whilst in support of the ALARP argument a 
comparative, qualitative, method is used.  
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CONTRIBUTION: the author developed and successfully trialled on a real life 
project, a new quantified risk assessment methodology. This work is described 
in Chapter 4, sections 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Project. New blend of the quantified and 
qualitative approach was developed and successfully applied on a LU Project as 
described in Chapter 7.   
Estimation and apportionment of the safety risk to the source 
causes and failures of preventative measures and risk profiling 
As part of the project depicted in Chapter 4, section 1
st
 Project the author 
developed algorithms for calculation of the contribution of equipment and 
procedural failures and human errors to the total safety risk. This methodology 
was successfully applied on the project and used to establish the safety targets at 
the subsystem level for the new train control system. The same methodology 
was used to develop multidimensional risk profile. 
As part of the LU Upgrade projects, the existing LU models have been utilised 
to define the system level hazard rates and calculate the contribution of the 
signalling system and rolling stock related failures to the overall risk.   
CONTRIBUTION: the author developed new algorithms for apportionment 
and importance calculations within the cause-consequence QRA modelling 
environment. This has been successfully applied on a project.   
A team of safety professionals under my guidance and following my instructions 
have implemented the framework the author developed for the QRA related 
work on the LU Upgrades. This work is depicted in Chapter 7.  
Identification of different solutions and mitigation measures 
(options and impact analysis) and optimisation of the system and 
selection of most gainful options and mitigations 
The outline of the need to undertake options and impact analysis is defined by 
industry standards and the legal framework in the UK. The author developed this 
framework further, combing the use of quantitative and qualitative analysis and 
assessment.  
The numerical safety targets are set using quantified risk modelling. The impact 
of the achieved performance of the subsystems on the overall system safety 
performance is tested using the QRA.  
The system level ALARP argument is supported by the ALARP review process 
developed by me using the existing comparative assessment criteria. As part of 
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this assessment, if there is a need for any further reduction of risk, different 
options are assessed and evaluated, taking in consideration all relevant 
parameters as defined with the framework.   
CONTRIBUTION: the author improved some aspects of existing 
methodologies and developed a process for options analysis integral to the 
overall system safety management framework, implemented within the LU 
Upgrades.  
Assertion of Completeness of System Analysis and Assessment of 
Uncertainties 
the author analysed the problem of the completeness of the system analysis and 
uncertainty of information and data. The author identified four distinct areas 
where assurance for completeness and analysis of uncertainty is required. 
CONTRIBUTION: For each one of these the author proposed and successfully 
implemented a framework in support of the assurance process and delivery of 
the related arguments and justification. 
Step 3: Derivation and management of requirements 
Existing well defined process for derivation of safety requirements have been followed 
and applied within the new framework. The author analysed the concept of the safety 
requirement from the system point of view and proposed a minor clarification of the 
definition and the topology of safety requirement as a system safety “object” in 
relation to defence/protection measures.  
CONTRIBUTION: the author defined the attributes for safety requirements and 
integrated and applied existing processes into a new framework. 
Step 4: Presentation of results and construction of safety knowledge net 
the author briefly analysed the reporting requirements on in support of the safety 
related activities and have identified 5 different types of reports.  
Of particular importance is the Safety Case. Complexity of modern systems inevitably 
brings about the intricacy of the safety case arguments or facts nets. Thus, it is 
necessary to endeavour to simplify the logic of the safety case fact net for a number of 
reasons: 
1. To provide the focus assisting the experts involved in production of the safety 
case; 
2. To assist the understanding aiding the reviewers; 
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3. To ease the management of updates and configuration control of the data and 
subsequently changes to the safety case. 
A method of achieving these requirements, discussed earlier, has been implemented on 
both VLUP and SSL.  
CONTRIBUTION: the author analysed the problem of complexity of constructing 
the fact net or a reasoning model in support of the safety argument and subsequent 
reporting, identified requirements for successful completion of it and proposed and 
implemented a structured approach to development of the safety case. This approach 
has been turned into a template and is now an integral part of the LU Upgrades 
processes and the Project Management Framework (Lucic, 2009a), (Lucic, 2009b), 
(Lucic, 2009c), (Lucic, 2009d), (Lucic, 2009e).  
Step 5: Management support 
In addition to usual project management related activities, management of the hazard 
logs, operational restrictions and the safety case delivery is necessitated as part of the 
engineering safety management activity.  
Regarding a hazard log as a tool for Change Safety Management, Configuration 
Control and Reporting, the author analysed the problem domain from the system 
analysis perspective, identified requirements and defined the data model (hierarchy 
and topology) for the hazard log.  
With regards to management of operational restrictions, the author analysed the 
problem domain, identified the process requirements and defined the template for the 
restrictions register. 
Finally, with regards to the management of the safety case delivery, as part of the 
overall framework the author identified the requirements and defied the processes 
supporting this activity including an outline template of a remit document. 
For all reports associated with the above activities the author identified requirements 
and defined the template and context including means of measuring progress.  
CONTRIBUTION: the author implemented all of the above processes and methods 
on real life projects and integrated these into an overall system safety management 
process.  
Step 6: Configuration control 
As integral part of the research the author identified the configurable data items, 
defined the hierarchy and topology of these and defined the requirements for 
configuration management of these data. In completing this work the author used 
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guidance from the industry standards, which provide a high level outline of basic 
needs for configuration management but do not provide the detail.  
CONTRIBUTION: the author implemented the configuration regime described as 
part of the overall system safety management process on the LU Upgrades. 
Step 7: Continual appraisal and knowledge update 
Apart from implementing existing guidance as part of the system safety management 
process framework the author did no further work in this area.  
  8.1.4 Overall contribution 
The author defined and successfully implemented a novel framework for system safety 
management on large projects. The framework has been accepted by LU Upgrades and 
is formalised through a number of procedures and the Project Management 
Framework (Lucic, 2009a), (Lucic, 2009b) ¸ (Lucic, 2009c), (Lucic, 2009d) ¸ (Lucic, 
2009e) ¸.   
As part of the initiative to implement the new Engineering Safety and Assurance Case 
framework across the LU Upgrades, the author developed and delivered training 
course (ESAC College) (Lucic, 2009f) to close to 120 professionals.  
The author published a number of papers and delivered several lectures on this subject 
((Lucic and Short, 2007), (Regan and Lucic, 2008), (Lucic, 2008), (Lucic, 2005a), 
(Lucic, 2005b)) at IEEE, IET, INCOSE seminars and as part of the Risk Management 
module of the MSc in Energy and Environmental Technology & Economics Module at 
City University.  
8.2 Future Work 
The system safety analysis and management framework that the author developed has 
been implemented and is proved in anger.  
Dissemination of the good practice within LU continues with “ESAC College” being 
used as a vehicle and attendance to it being mandatory to project engineers and 
managers. 
As part of continuous development and improvement policy the author embedded 
within the team we are challenging the framework process and the methodologies as 
well as deliverables. The change control process is established and in case that a 
weakness in the process or omission within any of the deliverables is identified an 
immediate action is taken to identify and implement correction  
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Most of the methodologies used within the framework are supported by tools; however 
a tool that could support and automate the integration of the methodologies would be 
extremely beneficial. At the moment this facility is embedded within the hazard log 
database but the process of cross-referencing the hazard constituents to originating  
process models interfaces, QRA elements, safety requirements repository, GSN 
elements, related documents, etc is manual, time consuming and prone to human error.  
Some of these facilities are provided in the Integrated Safety Assurance Network (link 
between the QRA and Hazard log and documents register) so the logical step forward 
would be to utilise and extend capabilities of the ISAE tool.  
The author is working on development of a specification and subsequently a business 
case for development of a tool (or a toolset) that would provide the following 
capabilities within the same environment: 
1. Process modelling tool: 
a. GUI with symbols tool set; 
b. Object and interfaces database (object and interfaces created and 
information populated via GUI); 
c. Facility to call up hazard log user interface from an object or interface 
symbol , automatically passing cross referencing information to newly 
created hazard log record and establishing a link between the two data 
sets; 
d. Reporting; 
2. Hazard log with functionalities described earlier has already been developed. 
However following functionalities should be added: 
a. Real time aligning and parallel working with the Process Modelling 
environment; 
b. Automatic generation of the “hazard universe” graphical metta model 
as support to analysis of its structure, constituents and topology;  
c. Automated linkage to requirements management tools (DOORS for 
example) enabling automatic cross referencing and tracking of 
progress;  
3. Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Assessment. A tool that provides most of the 
functionalities for qualitative and quantitative risk assessment with some 
  
Page 269 
 
linkage to the hazard log already exist, ISAE tool delivers some of the 
functionality required to support the framework. Further enhancements are 
necessary as follows: 
a. Automatic linkage between the “hazard universe” constituents and 
Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Assessment data constituents; 
4. GSN generation tool. The author believes that it is possible to automate 
generation of a draft GSN using the structured information in the hazard log. 
This GSN could only ever be used as a draft for detailed review, but creation of 
a real-time link between the “hazard universe” constituents and the safety case 
arguments-evidence net would be extremely valuable supporting reviews and 
sense check as well as enabling automatic synchronisation between the hazard 
log (and through hazard log the process models, QRA, Requirements, 
Restrictions, actions management and the safety case.  
A railway system is a “System of Systems” (SoS) (Karcanias and Hessami, 2008) and 
(Karcanias and Hessami, 2008). As the theory of SoS advances, the process outlines in 
this thesis needs to be kept aligned with the latest developments.  
A particular limitation of the process is related to lack of temporal properties of 
process models. Further development of process models methodology to cater better 
for temporal properties of the system, improving the identification and analysis of 
emerging properties of complex systems, is a challenge that would be worth taking on.  
Initial results from a number of case studies in different industries indicate that further 
research and refinement into the area of justifiable spend, and extension of the 
research into J-value, carried out by Thomas and Stupples (Thomas and Stupples, 
2006), to incorporate societal perception of risk acceptance will be beneficial.   
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APPENDIX A:  ALGORITHMS FOR APPORTIONMENT AND 
IMPORTANCE IN CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE MODELS  
Apportionment of a virtual consequence to lower level virtual consequences 
Apportionment of virtual consequence to the lower level virtual consequence is 
calculated as a proportion of the Risk contributed to the virtual consequence by the 
lower layer virtual consequence.  Therefore, if   l
vjR   is a risk of the virtual 
consequence ‘j’ (1 ≤ j ≤ n) at level ‘l’   (1 ≤ l ≤ n), then, ∑== −= nii lvilvj RR 1 1          Equation 5 
Hence, the fractional contribution of the virtual consequence ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n) at lower 
level ‘l-a’     (1 ≤ l ≤ n; 1 ≤ a ≤ n;  l > a) to the virtual consequence ‘j’ (1 ≤ j ≤ n), at 
level ‘l’ equals to: 
∑== −
−−− ==
ni
i
al
vi
al
vx
l
vj
al
vxal
vx
vj
R
R
R
R
A
1
                     Equation 6 
Where:  
al
vxR
−
 Is a risk of the lower level virtual consequence ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n), at level 
‘l-a’ whose contribution is calculated. 
l
vjR  
Is a risk of the virtual consequence ‘j’ at level ‘l’ analysed. 
Apportionment of a virtual consequence to “source” consequences 
“Source” consequences are consequences arising directly from the model before any 
grouping has taken a place. 
If  l
vjR  is a risk of the virtual consequence ‘j’ at any level ‘l’ and  ceksivjR  is a risk of any  
“source” consequence ‘i’ (1 ≤ i ≤ n), arising from any Critical Event ‘k’ (1 ≤ k ≤ n) and  
feeding the virtual consequence ‘j’, then, ∑∑== === nkk nii ceksivjlvj RR 1 1          Equation 7 
Where: ∑∑== ==nkk nii ceksivj R1 1 Is a total of risk of all source consequences ‘i’ arising from different Critical Events ‘k’ 
Hence, the fractional contribution of the “source” consequence ‘y’, arising from the 
Critical Event ‘h’ and feeding the virtual consequence ‘j’, to the virtual consequence 
‘j’ at any level ‘l’ equals to: 
                         Equation 8 
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Where:  
ceh
sy
vj R
 
Is the risk of a “source” consequence ‘y’ whose contribution is 
calculated. 
 
l
vjR  
Is a risk of the virtual consequence ‘j’ at any level ‘l’ analysed. 
Apportionment of a virtual consequence to Core Hazards (Critical Events) 
Risk arising from the Core Hazard (Critical Event) is equal to a total of risks embodied 
within all the “source” consequences arising from the Core Hazard. However, 
contribution of a Core Hazard to a Virtual Consequence equals to a sum of risks 
embodied within only those “source” consequences originating from the Core Hazard 
which are grouped into the Virtual Consequence analysed. Therefore 
vj
Aceh, fractional 
contribution of the Critical Event ‘h’ (1 ≤ h ≤ n) to the  virtual consequence ‘j’ at level 
‘l’ equals to: 
 ∑∑∑== ==
=
==
nk
k
ni
i
cek
si
vj
ni
i
ceh
si
vj
ceh
vj
R
R
A
1 1
1          Equation 9 
Where:  ∑==nii cehsivj R1  Is the sum of risks of all the “source” consequences ‘i’ arising from the critical event ‘h’ feeding into a virtual consequence ‘j’. ∑∑== ==nkk nii ceksivj R1 1  Is the sum of risks of all the “source” consequences ‘i’ arising from all critical events ‘k’ (1 ≤ k ≤ n) feeding into a virtual consequence 
‘j’. 
Importance of Base Events relative to a “source” consequence or a virtual 
consequence  
In order to define the contributions from base events to the consequences, decision 
was made to use the Fussel-Vesely (FV) importance value.  Fussel-Vesely importance 
is a measure of the contribution a constituent of the fault tree makes to the top event 
probability or frequency.  It is defined as the sum of the probabilities or frequencies of 
all cutsets in which the constituent appears, divided by the top event probability or 
frequency.  This value is sometimes referred to as Fractional Importance. In effect the 
Fussel-Vesely importance is a measure of the sensitivity of the top event to changes in 
the base event. Fractional importance of the Base Event ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n) to the Critical 
Event (Hazard) ‘k’ regarding Fussel-Vesely value is then given by: 
∑=== nii beibexbexcek FVFVI 1          Equation 10 
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Where: 
    Is the Fussel-Vesely importance value for the Base Event ‘x’.  ∑==nii beiFV1    Is the total Fussel Vesely importance value of the model (sum of FV values of all Base Events ‘i’ within the model). 
Fractional importance of the Base Event ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n) to the “source” consequence 
‘y’, originating from Critical Event ‘h’,  regarding  Fussel-Vesely value is same as  the 
Fractional importance of the Base Event ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n) to the Critical Event (Hazard) 
‘h’ giving a rise to the “source” consequence ‘y’ and is given by: 
∑==== nii beibexbexcehcehbexsy FVFVII 1         Equation 11 
Where: 
 bexFV  
  
Is the Fussel Vesely importance value for the Base Event ‘x’.  
∑==nii beiFV1    Is the total Fussel Vesely importance value of the model (sum of FV values of all Base Events ‘i’ within the model). 
 
Fractional importance of the Base Event ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n) to the virtual  consequence ‘j’ 
at any level ‘l’, regarding  Fussel-Vesely value, is relative to the fractional 
contribution of the “source” consequence ‘y’ (1 ≤ y ≤ n), originating from Critical 
Event ‘h’, the base event ’x’ is causing, to the  virtual consequence ‘j’ at any level ‘l’. 
Therefore: 
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  Equation 12 
Where: 
bex
vj I  Is the Fractional importance of the Base Event ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n) to the 
virtual consequence ‘j’. 
ceh
bex
syI  Is the Fractional importance of the Base Event ‘x’ (1 ≤ x ≤ n), causing 
a Critical Event ‘h’ to the “source” consequence ‘y’. 
ceh
sy
vj A  Is the fractional contribution of the “source” consequence ‘y’ (1 ≤ y ≤ 
n), arising from the Critical Event ‘h’, to the  virtual consequence ‘j’ at 
any level ‘l’. 
bexFV  Is the Fussel-Vesely importance value for the Base Event ‘x’. ∑==nii beiFV1  Is the total Fussel-Vesely importance value of the model (sum of FV values of all Base Events ‘i’ within the model). 
ceh
sy
vj R  Is risk of the “source” consequence ‘y’, arising from the Critical Event 
‘h’  
l
vjR   Is a risk of the virtual consequence ‘j’ at any level ‘l’ analysed. 
bexFV
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∑∑== ==nkk nii ceksivj R1 1 Is the sum of risks of all the “source” consequences ‘i’ arising from all critical events ‘k’ (1 ≤ k ≤ n) feeding into a virtual consequence ‘j’. 
Importance of Barriers and Splitters relative to a “source” consequence or a virtual 
consequence  
Measure of apportionment (importance) of the Barrier or Splitter is a measure of its 
“capability” to convey the frequency or probability of consequence occurrence 
towards the lower loss consequence.     
For any consequence model element ‘j ’ (α ≤ j ≤ ζ ), frequency at the consequence 
model element, fj, equals to a sum of all the frequencies feeding into the consequence 
model element ‘j’. Frequency coming out of the consequence model element is 
defined as a product of frequency at the consequence model element and probability of 
the consequence model element output.  
Note: Consequence model element can be a barrier, a splitter or a critical event. 
Therefore frequency at the consequence 
model element ‘ γ ’ is: 
 ∑∑== == ⋅= ζα γγ jj ii jji fpf 21   Equation 13 
Where: 
 
γf  Is the frequency at the consequence model 
element ‘ γ ’. 
j
ip
γ
 Is the probability of any output ‘i’ of any 
consequence model element ‘j’ feeding into 
the consequence model element ‘γ’.  
jf  Is the frequency at any consequence model 
element ‘j ’, whose output ‘i’ is feeding into 
the consequence model element ‘γ’.  
 
Figure B-1: Consequence model notation 
 
It follows that Risk of a “source” Consequence  ‘x ’ is a product of the Loss of the 
consequence and the sum of all the frequencies feeding into the consequence. 
Therefore: 
       ∑∑== == ⋅= ζα γjj ii jjixx fpLR 21                   Equation 14 
Where: 
Barrier ‘γ’ ∑∑== == ⋅= ζα γγ jj ii jji fpf 21  
Source Consequence  
(SCx) ∑∑== == ⋅= ζαjj ii jjixxx fpLR 21  
δf  jf
jf
γ
1p
x j
i
x pγ
2p
y
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xR  Is a risk of the “source” consequence ‘x ’. 
xL  Is a loss of the “source” consequence ‘x ’. 
j
i
x p  Is probability of any output ‘i’ of any consequence model element ‘j ’ 
feeding into the “source” consequence ‘x ’. 
jf  Is the frequency at any consequence model element ‘j ’, whose output ‘i’ is 
feeding into “source” consequence ‘x ’ analysed.  
‘Weight’ of a consequence model element’s output or risk conveyed through an output 
‘i’ of a model element ‘j ’ to a “source” consequence ‘x ’ or the next consequence 
model element ‘x ’ is equal to: 
j
j
ix
j
i fpLWr ⋅⋅= γ                           Equation 15 
Where: 
xL  Is a loss of the “source” consequence ‘x ’ or the next consequence model 
element ‘x’. 
j
i
x p  Is probability of any output ‘i’ of any consequence model element ‘j ’ 
feeding into the “source” consequence ‘x’ or the next consequence model 
element ‘x ’. 
jf  Is the frequency at any consequence model element ‘j ’, whose output ‘i’ is 
feeding into “source” consequence ‘x ’ or the next consequence model 
element ‘x’.  
 
It follows that the risk at the consequence  model element equals to a sum of risks 
conveyed out through a consequence model element outputs and is equal to: ∑=== 51ii jiMEj WrR                   Equation 16 
Hence, loss at the model element ‘j ’ equals to the risk at the consequence  model 
element divided by frequency at the consequence  model element: 
j
MEj
MEj f
R
L =                    Equation 17 
Absolute importance of the consequence model element ‘j ’, originating from Critical 
Event ‘h’ is equal to the maximum difference between outputs’ weights (risk conveyed 
through all outputs ‘i’ of a consequence model element ‘j ’) to a “source” consequence 
‘x ’ or the next consequence  model element ‘x ’ and  is expressed as: 
5
2
1max
=
=−−= iijijicehMEjabsolute WrWrI                              Equation 18 
Where: 
ceh
MEjabsolute I  
Is an absolute importance of the consequence model element ‘j ’. 
j
iWr  Is weight of the output ‘i’ of a consequence model element ‘j ’. 
j
iWr 1−   Is weight of the output ‘i-1’ of a consequence model element ‘j ’. 
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5
2
1max
=
=−− iijiji WrWr  Is maximum value of the difference in weight between all outputs ‘i’ of a consequence model element ‘j ’. 
Fractional importance of the consequence model element ‘ω ’ (1 ≤ ω ≤ n), originating 
from Critical Event ‘h’, relative to the whole consequence model structure is given by: 
  ∑=== njj cehMEjabsolute
ceh
MEabsoluteceh
MEj
I
II
1
ω                                   Equation 19 
Where: 
ceh
MEabsoluteI ω  Is an absolute importance of the consequence model element ‘ω’, 
originating from Critical Event ‘h’. ∑==njj cehMEjabsolute I1  Is the sum of all absolute importance values of all the consequence model elements ‘j’, originating from Critical Event ‘h’. 
Fractional importance of the consequence model element ‘ω ’ (1 ≤ ω ≤ n), to the 
“source” consequence ‘y’, originating from Critical Event ‘h’ is given by: 
  ∑=== njj cehMEjscyabsolute
ceh
ME
scy
absoluteceh
ME
scy
I
II
1
ωω                             Equation 20 
Where: 
ceh
ME
scy
absoluteI ω  Is an absolute importance of the consequence model element ‘ω’, 
originating from Critical Event ‘h’ and on the path to the “source” 
consequence ‘y’. ∑==njj cehMEjscyabsolute I1  Is the sum of all absolute importance values of all the consequence model elements ‘j’, originating from Critical Event ‘h’ and on the 
path to the “source” consequence ‘y’. 
Fractional importance of the consequence model element ‘ω ’ (1 ≤ ω ≤ n), on the path 
to the “source” consequence ‘y’, to the virtual consequence ‘j’, at any level ‘l’, is 
relative to the fractional contribution of the “source” consequence ‘y’ (1 ≤ y ≤ n), 
originating from Critical Event ‘h’ to the virtual consequence ‘j’, and is given by: 
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ωωω              Equation 21 
Where: 
ceh
ME
scy
absoluteI ω  Is an absolute importance of the consequence model element ‘ω’, 
originating from Critical Event ‘h’ and on the path to the “source” 
consequence ‘y’. ∑==njj cehMEjscyabsolute I1  Is the sum of all absolute importance values of all the consequence model elements ‘j’, originating from Critical Event ‘h’ and on the 
path to the “source” consequence ‘y’. 
ceh
sy
vj R
 
Is the risk of the “source” consequence ‘y’ on whose path the 
consequence model element ‘ω’ is. 
l
vjR  
Is the risk of the virtual consequence ‘j’ at any Layer ‘l’ analysed. 
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APPENDIX B: SPECIFICATION FOR CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE 
MODELS INTEGRATION ENVIRONMENT  
Object Type/Class 
Critical Event Model super object (real consequences and base events of the model) 
Object 
Attributes 
Each of the Cause-Consequence models within ISAE is presented through two 
distinguished sets of records:  
1. A record set providing basic information about all the consequences arising from the 
model (consequence name and reference number) and, 
2. Basic information about all the base events c from the model (consequence name and 
reference number).  
Visual appearance is provided below. Real Consequences cannot receive any frequencies 
from outside models. Real Consequences can only fed into base events of other models, 
intermittent operators or into high level/virtual consequences. Multi coloured circles 
present linking points: 
1. Real consequences linked to virtual consequences have red circles associated with 
them; 
2. Real consequences linked to intermittent operator have green circles associated with 
them; 
3. Real consequences linked to base events of other models have blue circles associated 
with them, and  
4. Critical events linked to base events of other models have orange circles associated 
with them 
5. Real consequences that are disabled (not to be taken into account for calculations of 
total risk, but still calculated for individual models risk) are to be notified by grey 
circles. Real consequences can be disabled manually, through a control switch or if the 
critical event has been linked as the feeder to the base event of some other model.  
Base events can be linked to other models only as recipients of frequencies coming out of 
consequences or critical events calculated within external models or intermittent operator 
linked to consequences.  
Base events can be fed by real consequences or critical events of other models. Base 
events related linking points are presented by collared circles as follows: 
1. Base events fed by real consequences/critical events of other models are presented by 
blue circles; 
2. Base events that are independent from other models are presented by grey circles; 
3. In case of common base events (same base events recurring throughout several 
different models, but not necessarily with the same frequency) these are notified by 
green circles; 
4. Base events determining the probability of the barrier failure are notified by black 
circles. Values for these base events are expressed as probabilities only.  
Object 
Referencing 
References of Cause-Consequence models are same as references of the Critical Events the 
models are built around. References of real consequences, critical events and base events 
are the same as the references within the model. 
Object 
Representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data 
referencing 
1. Data transferred from a real consequence to the base event is referenced as follows: 
FROM “consequence reference” TO “base event reference”.  
HP N0
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
BEIN----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COS----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COC----NAME 
COC----NAME 
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Object Type/Class 
Critical Event Model super object (real consequences and base events of the model) 
2. Data transferred from a critical event to the base event is referenced as follows: FROM 
“critical event reference” TO “base event reference”. 
3. Data transferred from the real consequence to the virtual consequence is referenced as 
follows: FROM “consequence reference” TO “virtual consequence reference” 
4. Data transferred from the real consequence to the intermittent operator is referenced as 
follows: FROM “consequence reference” TO “intermittent operator reference” 
5. Data transferred from a critical event to the base event is referenced as follows: FROM 
“critical event reference” TO “base event reference”. 
6. Data transferred from the critical event to the intermittent operator is referenced as 
follows: FROM “critical event reference” TO “intermittent operator reference” 
Object values 
and default 
conditions/data 
Default values for base events are values provided originally within the model.  
If the base event is linked with other model’s consequence or critical event then the value 
of the base event is the frequency of the consequence/critical event calculated by the other 
model.  
A default value of virtual consequences is null for all the loss categories risks of the 
consequence. Real consequences feeding the virtual consequence are passing risks 
calculated by individual models for all the loss categories to the virtual consequence. 
Value of risk for each loss category within the virtual consequence is calculated as a sum 
of all the risks passed to the virtual consequence from all the real consequences feeding the 
virtual consequence. 
Combinational 
Rules 
1. Only frequencies are passed from real consequences to base events; 
2. Linked base events can not be in AND relationship with other base events with 
frequencies used as units within the model structure. If this is the case then a warning 
message must be displayed. It is possible that frequency feeding the base event can be 
translated into probability using the TRANSFER FUNCTION object; 
3. Risk calculated for each loss category are passed from real consequences to virtual 
consequences; 
4. Aggregated risks are passed from a virtual consequence to virtual consequence; 
5. It is ensured that no closed loops are formed within the integrated model;  
6. Frequencies are passed from critical events to base events if the base event is 
determining the frequency of the critical event; 
7. If the base events defined by the other model are within the fault trees that determine 
the probability of the barrier failure, it must be ensured that the total outcome of such a 
fault tree is expressed as a probability  
8. All the rules applicable within the existing ISAE should still apply. 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
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Object Type/Class 
Inter-model IN and OUT linking objects/symbols 
Object 
Attributes 
These two objects are used for linking between two models during the modelling, from 
within one work sheet to another.  
“In From: - - - “ object feeds into the selected base event. “Output to: - - - “ object feeds 
into selected base event of another model, selected virtual consequence or intermittent 
operator.  These two objects are in correspondence with links established through Critical 
Event Model super object, i.e. all the links between models created within the Model 
Integration Environment are automatically mimicked by IN and OUT symbols, 
automatically created within the corresponding models worksheets.  Inverse applies as 
well, i.e. links defined through the models worksheets, using IN and OUT symbols are 
mimicked by the Model Integration Environment. Visual appearance is provided below.   
Object 
Referencing 
Objects are referenced as follows: 
1. Out to virtual consequence symbol: “Out to: virtual consequence reference”; 
2. Out to base event symbol: “Out to: base event/critical event (other model) reference”; 
3. In from symbol: “In from: consequence/critical event (other model) reference” or  “In 
from: intermittent operator reference”. 
Object 
Representation 
OUT symbols: Real consequences linked to virtual consequences have red arrow 
associated with them and real consequences or critical events linked to base events of 
other models have blue arrow associated with them. Real consequences are linked to OUT 
symbol by blue or red line. 
IN symbols: IN symbol have grey arrow associated with them. In Symbol is linked to base 
event by grey line.   
 
 
 
 
Data 
referencing 
Data transferred from a real consequence to the base event is referenced in the following 
way: FROM “consequence reference/critical event” TO “base event reference”.  
Data transferred from the real consequence to the virtual consequence is referenced as: 
FROM “consequence reference” to “virtual consequence reference” 
Object values Objects take values as follows: 
1. Out to virtual consequence symbol: risks calculated by individual models for all the 
loss categories; 
2. Out to base event symbol: the frequency of the consequence calculated by the model; 
3. In from symbol: risks calculated by individual models for all the loss categories or the 
frequency of the consequence (link from) calculated by the other model; 
4. Default values for base events are values provided originally within the model. If the 
base event is linked with other model’s consequence than the value of the base event; 
5. Default value of virtual consequences is null for all the loss categories risks of the 
consequence. Value of risk for each loss category within the virtual consequence is 
calculated as a sum of all the risks passed to the virtual consequence from all the real 
consequences feeding the virtual consequence. 
Combinational 
Rules 
1. IN symbol can fed in Base Event only; 
2. Base events can be linked to other models only as recipients of frequencies coming out 
of consequences/critical events calculated within external models; 
3. Real consequences/critical events cannot receive any direct input from outside models. 
Real consequences can only fed into base events of other models or into high 
level/virtual consequences; 
4. Critical event can only fed into base events of other models.  
5. If the base events defined by the other model are within the fault trees that determine 
the probability of the barrier, it must be ensured that the total outcome of such a fault 
tree is expressed as a probability (self check must operate on the structure 
instantaneously).  
Object 
controls/data 
fields 
Fields providing the information about the values passed through the link. In case of an IN 
symbol, i.e. link from a real consequence to the base event, frequency passed is displayed 
within the symbol’s dialog box. In case of an OUT symbol two possibilities exist: 
1. If the link is between the real consequence/critical event and the base event 
information displayed within the symbol’s dialog box should be the frequency passed 
through the link; 
2. If the link is between the two consequences (any consequences) the information passed 
HP700 
Out to: 
HP700 
In from:
C ------ 
Out to:
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through the link shall be risk calculated for all the existing risk categories.  
Working Environment of the object  Individual models worksheets  
Object Type/Class 
Transfer function  intermittent operator 
Object 
Attributes 
This object can have multiple inputs and outputs. Inputs are processed according to the 
“transfer function” defined within the object to yield outputs. For the transfer function it is 
possible to define inputs and outputs as the parameters of the “transfer function”.  Inputs 
may come from real consequences or high level/virtual consequences only or critical 
events. Two types of inputs may exist: 
1. If inputs are risks passed through, from consequences, the object must support 
distinction between different categories of risks. Therefore it is possible to define each 
of the risk categories as a separate parameter as well as to lump them all together if 
needed. In this case outputs must be risks as well; 
2. If inputs are frequencies/probabilities passed form the consequences/critical events to 
the object the object shall support a simple allocation of the input to the parameter. In 
this case outputs may be either frequencies or risks depending on the nature of the 
transfer function. 
Four types of parameters may be used: 
1. Parameters used/defined to identify inputs;  
2. Parameters used/defined to identify outputs; 
3. Parameters defined to establish/build the transform function; 
4. Parameters already existing within the database and used to establish/build the 
transform function. 
Immediate calculation of the “transform function” shall be available allowing for the 
modeller to check the function and results instantly.  
Object 
Referencing 
Object is referenced as TRFnnn, where TRF is a prefix and nnn is three digit 
identification. 
Object 
Representation 
 
 
 
Data 
referencing 
1. Each of the inputs is referenced separately as an input to the object. 
2. Each of the outputs is referenced separately as an output of the object. 
3. The transfer function is referenced to the object. 
4. All the additional information such as “rationale, justification, etc. are referenced to 
the object. 
5. All the parameters defined are referenced individually, or if parameters already 
defined elsewhere are to be used then reference to these parameters relative to the 
object must be established.  
Object values Calculated or defaulted values. 
Default 
conditions/data 
Transfer function is “null”, i.e. inputs to the object are not linked to the outputs of the 
object (outputs of the object are set to zero). 
Combinational 
Rules 
1. All the inputs into the object must be of the same units, either frequencies or risks;  
2. Combination of inputs defined by the transfer function yields outputs defined by the 
transfer function; 
3. If the output is to be linked to the base event then the unit of the output can be 
frequency or probability depending on the causal model structure the base event is 
positioned within;  
4. If the output is to be linked to the consequence then the unit of the output must be the 
risk calculated for all the risk categories. 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TRFnnn
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Object Type/Class 
Splitter  intermittent operator 
Object 
Attributes 
Two types of inputs may exist: 
1. If inputs are risks passed through, from consequences, the object supports distinction 
between different categories of risks. Therefore it is possible to define each of the risk 
categories as a separate input as well as to lump them all together if needed. Split is 
either per individual risk category or for the total/lumped value. Outputs must be risks 
as well. 
2. If inputs are frequencies/probabilities passed form the consequences to the object, the 
object supports a simple allocation of the input to the parameter. Outputs must be 
frequencies.  
Other attributes are same as for the splitter already existing within the worksheet 
environment. 
Object 
Representation 
 
 
 
 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
 
Object Type/Class 
Logical Gates (AND, OR)  intermittent operators 
Object 
Attributes 
The algorithm for calculations of gates is provided within the causal domain specification. 
Only links from real consequence or critical event to the base event can be linked to the 
gate.  
In case of an AND gate all the frequencies feeding the gate except for one, must be 
transferred into probabilities within the Transfer function object. Links from real 
consequence/virtual consequence to virtual consequence cannot be linked into gates. 
Object 
Representation 
 
 
 
Combinational 
Rules 
Only Links from real consequence/critical event to base events can be linked to the gate.  
No more than one frequency can fed the AND gate.  
Object 
controls/linking 
and processing 
Linking of inputs into the gate 
Linking of output from the gate 
Processing (same as described within the causal analysis tool specification)  
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
 
Object Type/Class 
Supper Connectors  intermittent operators 
Object 
Attributes 
Unlimited number of inputs into this object and only one output. The output of this object 
is the sum of all the inputs.  
Object 
Referencing 
Same/similar as the super-connector within the existing individual models worksheets 
environment. 
Object 
Representation 
 
Object values The output of the object is the sum of all the inputs. All the inputs must be of the same 
type i.e. either frequencies, probabilities or risks.  If inputs are frequencies/ probabilities 
the output is the sum of all the frequencies/ probabilities. If inputs are risks the output is 
the sum of all the inputs but aggregation must be done individually for each risk category. 
Consequently the output in this case will be in form of 13 values, one for each risk 
category.   
Combinational 
Rules 
All the inputs must be of the same type i.e. either frequencies or risks. 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
Splitter 
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Object Type/Class 
Virtual Consequences 
Object 
Attributes 
The value of these objects is calculated as the sum of risks for each risk category for all the 
feeders into the virtual consequence.  
Object 
Representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Default 
conditions/data 
Default value is null. 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
Object Type/Class 
Links from real/ virtual consequence to virtual consequence 
Object 
Attributes 
Only risks calculated for each risk category shall be passed by the link. 
Object 
Representation 
 
 
 
 
Combinational 
Rules 
Link from the real/ virtual consequence to the virtual consequence or any of the 
intermittent operators 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
Object Type/Class 
Links from real consequence to base event 
Object 
Attributes 
Only frequency calculated for the consequence shall be passed through the link.  
Object 
Referencing 
To be defined 
Object 
Representation 
 
 
Data 
referencing 
To be defined 
Object values Frequency calculated for the consequence 
Combinational 
Rules 
Links from the real consequence to the base event or any of the intermittent operators. 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
Object Type/Class 
Links from the critical event to the base event 
Object 
Attributes 
Only frequency calculated for the critical event shall be passed through the link.  
Object 
Representation 
 
 
Object values Frequency calculated for the critical event 
Combinational 
Rules 
Links from the critical event to the base event or any of the intermittent operators. 
Working Environment of the object  Model Integration Environment 
 
VRBC---- 
VREC---- 
VRSC---- 
VRCC---- 
